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Declining donor funding for HIV/AIDS has increased interest in transitioning donor 
programs to national control. However, evidence on the impact of transitioning health facilities 
is limited. The PEPFAR Geographic Prioritization in Uganda targeted 734 facilities for transition 
from PEPFAR site-level support during 2015–2016. 
This study uses a survey conducted in mid-2017 in 226 health facilities with past or 
present PEPFAR support. I examined the effects of transition at the facility level by comparing 
facilities transitioned to those maintained on PEPFAR. The survey gathered information on 
service delivery and human resources pre- and post-transition. An individual module collected 
information on time-allocation, motivation, and incentives from 479 health workers. I also 
obtained counts of HIV and non-HIV services provided by facilities during the period October 
2013–December 2017 from DHIS2 and counts of health workers employed at facilities for 
December 2015–December 2017 from HRHIS. I analyzed trends for these outcomes using 
interrupted time series analysis. 
Transition was associated with reduced supervision, incentives, and training as well as 
the termination of 9.5% of HIV workers — mostly lay health workers. There were no significant 
changes in staffing ratios for formal health workers. Relative to maintenance, transition facility 
in-charges were more likely to report discontinuation of HIV outreach and worsening access to 
and quality of HIV care. Yet, trends in service utilization indicators did not differ between 
transition and maintenance. Private not for-profit facilities were more likely than public 
iii 
 
facilities to report declining frequency of supervision and loss of staff. Private for-profit facilities 
have had declining HIV testing & counseling relative to public facilities and are more likely to 
report reduced time on HIV care and discontinuation of outreach. 
This study was limited by the short follow-up period. The loss of outreach and decline in 
training could lead to deterioration in HIV service delivery in the long-term. However, it is also 
possible that the health system is coping with loss of support. Further research is needed in a 
variety of settings, with longer follow-up, in order to better understand the impacts of 
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A Note about Terminology 
 
  
This thesis is about transition of donor health programs and the effects that transition has on 
the health system. I do not attempt to formally define transition. However, for the reader’s 
benefit, transition should be understood as any loss of donor support that was formerly provided 
to one or more components or units of the health system of a recipient nation. By this definition, 
transition has been occurring for almost as long as there have been donor health programs. Yet, 
transition remains little studied and poorly defined. 
The empirical evidence used in this thesis comes exclusively from one setting, Uganda in the 
mid-2010s, and focuses on one policy that guided transition in that setting, the PEPFAR 
Geographic Prioritization. While I often use the terms “transition” and “Geographic 
Prioritization” interchangeably in this thesis, transition should be understood as an occurrence 
taking place in the real world while PEPFAR’s Geographic Prioritization is a policy process that 
is associated with transition. It goes without saying that policies and reality do not always agree.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Overview and Study Objectives 
 
This thesis seeks to empirically assess the impacts of transition from site-level PEPFAR 
support in Uganda associated with the PEPFAR Geographic Prioritization (GP). I start by 
summarizing PEPFAR, the GP process, Uganda’s HIV/AIDS situation, and PEPFAR’s role in 
the HIV/AIDS response. I reviewed the literature on transition, and finding no suitable 
conceptual frameworks for the impacts of transition, I developed my own. Then, in the first of 
three papers, I measured the changes in PEPFAR support for human resources for health and the 
subsequent responses by health workers. Next, in the second paper, I examined the effects of 
transition from PEPFAR support on HIV and non-HIV services. In the third paper, I compared 
the effects of transition for private for-profit, private not for-profit, and public health facilities. 
Finally, I summarized the results and identify lessons that can be drawn for the GP in Uganda 
and future aid transitions. 
 
1.2 Background on PEPFAR & the Geographic Prioritization 
 
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has been a cornerstone of 
global HIV/AIDS assistance and accounted for more than half of donor funding for HIV in 
LMICs in 2015 (1). The 2008 Lantos-Hyde bill that reauthorized PEPFAR, and subsequent 
PEPFAR planning documents, have encouraged PEPFAR to increase the sustainability of its 
operations. An evaluation conducted by the Institute of Medicine (IOM) called for increased 
efficiency in targeting limited resources to achieve program goals and to engage in long-term 
capacity building in support of sustainability (2). The PEPFAR 3.0 strategy for 2014–2018 has 
encouraged sustainability within operations, including the addition of a sustainability index, 
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increases in domestic financial share, and expansion of the “Country Health Partnership” 
approach (3). The vague goals of “sustainability” and “partnership” outlined in the PEPFAR 3.0 
strategy were clarified in the 2015 Guidance for Country Operating Plans (COPs) as the 
Geographic Prioritization (4).  
The PEPFAR GP was introduced in guidance to PEPFAR country missions in 2015. It 
encouraged missions to identify locations and populations for scale-up over FYs 2016 & 2017 as 
part of the COP 2015 process. The primary criteria for selection of scale-up was identifying the 
areas and populations that contributed to 80% of the national total of people living with HIV 
(PLHIV), which would receive a package of services aimed at achieving saturation under the 
UNAIDS 90-90-90 goals. The 90-90-90 goals state that by 2020, 90% of PLHIV will know their 
status, 90% of those with known status will be on ART, and 90% of those on ART will have 
achieve viral suppression (5). Saturation would consist of 80% of PLHIV being on ART (90% of 
HIV+ pregnant women) across all age-sex groups. Local HIV prevalence and the presence of key 
populations (KPs) were other criteria in PEPFAR’s Geographic Prioritization process (4). 
Locations not designated for scale-up would either receive a “maintenance package of 
services” to be defined by PEPFAR country missions or be transitioned to “central support” (4). 
In COP Guidance for 2017, a fourth category of “attained” was added for sub-national units 
(e.g., districts) that have achieved the 80% ART coverage target for all age-sex groups (6). 
“Central support” is a term that is not defined in PEPFAR documents. It is applied both to 
sub-national units and to individual facilities. While it may imply that national health ministries 
(i.e. central government) would be responsible for HIV care, this interpretation does not 
correspond to the reality of decentralized health care management in Uganda. The term 
“transition to central support” is also applied to private facilities, including standalone private 
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for-profit providers with no conceivable “central” source of support at present. “Central support” 
could also imply that PEPFAR intends to continue providing support, but only through 
centralized systems for commodities, laboratory systems, and health system planning. However, 
not all facilities will benefit from or have access to these systems. 
COP Guidance for 2015 set standards for prioritization of sub-national units (SNUs) for 
scale-up, but it did not require that country missions identify SNUs for transition to central 
support. Nor did COP 2015 guidance provide guidelines for how transition locations or 
populations would be identified, other than as a residual of the process of identifying locations 
and populations for scale-up. Country missions themselves either identified SNUs for central 
support among those not receiving scale-up, or they did not identify any SNUs for central 
support at all (4). 
In addition to providing guidance for classifying SNUs, COP 2015 guidance was specific 
in advocating that PEPFAR country programs discontinue support to HTC and PMTCT sites 
with fewer than 4 HIV-positive tests per year and in consolidating low-volume ART sites, 
“PEPFAR should work with the host country government and other stakeholders to transition 
support for low-volume ART sites or refer current patients to higher volume sites to improve 
quality of care.” (p. 78) (4).  
While the guidance on transition was limited, the objective of achieving cost savings from 
maintenance and central-support was clear:  “Program costs and trade-offs should be taken into 
account when determining maintenance support for other locations and populations.” (p. 79) (4). 
There was no specific mention of how PEPFAR teams should assess readiness of locations or 
facilities for transition or implement the transition process. There is requirement for a “transition 
plan”, but that is only in the context of program activities that are to be discontinued as part of 
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the simultaneous “activity pivot” wherein the support provided to facilities that are maintained 
on PEPFAR is changing slightly, and not for facilities and SNUs that are to be discontinued.  
COP Guidance for 2016 largely built-on the guidance from 2015. Countries were 
encouraged to use COP 2016 to assess the progress of scale-up to saturation in FY2016 and re-
consider their classification for FY2017. The only mention of SNUs selected for transition is a 
deadline for transition to be completed:  “In central support districts, site-specific activities will 
transition to government or other support by the end of September 2016 and by no later than 
March 2017. Central support districts will continue to receive PEPFAR national support for 
overarching activities, such as quality assurance and quality improvement (QA/QI) to ensure that 
patients continue to receive quality services.” (p. 59) Beyond this timeline and the re-iteration of 
continued national-level support for transition SNUs, there is no prescriptive guidance on the 
transition process to be applied for either the central-support SNUs or low-volume sites 
transitioned (7). 
COP Guidance for 2017 outlined strategies for each investment category, including the 
new category “attained”. Uganda’s COP 2017 identifies 40 out of 112 districts containing 50% 
of PLHIV as being predicted to reach attained status in FY2018. Interestingly, five districts 
(Amolatar, Buvuma, Koboko, Nakasongola, and Pallisa) reached attained status from 
maintenance, without receiving scale-up support. Attained are classified together with sustained 
districts, indicating that these districts will no longer receive intensive scale-up support (if they 
ever did) but will be supported to maintain their routine progress (pg. 42) (8). 
However, PEPFAR guidance on attained also notes that, “In the current environment there 
is an urgent need to shift program resources to the locations and populations where most new 
HIV infections are likely to occur.” (pg. 78). COP Guidance also stipulates that low-yield sites 
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that don’t contribute should be considered for transition. In SNUs identified as maintenance, the 
PEPFAR country offices are advised that, “While PEPFAR programs phase out of active 
counseling and testing and new ART enrolment, PEPFAR service or technical support for other 
programs must be done as well through careful transition planning to ensure that harmful 
consequences are avoided.” (6)  This is the first mention in COP guidance of transition planning, 
and it comes two years after the initiation of the GP. 
 
 
1.3 Background on Uganda’s HIV/AIDS Response & the PEPFAR GP in Uganda 
 
Uganda was one of the first countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to openly address HIV/AIDS 
in 1986 as a national priority and has been considered by many as an HIV success story (9). The 
cause of Uganda’s success in reducing HIV prevalence in the 1990s is debated (9, 10). 
Regardless, HIV incidence increased again in the late 2000s (11) and Uganda has been faulted 
for active opposition to condoms by social conservatives as well as draconian anti-LGBT 
legislation (12). Moreover, Uganda is among the many African countries that have not met their 
Abuja Declaration commitment to spend 15% of their budgets on health, with health spending 
taking up 10.8% of the budget in 2014 (13).  
The bulk of HIV expenditure in Uganda has come from donors, including PEPFAR. 
Uganda is classified as a “long-term strategy” PEPFAR country (4). “Long-term strategy” is a 
category that, under PEPFAR FY2014 Guidance, is characterized by high need for external 
support, high HIV prevalence, and limited domestic financial resources (14). Uganda is heavily 
dependent on donor financing for its HIV/AIDS response, with 90% of funding for ARVs 
coming from PEPFAR and the Global Fund (8). The Government of Uganda (GoU) ’s share of 
total HIV/AIDS spending in 2013 was only 12% while households accounted for more than 20% 
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of HIV/AIDS spending through out-of-pocket payments (15). Recent National Health Accounts 
put the GoU’s share of HIV/AIDS spending at 8.2% in FY2015/16 with 84% coming from 
development partners (16). Uganda’s high level of aid dependency for HIV makes it an 
interesting test case for transition. 
The national PEPFAR Country Operational Plans (COPs) for Uganda indicate how the GP 
has been applied in the country. In Uganda, the decision on scale-up was made at the unit of the 
district. Districts were ranked according to the number of PLHIV. The top districts in number of 
PLHIV were allocated to scale-up until the scale-up districts accounted for 80% of the PLHIV in 
Uganda. Five additional low-burden (i.e., not contributing to 80% of PLHIV) district with high-
prevalence (≥7.3%) that had substantial numbers of KP/PPs or who were sources of patients 
receiving care at regional referral hospitals/centers of excellence in neighboring districts were 
included. Ten “central support” districts were selected among 43 low-burden/low-prevalence 
districts based on their having limited prior support (four districts had only received district-level 
support and six had limited technical assistance only). Table 1 shows the district classification 
and Figure 1 shows the distribution of facilities under the PEPFAR Geographic Prioritization in 
Uganda (17). 
Table 1:  PEPFAR Uganda’s Classification of Districts for Prioritization 


















<7.3% No 18 33 10 
   
 
 
Source:  PEPFAR, Uganda COP 2015 
Footnote:  KP/PP:  Key population/Priority population. PLHIV:  People living with HIV 





Figure 1:  Map of Uganda Districts by Geographic Prioritization Classification and Number of 
Sites to be Transitioned 
 
 
The 10 central support districts contained 94 PEPFAR-supported facilities in FY2014. An 
additional 640 PEPFAR facilities were selected for transition outside of the central-support 
districts selected based on three criteria:  1.) Low-volume sites with <12 HTC HIV+, <5 HIV+ in 
PMTCT, and <21 on ART (in scale-up districts), or 2.) <5 HIV+ in PMTCT and <21 on ART (in 
maintenance districts), and 3.) HTC standalone sites, regardless of their volume. Between 
FY2015 and FY2017, the number of PEPFAR-supported sites in Uganda was supposed to 
decline from 2,537 to 1,803. The bulk of the sites intended for transitioned were low-volume 
sites outside of the central support districts. Many of these low-HIV volume facilities were 
private, including a substantial number of private for-profit (PFP) facilities. USAID provided the 
study team with multiple, conflicting lists of facilities to be transitioned. This left the research 
team with some uncertainty about transition assignment, particularly among the low-volume 
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transition sites. Additionally, it became clear that the dataset used for identifying “low volume” 
sites was PEPFAR’s DATIM, which is cleaned to produce a lower bound of attributable services, 
not an estimate of actual services provided. Therefore, a facility that provides HTC, ART, and 
PMTCT but is only supported by PEPFAR for HTC will appear as a HTC-only site and be 
selected for transition on that basis. 
While the Geographic Prioritization in COP 2015 and 2016 represents a break from prior 
PEPFAR practice in Uganda by discontinuing support to (i.e., transitioning) whole SNUs, the 
strategy builds on practices documented in prior COPs (15) that allocate resources according to 
needs. Uganda’s transition involves a greater number of low-volume facilities outside of “central 
support” districts than facilities within those districts. There is an ongoing churn in the supported 
facilities that pre-existed transition, as implementing partners change and so does their view of 
which sites are contributing towards PEPFAR targets. In this sense, the GP launched in 2015 
may be seen as a deepening and formalization of an existing trend of focusing on facilities that 
yield patients, with the addition of whole-SNU transitions. 
 
1.4 Literature Review of Health Program Transition 
 
The PEPFAR GP was implemented in Uganda at a time when international assistance for 
HIV has been declining. According to a joint report of the Kaiser Family Foundation and 
UNAIDS, total HIV assistance declined 19% between 2014 and 2016 (1). Figure 2 plots global 








Figure 2:  Donor HIV Funding Trends 2002–2016 
 
Source:  Kates, Wexler, & Lief, 2017 
 
 
As of 2018, PEPFAR has been active for 15 years and has spanned three different U.S. 
Presidents’ administrations. The PEPFAR GP could be viewed as a sign of donor fatigue in HIV 
that will likely be reinforced by continued trends in economic and political isolation in Europe 
and the United States. Budget proposals made by the Trump administration in 2017 that called 
for a 28% cut and included a clause to “maintain current commitments and all current patient 
levels on HIV/AIDS treatment under the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief 
(PEPFAR)” (pg. 34) (18) left the door open to not support additional enrollment on HIV services 
that is necessary to achieve 90-90-90 targets. These proposals were rejected by Congress in 2017 
(19). However, foreign policy experts have claimed that the erratic budgeting process has wasted 
resources and prevented long-term planning (20). 
While ambitious goals have been set for ending AIDS by 2030, with considerable 
resources needed to meet them (21), it is unclear if current donors are willing to sustain, much 
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less increase, their support. Without new entrants of non-traditional donors in the HIV funding 
environment (e.g., China), large-scale transitions of HIV/AIDS programs are to be expected in 
coming years. 
The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM) also has a large role in 
Uganda, but more than 90% of its funding is used to procure commodities for the public sector 
(8). Uganda has a GFATM grant agreement for $212 million for HIV/AIDS from July 2015 to 
December 2017, which includes a costed extension for July-December 2017 (22). GFATM 
disbursements for HIV/AIDS have remained steady over the period of 2015 to 2018 (23); 
therefore, I expect the Global Funds to have limited influence on the PEPFAR GP process in 
Uganda. GFATM is certainly not replacing the services that PEPFAR IPs once provided at the 
health facility level. 
PEPFAR has already transitioned programs in South Africa, Botswana, and Namibia, as 
well as regional support to programs in the Eastern Caribbean (24). PEPFAR’s new role in these 
countries is primarily one of co-financing national programs. These nations have more financial 
and managerial resources to devote to HIV than do aid-dependent nations, like Uganda or 
Malawi. They also have relatively strong political commitment to HIV. However, as we will see 
for South Africa, these conditions may not be sufficient for a smooth HIV transition. 
In low- and lower-middle income countries (LMICs), including Uganda, PEPFAR is 
applying the GP strategy that transitions only a small portion of the total HIV burden to central 
support. Given the likelihood of more extensive transitions to come, it is important to scrutinize 
Uganda’s experience to assess readiness for more far-reaching transitions in the future and to 
anticipate the potential impacts. Past experience of transition can also shed light on the expected 




1.4.1 Previous HIV Transition Experiences 
 
Prior experiences with transitions from HIV assistance are relevant to the evaluation of the 
PEPFAR GP. The experience of the Avahan project in India, PEPFAR’s transitions in Southern 
Africa and the Eastern Caribbean, and GFATM’s departure from Eastern Europe are cases that 
have been studied in depth (24-28). These HIV transitions constitute either whole-country donor 
exits or major scale-backs of engagement, whereas the GP in Uganda comprises only a regional 
and site-level withdrawal of support with continued above-site commodity and laboratory 
support. However, the lessons from national-level transitions are still likely to be relevant to GP 
process. 
 The scale of HIV/AIDS and the PEPFAR program in South Africa makes this country’s 
experience particularly important. The transition was laid out in the PEPFAR Partnership 
Framework in 2010 with substantial host country engagement in program governance. However, 
in spite of a relatively long transition timeline, PEPFAR has been criticized for moving too fast 
with negative consequences for patient care (26). The transfer of patients from NGO-run HIV 
specialty clinics to government facilities was not seamless, and one study showed that 18% of 
ART patients transferred from private HIV-specialized treatment to public primary health centers 
were lost to follow up during the transition (29). Another study revealed low satisfaction with the 
quality of care and responsiveness among patients transferred from a private facility to 
government clinics (30). The evidence of loss to follow-up during transfer and reduced 
satisfaction when HIV patients move from specialized private HIV clinics to government 
facilities is not unique to South Africa and has been seen in transitions in other settings in SSA, 
including the Democratic Republic of the Congo (31). Human resource capacity has also been 
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affected. Whereas PEPFAR supported salaries and top-ups for government health workers and 
maintained community health workers prior to transition in South Africa, support has been 
discontinued without a plan for retaining staff (26). 
PEPFAR’s experience in Botswana has been similarly criticized for being too hasty and 
happening at a time when the goal of an AIDS-free Generation was being promoted (32). 
PEPFAR put support to Botswana on a “glide path” with funding declining from $75 million to 
$35 per year over a five-year period. PEPFAR had seconded 170 health professionals to 
HIV/AIDS agencies, at its peak. Bringing these positions into public service was hindered by a 
government hiring freeze (32).  
  PEPFAR’s transition in the Eastern Caribbean differs from the experience in Southern 
Africa because HIV has a lower profile, with transmission concentrated among men who have 
sex with men (MSM) and commercial sex workers (CSWs). In addition, PEPFAR accounted for 
less than half of HIV funding in these countries (28). However, Vogus & Graff (2015) expressed 
concern about the sustainability of programs targeting KPs by governments that criminalize sex 
work and homosexuality once PEPFAR exits (28). 
Concerns about the willingness of governments to continue work with key populations 
have been echoed in Mexico and in Eastern Europe as the Global Fund transitions out of many of 
these countries. In these settings, needle exchange and opiate substitution therapy programs for 
prevention among injecting drug users (IDU) have not been sustained, and, in Romania, IDUs 
have become a major source of new HIV infections (24). 
 India offers a counter-example where outreach to key populations was maintained by 
government during the early post-transition period. Among HIV transitions, the early experience 
of transitioning the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation’s Avahan initiative in India stands out as 
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one of the most successful to date. Continued service delivery during and following the transition 
process as well as positive feedback from program managers were cited as positive outcomes. 
However, the quantity and timeliness of funding and stability of commodity supply were 
negatively affected in the transition, as were the experiences of some community members who 
had been pushed from specialized services to less welcoming government health centers (25). 
The design of Avahan with the explicit goal of transferring it to government may have been a 
factor in its relative success (24). 
The experience of Avahan is notable because, like PEPFAR, it was funded with 
international donor assistance, relied on NGOs for service delivery, and targeted key populations 
(CSWs, MSM, Transgender, and PWID) who are traditionally marginalized. The financial and 
policy commitment of the Government of India was a considerable factor in the 
institutionalization of the initiative after transition (33). Bennett et al. (2015) identified other key 
elements of the transitions associated with its success:  strong links between the project and local 
partners, continued post-transition monitoring and assistance, funding for transition activities, 
and an extended time-frame with opportunities for reflection and assessment (34). The Avahan 
experience also stands out for having a prospective evaluation plan in place before the transition 
began (35) while most evaluations of transitions are retrospective and post-hoc. 
 These recent HIV transition experiences offer some broad lessons. First, successful 
transitions take years and, while transition planning is vital, it is not always enough to guarantee 
a smooth outcome. Secondly, KPs may be neglected by national governments following 
transition. Thirdly, political will is a major component of the success of Avahan’s transition in 
India and in the somewhat successful experience in South Africa and Botswana. Uganda’s GP, 
while smaller in scope, is being planned on a 1-2 year timeline that may be overly ambitious. 
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While the GP explicitly avoids discontinuing services to KPs, it remains unclear whether there is 
adequate political commitment, much less sufficient resources, at national or local levels to 
sustain HIV services following transition were KP programming transitioned in Uganda. 
The GP in Uganda is occurring within the context of declining international support for 
HIV. The experience will gauge how ready low-income countries are for even a minor transition, 
and assess the potential impacts of transition on the sustainability of HIV services. However, 
HIV programs have health system impacts that extend beyond HIV care. It is important to 
understand how transition will affect the health system more broadly. 
 
1.5 Literature Review of HIV Program Impacts on Health Systems 
 
Since the launch of PEPFAR, many have voiced concern about the effect that large 
disbursements for HIV care will have on health system performance in SSA. This review of the 
empirical literature addresses three domains in which HIV assistance has been hypothesized to 
affect health systems negatively or positively:  through impacts on funding for system 
strengthening and for other diseases, through human resources, and through delivery of non-HIV 
services. 
 
1.5.1 Impacts of International HIV Funding for other Diseases and Health Systems 
Strengthening 
 
Since the PEPFAR program was announced, there has been concern that funding for a 
single-disease vertical health program would reduce donor funding for other disease concerns 
(36-39) and horizontal health system strengthening (HSS). However, the evidence to date 
suggest that, while health sector strengthening has declined as a share of assistance, the increase 
in health funding overall has been a rising tide that lifts all boats. Dieleman et al. (2016) 
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analyzed trends in publicly reported development assistance for health by health focus area and 
find that annual growth across all areas, but especially malaria and TB, was high during the 
period 2000–2009 when HIV expenditure increased and exceeded the growth in HIV funding in 
2010–2015, when HIV funding growth slowed to 1.3%. Maternal and child health have had 
steady rates of funding growth (40). However, negative impacts on funding for other diseases 
have been seen. Among countries where TB, malaria, HIV/AIDS, and HSS are all major 
priorities, a rise in HIV funding was associated with reduced funding for malaria but not TB or 
HSS (41). 
The growth in donor funding for health system strengthening (HSS) is less positive, 
although somewhat unclear due to the multiple data sources and definitions of HSS used. Using a 
broad definition, the share of international assistance for HSS1 has declined from 62% of health 
aid in 1998 to 24% in 2007, but the nominal amount dedicated to this purpose has risen slightly 
(42). Much of the increase in HSS is directly due to vertical programs. PEPFAR itself has 
directed about 20% of its funding to “governance and systems,” which includes HSS and 
investments in laboratory and strategic information systems (43). A detailed analysis of 
expenditures by two PEPFAR implementing partners in Kenya for programs aimed at the 
prevention of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) show that “support to health system 
strengthening” increased from 12% to 33% of spending between 2005 and 2010 (44). 
However, in spite of vertical programs’ contributions, health system strengthening seems 
to be falling behind in funding. Dieleman et al. (2016) find that annual growth in funding for 
“sector-wide approaches and health system strengthening”, including that channeled through 
                                                 
1 Shiffman J, Berlan D, Hafner T (2009) include in HSS a broad set of classes included in the CRS dataset, including 
health policy and administration, medical education/training, research, basic health care, nutrition, infrastructure, 
health education, and human resources development. 
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disease-specific programs, was lower in 2000-2009, during the scale-up of HIV programs, than 
from 1990-2000. From 2010-2015, as annual growth in total DAH and HIV/AIDS funding 
slowed to roughly 1% per year, funding for the category of “sector-wide approaches and health 
system strengthening” declined by 2.3% per year. Overall, it seems that HIV-specific funding 
has brought additional resources to health system strengthening agendas, but may have pushed 
out other disease-specific donor funding (e.g. malaria) and been associated with a period of 
weakening growth in funding of HSS that has persisted (40). The lack of consistency across 
development assistance data sources is a major limitation. 
The large donor outlays for health (of which HIV comprises a significant share) have the 
potential to discourage nations from investing in their own health systems. Lu et al. (2010) 
identifies that for each $1 of DAH channeled through LMIC governments, governments’ own 
contributions to health decline by $0.43. Among low-income countries such as Uganda, the 
estimated reduction in government expenditure for each dollar of aid received is $0.32. However, 
funds channeled through the private sector are associated with increased government expenditure 
on health (45). Critics of Lu et al. have indicated that off-budget aid was not accounted for in the 
analysis. Including off-budget aid, van de Sijpe (2013) finds that the fungibility of aid for health 
is limited or non-existent (46). Dieleman, Graves, and Hanlon (2013) conducts a re-analysis of 
Lu et al. (2010) with updated and expanded data and taking into account on and off-budget aid, 
and find that aid remains fungible (47). While it is uncertain to what extent donor funding pushes 
out government funding, it is clear that in many low-income countries international HIV funding 
has outstripped government’s contributions. 
 Specifically, in Uganda, DAH increased dramatically from 2003 to 2009, with PEPFAR 
support for HIV/AIDS being the primary driver. While the GoU increased its total funding and 
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maintained its level of support as a share of government expenditure, donor-funding increased at 
a more rapid pace. The bulk of this DAH was allocated through project support that bypassed the 
national coordinating mechanism (i.e. the Sector Wide Approach) (48). Uganda’s national health 
account in 2011/2012 put the share of public financing for health care at 9.6% (49) of total health 
expenditure, but estimates for 2013 place direct public funding at 19% and donor funds at 36%, 
with the remainder consisting of private spending (50). 
In addition to being considerably larger than GoU contributions, DAH was not aligned to 
Uganda’s national objectives. STI & HIV/AIDS comprised more than 65% of donor project 
support. By contrast, the share of project support for “support systems” and “Essential Clinical 
Care, IMCI & Mental Health” declined from 29% and 18% in 2003 to 7% and 4% in 2009, 
respectively. This allocation stood in direct contrast to the Ugandan government’s Health Sector 
Strategic Plan (HSSP), which allocated 2% to HIV/AIDS, 65% to “support systems” and 21% to 
“essential care” (48). The misalignment of donor funding to national goals has had distortional 
impact within the health system. 
 
1.5.2 Impacts of Donor HIV Funding on Human Resources for Health 
 
The distortion can be seen in the allocation of human resources for health. The funding 
directed to HIV has had a strong impact on human resources for health, attracting many health 
workers to focus on the delivery of HIV/AIDS services, which has led to claims of an “internal 
brain-drain” with the potential to exacerbate the human resources crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(51). Empirical research on the effects of HIV programs on HRH is limited. A review of 31 
reported program evaluations identified multiple incidences of personnel migrating from other 
health service areas, from public to private facilities, and to NGOs and donor agencies (52). A 
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survey of graduates of one health training institution in Uganda found that 51% worked for a 
HIV-related NGOs and 42% spent at least half of their time on HIV (51). The draw of higher 
salaries and better-equipped facilities has pulled many workers into HIV-focused health care or 
into NGO administration (53), and frequent trainings reduce workers’ time spent with patients. 
An example of the impact training has on service delivery, a survey of health workers in a region 
of Tanzania with severe understaffing found that 44% of clinical staff were away at the time of 
the survey, and more than 46% of these were attending seminars, meetings, or on long-term 
training (54). In contrast to these negative impacts, it is important to remember that health 
workers themselves are a population affected by HIV/AIDS and their ability to access treatment 
has positive implications on the health sector (55). 
 
1.5.3 Impact of Donor HIV Programs on non-HIV Service Delivery 
 
PEPFAR’s positive impact on HIV service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 
Uganda, in particular, is widely acknowledged (2, 56). However, the impact of PEPFAR and 
other vertical programs for HIV on non-HIV services remains unclear. Grépin (2012) performed 
a multi-country ecological analysis of donor health spending for HIV and MNCH outcomes in 
SSA. She found no significant associations between HIV aid and MNCH outcomes overall. 
However, in low human resource density countries, HIV funding per capita is associated with 
higher coverage of ANC4+ and skilled birth attendance. However, HIV funding per capita was 
also associated with lower coverage of 3rd dose of DPT and Polio vaccines, particularly in low 
human resource density countries (57). Chima & Franzini also find negative associations 
between HIV aid and immunization rates in an ecological analysis in Nigeria. Each $1 increase 
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in health aid for HIV per capita is associated with a 0.08 percentage point decline in full 
immunization (58). 
In contrast, Rasschaert, Pirard, Philips et al. (2011) find positive spill-overs for non-HIV 
services from health system strengthening investments made in Malawi and Ethiopia alongside 
increased provision of ART. Antenatal care, outpatient visits, and delivery attendance at health 
facilities in both countries increased from 2004/2005 to 2009 as ART scale-up was underway. 
Measles immunization coverage also increased (59). In a very different setting, the transition of 
ART patients to community-based primary health care clinics in Kwa Zulu-Natal resulted in 
increased use of PHC facilities by HIV-negative individuals. Upgrades of PHC facilities 
concomitant with the transfer of ART facilities may explain the increased use by HIV-
community members; however, the authors cite the case as a potential example of “therapeutic 
citizenship”, where ART clients promote use of their source of care among members of their 
communities (60). 
Kruk, Jakubowski, Rabkin, et al. (2015) conducted a survey of health facilities in Kenya 
and found that the presence of PMTCT and ART programs was associated with better pre- and 
postnatal care quality. However, the ability to infer a causal relationship from cross-sectional 
studies of this type is limited (61). Using multi-country longitudinal data from a network of 
private not for-profit providers, Kruk et al., (2012) found that facility deliveries to HIV-negative 
women, but not ANC care, increased along with the number of patients on ART (62). 
In Zambia, a study of patient records in 39 purposively-selected facilities from 2004–2007 
showed that facilities that scaled-up HIV services had increased immunization relative to those 
that didn’t, but no effect was seen for family planning or for antenatal care (63). Potter et al. 
(2008) found that compliance with national guidelines for syphilis testing in ANC increased 
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more in clinics that had PMTCT research and treatment programs. The authors posit that 
research program investments in training and supplies may have spilled over to ANC clients not 
enrolled in research studies (64). Mutabazi JC, Zarowsky C, & Trottier H. (2017) conducted a 
review of the impact of PMTCT on other services. PMTCT has important backward linkages 
(through promoting ANC attendance and testing) and forward linkages (by encouraging HIV+ 
pregnant women to deliver in health facilities) to MNCH care. They found that there was not a 
consistent empirical, quantitative assessment of the effects of PMTCT on outcomes (65). 
Studies conducted in Uganda have yielded results that are as contradictory as those 
conducted in other countries. In a study of six public clinics in Kampala where HIV services 
were being rapidly scaled up, there was an acceleration of service delivery for immunization, 
laboratory testing of malaria, and diagnosis of skin diseases but no change in ANC and injectable 
contraceptive provision (66). A nationwide, district-level analysis conducted by Luboga, Stover, 
Lim, et al. (2016) presented evidence that ART scale-up in Uganda in 2005–2010 was associated 
with lower growth in non-HIV services (67). A companion qualitative study conducted among 
district health officers in Uganda demonstrated the belief that the benefits of PEPFAR 
outweighed its harms, but that PEPFAR funding overemphasized HIV relative to other health 
conditions and burdened health workers (56). The findings of Luboga et al. (2016) are countered 
by Wollum et al. (2017), who examined a nationally-representative sample of health facilities in 
Uganda over the period 2007–2012. They could not identify an association between ART 
program existence, size, growth, or relative size and outpatient department (OPD) visits for non-
HIV care (68). 
Many previous studies have addressed the impact of HIV programs on HIV and non-HIV 
services (56-68), but relatively few have evaluated the effect of transitioning HIV programs on 
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HIV services (28, 30, 33, 69-75). Furthermore, I am aware of no previously published studies 
that have examined the effects of transition of an HIV program on non-HIV services. In Rwanda, 
Binagwaho, Kankindi, Kayirangwa, et al. (2016) note that HIV services increased in Rwanda 
while PEPFAR support was scaled-back and funding transitioned to a budget-support model (70) 
and Farmer, Nutt, Wagner, et al. (2013) report continued improvements in maternal, neonatal, 
and child health outcomes coincident with Rwanda’s HIV program transition, but does not 
explore the association empirically (72). 
1.6 Conceptual Model 
 
In seeking to understand the potential effects of transition on health systems, I searched the 
literature for conceptual models of transition. I could not find any in the literature. Therefore, I 
sought to develop a rudimentary conceptual model of transition impacts on health systems based 
on the idea that donor programs introduce “distortions” to the health system, which transition 
modifies. An example of a distortion is the concentration of health workers in facilities that serve 
as delivery points for vertical programs, which attract workers through incentives, access to 
training, and better-equipped facilities. When donor support is lost, the distortion will also be 
affected by transition. The outcome of transition — i.e. whether the functions provided by donor 
programs are adopted, discarded, or modified and institutionalized into a national system — 
affects the transition outcome. This could result in incentives being lost, and the distribution of 
workers transferring back to the prior state. Or, if the incentives are institutionalized, workers 
could remain in these facilities. I developed a conceptual model of how transition outcomes are 
likely to be determined, as an interplay between the nature of support, the transition design and 
implementation, and the national context.  
22 
 
Drawing from the literature, I catalogued the impacts that donor programs, particularly 
HIV donor programs, have had on health systems. Using the WHO Health Systems Building 
Blocks framework, I organized these according to building block. For each health system 
distortion identified in the literature, I identified how it may be impacted by transition and rated 
its relevance to the PEPFAR GP in Uganda. For the health system distortions most relevant to 
the GP in Uganda, I applied the conceptual model using my own assumptions about probable 
transition outcomes in the context of PEPFAR and Uganda. Finally, I summarized my 
hypotheses about impacts of transition in Uganda in Table 3. Readers who are primarily 
interested in the empirical findings may want to skip to chapter 2. 
 
1.6.1 Review of Conceptual Models of Indirect Health System Impacts 
 
To further understand the potential effects of transition, I examined conceptual models of 
the impacts — intentional and unintentional — that GHIs have purported to have on health 
systems in LMICs. I searched the literature to identify conceptual models of GHIs’ health system 
impacts. The search strategy is described in the Annex. Seven studies containing conceptual 
frameworks were identified (52, 76-81). 
Bennett and Fairbank (2003) developed a conceptual framework for analyzing the potential 
“systemwide effects” of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB, and Malaria (GFATM) (76). This 
conceptual framework was applied to three case studies of the Global Fund’s impact in Benin, 
Malawi, and Ethiopia in Stillman and Bennett (2005) (77). Together these two studies present a 
wide range of unintended effects of Global Fund programs across domains of “stewardship”, 
“resource development”, “resource allocation”, “financing’, “service delivery” during the 
GFATM’s early roll-out. 
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Biesma et al. (2009) conducted a review of the published literature on health system effects 
of HIV/AIDS programs (52). Their conceptual framework builds on that of Bennett and Fairbank 
(2003) and broadens it with additions from other prior work by Brugha (2008)(82) to apply to the 
operations of the three major global health initiatives for HIV:  GFATM, the World Bank Multi-
country AIDS Program (MAP) and PEPFAR. Biesma et al. (2009) organizes the impacts 
identified in the literature into “policy development” and “policy implementation” categories 
(52). 
The conceptual model of Warren, Wyss, Shakarishvili et al. (2013) (78) further extends the 
work of Biesma et al. (2009). Noting that the framework of Biesma et al. (2009) does not cover 
the WHO health system framework building blocks of “Service Delivery”, “Technologies”, and 
“Information Systems” (except for M&E), the authors extend the framework and apply it to an 
assessment of funding for health system strengthening within a sample of Global Fund Round 8 
grants. The use of the WHO’s Health System Framework is also seen in the review of health 
systems strengthening of HIV/AIDS programs conducted by Yu, Souteyrand, Banta, et al.  
(2008) (80). 
Using a different approach, Oliveira Cruz and McPake (2010) used agent theory to assess 
the hypothetical effects that HIV/AIDS programs have on the financial and regulatory 
relationships between on health system actors at the macro level. Oliveira Cruz and McPake 
(2011) applied this conceptual framework to a case study of PEPFAR and GFATM in Uganda 








1.6.2 Synthesis of Impacts 
 
I consolidated the system-level effects included in these seven conceptual frameworks into 
a single list. Indirect effects that were common across sources were combined. Health systems 
impacts that were largely intentional, such as health systems strengthening interventions, were 
removed, as I was only interested in unintended health system impacts. PEPFAR health system 
strengthening at the above-site levels (laboratory, commodity, pre-service training) are likely to 
remain in place during the PEPFAR GP, and therefore are not relevant in transition. 
Each unintended impact was assigned to one of the six WHO health systems building 
blocks:  “Governance”, “Health workforce”, “Financing”, “Information”, “Service Delivery”, 
and “Medical Products” (83). The result is a set of 38 health systems impacts, each one of which 
is assigned to a row in Table 2. For each indirect impact described in blue, I have added my own 
thoughts on the potential effect of HIV program withdrawal on the impact and a ranking (Low, 








Table 2:  Indirect Effects of HIV Programs – A Summary of the Literature & Extension 
to HIV Program Transition, with particular application to the PEPFAR GP in Uganda  
Literature Predicted Applications to Transition 
 Program Function Indirect Effects Citation Potential Impact 
Under HIV Program 
Transition 
Hypothesized 




Regulation of private 
sector providers 
Regulatory challenges 
imposed by including 
private providers 
(76) Without PEPFAR to 
monitor quality, private 
providers who continue to 
provide HIV services will 
need to be more closely 
supervised by 
government. 
Moderate:  Private facilities 







without local input 
were uninformed and 





(76-78) Vertical programs tend to 
be centralized, their 
removal could shift control 
to local levels 
Moderate:  The suddenness 
of PEPFAR GP will push 
central support SNUs to 
make decisions about 
resource allocation. 
However, they could avoid 





nature of programs 
(52, 76) Standalone facilities will 
likely be closed/integrated 
and the health system will 
become less vertically 
oriented.  
Already integrated 
services may shift focus 
away from HIV toward 
other health priorities. 
High:  Removal of incentives 
for vertical delivery may 
have multiple, unclear 
effects on services, 
including, potentially, a shift 
from HIV to non-HIV care. 
 
Requests for policies 
that conflict with 
national policies, and 
micro-management 
funding decisions and 
program 
implementation 
Caused a sense of loss 







Donor exit would reinforce 
national ownership, but it 
may just shift dependence 
to other donors; 
sustainability may be 
affected by lack of 
ownership. Policies may 
better align with national 
than with donor interests. 
High:  Districts and national 
policy-makers will need to 
decide how to support 
programs over which they 
previously had little control. 
 
Donor expectations of 
policy plans 
Resulted in "tokenism" 
in the creation of 
plans with unrealistic 
goals to meet donor 
requirements 
(79) Government incentives to 
produce tokenistic policy 
plans will decline, but may 
not be replaced with 
genuine efforts 
Low:  National level 











Shifted public and 
private staff away 
from other uses 
(52, 79) Policy-makers may be able 
to shift time towards other 
activities 
Low:  Impact on national 
level will be limited as 
GFATM and PEPFAR 
national processes will 
remain in place. Impact on 
facilities and district may be 
moderate.  
Programs and NGOs 
best able to write 
proposals and monitor 
projects funded over 
those with best able to 
achieve results 
(79) Donor-requirements will 
leave, but skills and habits 
built may be retained and 
transition into other 
mechanisms. Funding may 
shift away from programs 
that could best write 






Funding provided for 
specific diseases would 
not have been used 
the same way if untied 
Provision of tied funds 





Donor exit would remove 
the explicit tie to diseases, 
but it would do so after a 
decade or more of 
historically high levels of 
funding  
Low:  In CSD, district 
government will have 
choice about whether to 
replace IP support or invest 













and leave government as 
the primary or only actor 
in coordination 
Low:  PEPFAR will remain 





within and across 
programs, failure to 
harmonize through 
SWAps 
Use of multiple 
financing channels 
dilutes accountability 






Withdrawal reduces the 
number of mechanisms 
and increases sense of 
ownership, but also 
removes sources of 
external accountability. 
Public accountability 
becomes more critical. 
Moderate:  In CSD, the 
consolidation of 




of Civil Society  
Did not remove 
barriers for 
participation of most 
marginalized groups 
(79) Civil Society involvement 
will diminish to whatever 
level of participation it is 
able to obtain without 
donor support; most 
marginalized groups will 
remain so 
Low:  National level civil 




stimulated the growth 






NGOs" came into 
existence with limited 
roots or experience 
and lack of trust from 
government 
(52, 77) Renegotiation of public-
private partnership after 
more than a decade of 
working together with 
donor support may result 
in private sector exclusion 
or a new private-public 
partnership 
High: Private HIV provision 
may be de-emphasized if 
government is the only 
actor left to support health 
sector. To the extent that 
other funding is available, 
non-governmental 
organizations may be able 
to remain active.  
Donor-facilitated 
coordination between 






over control of 
resources hindered 
response 
(52, 78) Donor incentives for 
coordination will fade, 
which may allow other 
coordination models to 
emerge or for 
coordination to weaken 
Low:  GP is localized and 
national-level coordination 
support will remain 
 
Lack of clear, 
coordinated strategy 
for HSS to implement 
program 
Various HS distortions 
not overcome in a 
systematic way 
(77) HSS has become an 
element of health 
programs, donor exit may 
undermine HSS or remove 
distortions to HSS 
Low:  removal of HSS in CS-




Distribution of human 
resources between 
focal and non-focal 
areas, between public 
and private systems:  
Health workers drawn 
to donor-supported 
programs 
Reduced HRH for 
other conditions, 
decreased availability 




Incentives for HIV care will 
lessen, and health workers 
may filter back into other 
types of care or emigrate 
High:  Directly supported 
staff will probably be 
retrenched while other 
supported staff may be 
demotivated and/or decide 
to turnover 
 
Equity in distribution 
of resources across 
regions and levels of 
the health system 
Disadvantage small 
facilities and rural 
areas (any areas 
where it is harder to 
provide services) 
(76) New equity issues will 
arise 
High:  PEPFAR GP targets 
low prevalence, sparsely 
populated districts that are 
already under-served with 
lower levels of PLHIV on 
treatment.  
Increased burden on 
workers in HIV care 
Staff burnout and 
demotivation are 
possibilities 
(52, 77) Withdrawal will reduce 
workload only if services 
decline 
Low:  Workload to remain 





will support clinical but 
not auxiliary staff 
Higher burden on the 
staff for upkeep of 
health facilities that 
support HIV care 
(79) Forced cross-subsidization 
of HIV programs will end, 
but so too will support for 
HIV care, which may have 
had spill-over benefits. 
Overall, it may not matter. 
Moderate:  Loss of support 
for HIV staff will further 
increase burden on health 
sector 
 
Without a national 
strategy (as in Malawi), 
various actors at the 
national and sub-
national levels 
developed policies to 
fill gaps that distort 
incentives 
Hiring short-term staff 
at higher rates, top-
ups, allowances using 
program moneys in an 
unbalanced way 
(77) If the incentives were 
distortional, withdrawal 
will remove distortion and 
a new equilibrium will be 
established.  
High:  Health workers losing 
incentives through PEPFAR 




Large element of 
programs dedicated to 
in-service training on 
clinical skills 
In-service training 
provides per diem 
income, but removes 
staff from clinical care 
(52, 77, 
78) 
In-service training will be 
reduced, affecting skills for 
both the targeted and 
some non-targeted 
services, and affecting 
incomes of health 
workers. 
Moderate:  Loss of targeted 
disease-specific training 
may affect skill 
development more 
generally, leading to lower 
quality of care. 
 
Training and resources 
provided have impacts 
on non-focal services 
Non-focal conditions 
benefit from shared 
training as well 
(52, 77) Reduced training may 
remove spillovers 
Moderate:  Access to 







Donors support HIV 
referral systems that 
link public, PNFP, and 
PFP providers 
(76) Integration may 
breakdown without the 
support of donors 
High:  The HIV referral 
system may deteriorate, 
particularly if HIV services 
are consolidated to a 
smaller number of facilities 
or concentrated in the 
public sector  
Inclusion of private 
provider groups 
 
(76) Transitioned private 
providers may discontinue 
HIV care OR implement 
more cost-recovery from 
patients 
Moderate:  Low-volume and 
some large CS-SNU private 





relied upon for service 
delivery without being 
incorporated in public 
financing or regulation 
(76) Withdrawal from private 
facilities may cause an 
exodus to remaining public 
facilities, unless the quality 
deterioration leads to the 
opposite process 
High:  HIV services may 
become concentrated in the 
public facilities. However, 




Support for public and 
private provision 
resulted in 
fragmentation and the 
need for coordination 
(79) Fragmentation may 
diminish if private 
providers exit HIV care, 
but it may increase if 
coordination cannot be 
achieved 
Moderate:  Loss of support 
by private providers could 
result in reduced provision, 
but the low-volume sites 









(77) Loss of incentives for 
verticalization may result 
in in integration of services 
Moderate:  Facilities and CS-
SNU managers have 
decision of how best to 
organize HIV and non-HIV 





to the highest returns 
(post-2008 reforms in 
Global Funds) 
Targeting investments 
contrary to equity 
(79) Government priorities for 
resource allocation will 
replace GHI's efficiency-
driven resource allocation 
strategies 
Low:  PEPFAR is targeting 
and remains in control of 






investments place hold 
on future budgets to 
maintain 
May demand more 
government resources 
post transition 
(76, 79) Many investments 
(logistics, information 
systems, and facilities) 
require "central support" 
to continue to maintain 
them 
Moderate:  Budgetary 
response is likely to be 
delayed, but effects of lack 
of funding may be seen in 1-





budget limits set by 
GoU, thereby 
requiring that funding 
be provided off-
budget 
(79) If funding was truly 
additional, replacing it 
would push budgets 
against macroeconomic 
limits 
Low:  Budgets unlikely to 
respond in the short-term, 
and changes in funding with 
GP likely to be small 
 




back if not genuinely 
additional) 
(76, 77) Genuinely "additional" 
funding cannot be 
replaced after transition 
unless through new 
sources of revenues. If 
funding was not additional 
but was fungible, 
government will be able 
(but not necessarily 
willing) to transfer it back 
into health and HIV. 
Moderate:  Governments 
may choose to step up 
support to replace donors 
 
Donor-specific funding 
cycles, delays in 
disbursement, and 
year-to-year shifts in 
commitments, and lack 
of flexibility 
Governments have 
difficulty budgeting for 
unreliable donor 
funding 
(52) Reduction in funding will 
simplify budgeting 
process, but also 
dramatically reduce total 
resources available 
Low:  PEPFAR funding cycles 





created along with 
supply chains 
Developing parallel 
systems for logistics 
(76) Fewer parallel systems, 
but what will become of 
the now strengthened 
logistic systems? 
Low:  Support for HMIS and 
logistics to remain in place 
 
Donors establish 
parallel  service 
delivery M&E systems 
to bypass weak M&E 
Duplication of 
reporting and capacity 





Single M&E will be left, but 
it will not contain all the 
elements of the parallel 
M&E system, and the 
support and accountability 
attached to it is missing 
Moderate:  PEPFAR is 
leaving M&E support in 
place, but parallel systems 
will remain. Parallel systems 
are still actively used by 
PEPFAR in Uganda.  
Increase evidence-
based planning 
Donors provide a 
demand for strategic 
information as well as 
resources for M&E 
(78) Following exit, the use of 
M&E data for planning will 
be lost. Governments, 
without an incentive to 
use information for 
reporting, may not replace 
PEPFAR in evidence-based 
planning 
Low:  PEPFAR is as engaged 
in M&E as before, perhaps 




Donors produce SI 
that is available for 
government 
(78) Governments benefit from 
SI that donors 
support/produce. If 
transition results in less 
focus on SI, availability of 
information may suffer. 
Low:  PEPFAR is still 
supposed to be supporting 
SI everywhere. 




Capacity not built 
within the national 
government 
procurement systems 
(77) Support for national 
procurement will be 
discontinued with or 
without parallel systems 
Low due to the retention of 




resulted in differing 




(77) Public-private cost 
differential likely to 
increase as donor support 
to private sector wanes 
Moderate:  Larger private 
facilities may continue HIV 





Footnotes:  CS, central support; GFATM, Global Funds to Fight AIDS, TB, & Malaria; GHI, global health initiatives; GoU, government of 
Uganda; GP, geographic prioritization; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus ; HSS, health system strengthening; NGO, non-governmental 
organizations; M&E, monitoring & evaluation; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; PNFP, private not for-profit; PFP, private 
for-profit; SI, strategic information; SNU, sub-national unit; SWAp, Sector-wide approach. 
 
1.6.3 Conceptual Model of Health System Impacts of HIV Program Transition 
 
The conceptual models identified in the literature address the potential impacts of GHIs on 
health systems, but they do not address how these impacts will change during transition. As 
noted previously, the impacts that HIV programs have on health systems will not simply reverse 
under transition. First, HIV program transitions tend to be piecemeal and sequential, and the 
PEPFAR GP only transitions site-level components. The context of the program transition also 
matters, as does the institutional framework and local context in which the transition is taking 
place. 
HIV programs are composed of multiple components ranging from specific technical 
services provided through facilities (e.g. ART), to care for orphans and vulnerable children, or 
broad prevention campaigns (behavioral change communication). Differing components will 
likely have disparate outcomes under transition. In rare cases, HIV program activities will be 
adopted wholesale by governments and their functions will be sustained exactly as before, 
leaving the indirect impacts largely unchanged. However, it is more likely that the HIV program 
functions will either be performed by adapting existing national institutions or they will be 
scaled-back or discontinued entirely as systems revert to the pre-program status quo. 
If the transition results in the discontinuation of an HIV program function, the distortional 
effect will also fade. For example, the GFATM encouraged civil society involvement in planning 
and coordination, often over the concerns of the public sector. Without GFATM support, civil 
society may not be included in such settings (discontinuation) with consequences for the health 
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system (i.e., increased sense of government ownership but reduced civil society input in the HIV 
sector). 
In many cases, the outcome of transition will be the institutionalization of a prior donor-
supported activity into existing national systems. The outcome for the health system under such 
situations will depend on the specific details of the processes that perform the function once 
provided under the donor-supported HIV program. For example, if coordination now takes place 
through a single body rather than through multiple donor coordination mechanisms, the role of 
civil society will depend on the extent to which it can advocate for its own involvement in that 
consolidated body. Figure 3 seeks to capture this interplay between program transition and 
national institutions in determining if and how prior HIV program functions are sustained. 
In Figure 3, the design and implementation of the program transition are jointly determined 
and influence the transition outcome, that is if and how prior HIV program functions will be 
sustained, together with local contacts and program characteristics. The transition outcome will 
determine how the original indirect effects of health systems are altered by the transition process. 
The starting point for Figure 3 is the transition decision. Transition will have a specific 
design and implementation process, which will likely interact with and be altered by contextual 
factors related to the national political and economic context (e.g. degree of political support for 
HIV) as well as the characteristics of the preceding HIV program (e.g. alignment with national 
priorities, use of national health system for service delivery). These factors will interact to 
determine if and how each HIV function is transitioned (called here the “transition outcome”). 
HIV program functions (e.g. testing of high-risk groups) can be discontinued and the service will 
revert to whatever existed before the program, be adapted and institutionalized, or be adopted 
entirely with little change. Each outcome will have a different effect on the health system. 
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The conceptual model has some limitations and assumptions that should be noted. First, 
the transition decision is assumed to be exogenous. However, this is unlikely to be the case for 
most transitions that consider the context and probability of various transition outcomes prior to 
transitioning programs. Programs that are likely to have transition outcomes that are unfavorable 
to donors are less likely to be transitioned. However, this model is still useful to the Uganda GP, 
in which transition decisions were made based on PEPFAR/Uganda criteria according to 
guidelines set out by PEPFAR in Washington, D.C. with, what seems to have been, limited 





Figure 3:  Conceptual Model for Assessing Health System Impacts during Transition of an HIV 
Program 
 
Footnotes:  DSD: direct service delivery; KP:  key populations, TA:  technical assistance. 
 
1.6.4 Application of Conceptual Framework to the PEPFAR GP in Uganda 
 
I predicted the changes in health system impacts listed in Table 2 during program 
transition using the conceptual framework outlined in Figure 3. As contextual factors are 
important in applying the conceptual framework, I limit the discussion to the health system 
impacts that are relevant to the PEPFAR GP in Uganda. Relevance is determined both by what is 
known of the transition process in Uganda and by the feasibility of measuring outcomes 
associated with the indirect impacts under transition. Not all potential impacts on health systems 
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can be quantified with existing secondary or even primary data collection efforts. Moreover, as 
the transition outcomes in Uganda remain to be seen for many program functions, I included 
more than one plausible transition scenarios for some programs functions. 
The primary indirect impacts of relevance to the GP in Uganda include Health 
Workforce/Distribution of workers between services and facilities, Health Workforce/Incentives 
and motivation, Health Workforce/Training, Service Delivery/Provider Integration, Service 
Delivery/Public-Private Provision mix, Service Delivery/Capacity & Utilization, Medical 
Products/Supply of commodities, Governance/Ownership, and Governance/Accountability. 
These indirect effects occur alongside the many direct effects resulting from the transition of 
PEPFAR programs.  
However, not all of these impacts could be examined in by the parent study or addressed in 
the thesis. I will narrow the discussion of impacts to three domains:  1.) Health Workforce 
(Training, Incentives and motivation, Distribution), which I address in the first paper of this 
thesis; 2.) Service Delivery/Capacity & Utilization, which is addressed in the second paper; and 




HIV programs have drawn a disproportionate share of health workers in Uganda, 
particularly among highly-trained cadres. The distribution of health workers following transition 
will be determined by the extent to which HIV care and the facilities providing it can retain staff 
relative to other services and facilities. This will be influenced by the loss of salaries and 
incentives (e.g., training, and per diems/bonuses) due to transition. It is unlikely that alternative 
funding will be available to replace these incentives in the short-run, but coping mechanisms can 
blunt the impact. Staff responsiveness to the loss of incentives will determine the extent to which 
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maldistribution of staff created by PEPFAR incentives is adjusted. Such effects can be seen by 
tracking the number of each type of cadre employed by health facilities over time and through 
time-use surveys of health workers. 
Among the direct effects of PEPFAR withdrawal, the loss of health worker incentives may 
not only influence the distribution of health workers but also directly reduce their motivation and 
productivity. Indirect impacts on health workers from transition, in the form of poorer working 
conditions and less support and training, may also affect motivation. Workers may seek 
alternative sources of income (e.g., informal payments or moonlighting) or their productivity 
may decline. Either response by health workers would negatively affect HIV service volume as 
well as any non-HIV services that they were providing. The consequence would be a decline in 
service provision per staff member. Alternatively, the loss of incentives for HIV could result in a 
switch from provision of HIV to non-HIV care. 
Health Workforce/Training will be strongly affected by the transition through the 
discontinuation of PEPFAR support for trainings. The composition of trainings following 
transition will be determined by remaining actors, including government and other vertical 
projects for malaria, MNCH, TB, etc. Assuming that the HIV trainings aren’t continued, or that 
workers cannot access them without PEPFAR support, there will be a direct impact on the 
quality of skills in HIV care within a few years, especially given rapidly-evolving HIV treatment 
guidelines. These trainings may have also improved the quality of non-HIV services. The long-
term effect on quality of care would be difficult to measure, but some quality measures can be 









In the short-run, reduced training and meetings with PEPFAR IPs may result in more time 
for patients, resulting in higher delivery of services. Health workers are frequently absent due to 
meetings and trainings (54). In the long-run, loss of training and reduced coordination may have 
negative results. 
Service Delivery/Capacity & Utilization can be affected through multiple channels. 
Changes in Health Workforce and Medical Products (i.e. drug stock-outs) domains could have 
secondary effects on the domain of Service Delivery. However, the GP could also lead to a loss 
of quality or accessibility of services that reduce utilization without having an impact on the 
supply of drugs. Facilities may decide to discontinue some HIV services and shift patients to 
other providers. For example, facilities could decide to cease provider-initiated testing, outreach 
testing, or ART default-tracing activities which would reduce use of related services. A shift 
towards provision of non-HIV care (potentially driven by a desire to seek incentives provided 
through other health programs) could lead to lower volume of HIV services being performed. 
Public/Private Provision Mix will probably be affected by the PEPFAR GP, which will 
eliminate support to many private facilities with low-volume of HIV care. Without access to 
public sector resources, private providers will either cease to provide HIV care or use cost 
recovery to supplement support previously received through PEPFAR. Either scenario will likely 
result in fewer patients using private facilities for HIV care. Reduced private sector competition 
may alleviate fragmentation of services, but can also limit patient choice and access. The 
distribution of services between public and private facilities can be assessed, but the impacts of 




1.6.5 Hypotheses of PEPFAR GP Impacts in Uganda 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the above discussion. For each impact, the outcome of transition (how 
transition adapts the HIV program functions) will have effects on measured quantities of service 
delivery and/or human resources. It can be seen that many different impacts influence service 
volume. For example, an increase in non-HIV services could be the result of an increased supply 
of health workers in non-HIV care resulting from transition, a decline in time spent in trainings, 
or time freed by a decline in HIV services. In the analysis proposed, the profile of human 
resources, HIV care, and non-HIV service delivery will be considered in conjunction to 
differentiate among hypotheses. There are also many unrelated factors that can confound the 
outcome in this non-experimental study, methods to address these factors will be discussed in 
each paper. 
Where relevant, the anticipated short-term (<1 year) and long-term effects (≥1 year) are 
differentiated. In many cases, short-term effects are not expected. The exception is for loss of 
incentives that encourage HIV care relative to non-HIV care, which can shift provider behavior 
fairly rapidly. Loss of training opportunities will have an immediate benefit if it leaves providers 
more time for patient care. The same can be said about other demands placed on providers’ time 
by PEPFAR (reporting, mentoring visits). However, in this case the long-term effects of less 
training and mentoring is a reduction in quality of HIV services. I have assumed that the effect 
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Footnotes:  HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; PNFP, private not for-profit; PFP, 
private for-profit. 
 
1.7 Research Questions & Methods 
 
This thesis consists of three papers, each of which addresses a single, overarching research 
question. The papers outline effects of transition on 1.) Human resources for Health (HRH), 2.) 
Service delivery, and 3.) Differential impacts on public, PNFP, and PFP providers. In order to 
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answer the questions raised in the three papers, I relied on the quantitative components of the 
parent study (Project SOAR, Geographic Prioritization Study) in Uganda. These include a cross-
sectional facility survey and analysis of secondary data from DHIS2 and HRHIS.  
Table 4 relates papers and objectives to data sources. I discussed the data source and data 
methods broadly in this introduction. Specific issues of data analysis are addressed in the 
individual papers.  
 
Table 4:  Dissertation Papers, Objectives, and Methods 
Paper 
Theme 
Research Question Sub-Objectives Data Sources 
1.) HRH How does transition 
affect inputs to HRH 
and health worker 
outcomes? 
Summarize how transition changes 
site-level support for HRH 
Facility Survey 
Measure the impacts on human 
resources in transitioned and 
maintained facilities in terms of 
termination of posts, numbers of 
staff, worker time-allocation, 







What is the impact of 
transition on the 
availability, quality, 
and volume of HIV 
and non-HIV 
services? 
Impact of transition on HIV and 
non-HIV service availability 
Facility Survey 
Impact of transition on patient 
access and service quality 
Facility Survey 
Effect of transition on the volume of 





How do the impacts 
of transition differ by 
facility ownership? 
Identify disparate impacts of 
PEPFAR GP on health systems and 
human resources in transitioned 
private sector facilities 
Facility Survey 
Identify how service delivery 
changes in PNFP and PFPs in 









1.7.1 The Parent Study:  Mixed Methods Evaluations of PEPFAR GP in Kenya & Uganda 
 
The broader study consisted of a mixed methods evaluation of the PEPFAR Geographic 
Prioritization in Kenya and Uganda. The study objectives and methods are presented in  
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Table 5, and these include document review & key informant interviews, facility survey 
and secondary data (DHIS2), and longitudinal case studies. The findings presented in this 
dissertation come exclusively from the facility survey and secondary data analysis. However, I 
did rely on information gleaned from other study methods in the discussion of the results. 
 
Table 5:  SOAR Study Overview 
 
 
 The facility survey was designed by researchers from the Department of International 
Health at Johns Hopkins, myself included, in consultation with local partners, including 
Makerere University School of Public Health. The survey instrument consists of eight sections:  
1. Facility information; 2. Transition Arrangements; 3. Service Delivery, 4. Drugs, commodities, 
and laboratory support; 5. Supervision; 6. Human Resources; 7. Finance and budget, and 8. 
Individual worker questionnaires. The analyses presented in this study use indicators contained 
in sections 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 of the survey as well as covariate data obtained from section 1, 2, & 
6. 
Survey interviews took a minimum of one hour to administer, but could extend over a 
single or multiple days in larger facilities. In small facilities (HC II, III, & Clinics) the facility in-
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charge or her acting replacement was used as the primary respondent. Respondents were allowed 
to seek information from other staff members. In large facilities (HC IV & Hospital), multiple 
respondents were used to obtain information, including the in-charge, directors of HIV clinic and 
maternity wards, the pharmacist, laboratory personnel, and the financial officer. In all facilities, 
1–3 staff, including the primary respondent, involved in HIV services present on the day of the 
survey were randomly surveyed for section 8 (individual worker questionnaires). The individual 
respondents were asked about changes in time-allocation, non-salary support, job satisfaction, 
and motivation.  
The sample contained 275 facilities with an expected non-response rate of 10% and a 
target sample size of 250. The sample size calculation is discussed in the annex to the 
introduction. I constructed the facility survey sample frame from a list supplied by USAID with 
designation of facilities as intended for either maintenance, scale-up, or transition in FY2015. I 
excluded all facilities identified for scale-up. From the sample frame, I selected survey units 
using a stratified random sampling design with three strata:  1.) 100% selection of all districts 
containing transitioning HC IVs and/or Hospitals as well as Kampala and Wakiso, which contain 
many transitioned PFPs, 2.) Random sampling of 11 out of 18 remaining districts that were 
designated as central support or maintenance districts, 3.) Random sampling of 6 out of 14 
priority districts. Within all districts except Kampala and Wakiso, I sampled all facilities that 
were identified as maintenance or transition. In Kampala and Wakiso districts, I took a 40% 
random sample of transition facilities only. 
Two facilities that were selected for longitudinal case studies that were also being 
conducted by the study but were not randomly selected for the facility survey — Amuru HC III 
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(Amuru District) and JB Clinic (Kampala City Council) — were purposively added to the survey 
sample, bringing the total sample size to 277. 
The survey was fielded in July & August 2017 by enumerators hired by Makerere 
University. Enumerators were able to complete surveys at 262 facilities. Of the 15 facilities that 
could not be surveyed, nine had closed permanently, two were closed for construction, two 
facilities were identified as duplicate records, one (a PFP facility) refused to participate in the 
survey, and one was not accessible on account of hazardous road conditions. Ethical approval 
came from the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health Institutional Review Board 
(00007208) and local ethical approval was provided by the Uganda National Council for Science 
and Technology (SS 4263). 
Secondary data came from two datasets:  the district health information system 2.0 
(DHIS2) and the human resources for health information system (HRHIS). The DHIS2 is an 
electronic web-based database for aggregating, managing, and displaying data collected from 
through the Health Management Information System (HMIS) in Uganda (84). The HMIS 
collects routinely generated data from health facilities and districts throughout Uganda relating to 
service provision, commodities, and health outcomes. The data used in this dissertation derive 
from two paper reporting forms submitted by health facilities:  HMIS 105 & HMIS 106a. The 
HMIS 105 collects basic data on outpatient services related to acute events from health facilities 
on a monthly basis. The 106a collects outpatient data related to long-term follow-up of health 
conditions (e.g., HIV & TB) on a quarterly basis. In this study, I extracted data from DHIS2 for 
the period October 2013–December 2017. 
The Human Resources for Health Information System (HRHIS) contains facility audit 
data, which consist of a real-time reporting of staffing levels for facilities (85). The data comes 
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from the iHRIS platform, developed by IntraHealth, and is maintained by the Ugandan Ministry 
of Health Resource Center. The facility audits contain data on the number of approved and filled 
positions by cadre in reporting facilities. Reporting by facilities is incomplete for both DHIS2 
and HRHIS datasets. Data is particularly rare for private for-profit facilities. I extracted HRHIS 
data on five occasions between April 2016 and December 2017. To extend the baseline, I use a 
dataset for December 2015 provided to the research team by IntraHealth. 
 
1.7.2 Defining Transition – Official PEPFAR & Facility Self-Report 
 
There are two different sources of information on past PEPFAR support and current 
transition status. The first is an official list of PEPFAR sites in FY2014 that identifies each site 
as transition/central support, maintenance, or scale-up. The list was provided to the study team 
by USAID in 2016 and represents transition intentions made in 2015. The second source is self-
report by facilities, which is available for only for surveyed facilities, and represents transition 
status as of July–August 2017. In addition to asking about their transition status directly, the 
survey instrument asks facility in-charges about past support from PEPFAR IPs in the past three 
years overall and for specific forms of support (lab services, outreach, staff training, and 
supervision). If facilities received such support, the respondents were asked to identify when 
they stopped receiving it. 
The USAID list of facilities that were targeted for transition differs considerably from 
facility self-report (Table 6). The percent agreement is only 54.2%. In particular, there are 68 
facilities (26.0%) that were supposed to be maintenance but report transition in the facility 
survey. Most of these facilities were in a gap of support between IPs lasting for 9–12 months. 
The facilities lost support from Management Sciences for Health/Strengthening TB & AIDS 
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Response – Eastern Uganda (MSH/STAR-E), but had not yet received support from the Regional 
Health Integration to Enhance Services in Eastern Uganda (RHITES-E) project. The facilities 
report their experience as transition from PEPFAR support and exhibit similarities to other 
transitioned facilities. Therefore, I counted them as transitioned in the analysis of facility survey 
data. The maintenance facility sample size is reduced, and with it our power to detect significant 
differences between transition and maintenance has declined. Also, 36 facilities (13.8%) report 
no support from PEPFAR in the past three years. 
 
Table 6: Comparison of Reporting Transition Status in Facility Survey Sample 
PEPFAR Official 
Transition Designation 
Facility-Reported Transition Status 













Footnotes:  PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. 
 
 
Given the discrepancies between sources, I used the official PEPFAR transition 
designation as an intention to treat (ITT) analysis. In secondary analyses, I examined the findings 
using facility-reported transition status among the survey sample. In the individual papers, I 
addressed the limitations of both analyses. This thesis does not attempt to define transition, rather 
I alternate between the official intentions and self-reported transition status of facilities in my 
analyses. 
 
1.7.3 Modeling Transition Impacts 
 
I used two methods to measure trends in services:  difference-in-difference (D-in-D) and 
trend analysis. The D-in-D approach compares levels of services before and after a transition 
period for transition and maintenance facilities. The D-in-D approach comes with multiple 
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assumptions, the most important of which for this study is the assumption of parallel baseline 
trends. I only used D-in-D approach for indicators for which baseline trends tend to be parallel, 
and I examine trends graphically in order to assess the validity of the assumption. Trend analysis 
compares the change in slope around a transition point for transition facilities relative to 
maintenance facilities (Figure 4). It is the preferred method for outcomes wherein baseline trends 
cannot be assumed to be parallel, which includes all count indicators. For all models using count 
data, I fitted mixed effect negative binomial regression models. For models with proportions or 
ratios, I assessed normality and fit Gaussian mixed effects models. Models are specified further 











1.8 Thesis Organization 
 
The remainder of this thesis contains of three papers that address the issues of human 
resources, service delivery, and differential impacts on public and private facilities, respectively. 
The first paper addresses changing support to human resources and examines how health 
workers respond to transition. Having noted the human resources dimensions of transition, the 
second paper examines whether loss of PEPFAR support was associated with changes in service 
availability, quality, and volume. Having quantified the effect of transition on human resources 
and services, the third paper looks at ownership as a potential effect modifier of transition. 
Transition had different implications for private for-profit, private not for-profit, and public 
facilities and their responses to transition may differ. In the fifth and final chapter of this thesis, I 
summarized the results, compare the finding to my hypotheses, and discuss some of the lessons 
that can be drawn for policymakers, researchers, and implementers. 
 
Chapter 2.  “The Impact of Donor Transition on Human Resources for 




The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has had a substantial impact 
on human resources for health (HRH) in recipient countries. PEPFAR identified 734 facilities for 
transition in 2015–2016. There is limited prior evidence to suggest how human resources will 
fare following transition. 
 The Johns Hopkins University/Makerere University study team conducted a facility 
survey in mid-2017 that captured inputs to health workforce (salaries, incentives, training, and 
supervision) as well as health worker outcomes (termination of workers, changing time 
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allocation, job satisfaction, and motivation). Using facility-reported transition status, I compare 
responses for transitioned facilities to those maintained on PEPFAR using a weighted Chi-square 
test and an unweighted Fisher’s exact test. In addition, we extracted data on staffing levels at 
publicly-owned health facilities from the Human Resources for Health Information System 
(HRHIS) for December 2015 to December 2017 and use a difference-in-difference analysis to 
compare staffing ratios for all workers and for nurses and midwives. 
Of 226 PEPFAR-supported facilities surveyed, 206 reported transition. Compared to 
facilities that were maintained on PEPFAR support, transitioned facilities were more likely to 
have declining frequency of supervision for HIV (transition:  54.9% vs. maintenance:  9.2%; 
p<0.001) and declining incentives for outreach (95.3% vs. 25.4%; p<0.001) and “other” (airtime, 
food items, etc.) (94.1% vs. 13.5%; p<0.001). After loss of PEPFAR support, workers in 
transition facilities were significantly more likely to report decreased time spent on HIV care 
(32.1% vs. 11.2%; p=0.002), training (80.8% vs. 34.5%; p=0.005), reports (18.5% vs. 9.5%; 
p=0.023), meetings (39.2% vs. 6.0%; p<0.001), and administration (16.1% vs. 3.9%; p=0.028). 
Transition facilities were more likely to terminate HIV positions (25.7% vs. 0%; p=0.005), 
mostly those of lay health workers, such as HIV testing counselors and expert patients. However, 
trends in staffing levels for formal health worker cadres in public facilities did not differ 
significantly. 
Transition negatively affected both inputs to HRH and some health workforce outcomes. 
Transitions of global health initiatives should take HRH impacts into account. In particular, 
donor-supported lay health workers are at risk of being lost during transition. Donors should 







Since their inception in the early 2000s, there has been an ongoing debate about the effects 
of global health initiatives (GHIs), such as PEPFAR and the Global Funds to Fight AIDS, TB, 
and Malaria (GFATM), on health systems and human resources for health (HRH). However, 
much of the early debate (prior to 2009) was characterized by a lack of evidence and reliance on 
anecdotal information (86). Since 2009, a number of studies have been published that sought to 
explore the connection between GHIs and HRH more broadly and with greater evidence. 
However, despite the growing pool of evidence, the subject remains unclear. 
A number of studies have noted the large share of GHI spending going towards health 
system strengthening (43, 44, 87), with particular attention in recent years to above-site 
laboratory and information systems (87). Other studies have emphasized the human resources 
expansion that followed the introduction of GHIs. Cailhol, Craveiro, Madede, et al. (2013) note 
that, between 2004 and 2010, the density of health workers increased in four out of five high-
HIV prevalence countries studied (88). Drawing on the experience of Malawi and Ethiopia, 
which expanded HRH during HIV scale-up, Rasschaert, Atun, Wouters, et al. (2011) present 
evidence that GHIs brought attention and funding to HRH and resulted in expansion of the health 
workforce as well as task-shifting models that allowed the health system to be more effective 
despite the added service volume associated with GHIs (59).  
Much of the health system strengthening efforts made by GHIs have been directed toward 
training of health workers. Vujicic, Weber, Nikolic, et al. (2012) note that training of health 
workers is included in nearly all World Bank, GFATM, and GAVI grants, with the majority 
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consisting of in-service training (89). In Uganda, district health officers (DHOs) credited training 
programs with improving HRH for both HIV and non-HIV services (56).  
However, many articles rebut the claims that GHIs have only benefited HRH. Brugha et al. 
(2010) contrasted Malawi, which had an integrated human resources policy during HIV scale-up, 
with Zambia, where PEPFAR and the GFATM had uncoordinated HRH policies that increased 
workloads without increasing staff numbers (53). Uganda’s DHOs also noted that, while 
PEPFAR’s impact overall has been positive, there were negative impacts from increased 
workloads for HIV care and reporting requirements (56).   
GHIs have also been accused of pulling clinicians out of routine health care into either 
specialized vertical programs or into administrative roles. This “internal brain drain” from the 
public sector has been cited by health system administrators in many countries, including 
Mozambique (90) and Uganda (56). In Uganda specifically, more than half of graduates from 
one of Uganda’s medical schools worked in a HIV-related NGO and 42% reported spending “at 
least 50%” of their time on HIV (51). For comparison, it was estimated that HIV/AIDS 
contributed to 10% of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) lost in 2016 (91). Salary and 
incentive differentials, including access to trainings with generous per diems and travel 
reimbursements, have been cited as a cause of low morale among health workers in Uganda (56) 
and a source of conflict between workers in Zambia (92). 
On funding, Fan, Tsai, Shroff et al. (2017) show that GFATM’s “health system 
strengthening” (HSS) investments do not appear to be related to government effectiveness or 
health worker density, despite these being the very criteria that GFATM used in deciding 
whether to maintain or transition its support (93). At best, the authors argue that HSS funding is 
not driven by needs. Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI) funding earmarked 
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for HSS has been identified as largely consisting of supplies and health worker incentives, which 
do not result in long-term system strengthening (94). An analysis of GAVI, GFATM, and World 
Bank grants showed that health worker remuneration was included in more than 60% of GFATM 
and more than 50% of GAVI grants. However, in 69% of GAVI and 100% GFATM of these 
grants the sustainability strategy assumed that government or other actors would take over 
payments (89). These temporary incentives may distort HRH and render health systems less, 
rather than more, sustainable without external support. 
Even for training there is disagreement about the benefits for HRH. Vujicic et al. (2012) 
note that, of studied GFATM grants, in 97% of cases where training was included, the training 
was disease-specific only (89). It is possible for disease-specific training to have spill-over 
benefits for non-targeted diseases, as noted by DHOs in Uganda (56), but it is less likely than for 
general training. 
This is not to say that national health systems have been passive in response to GHIs. 
Health systems have been noted to respond to the burdens of HIV scale-up in a number of ways, 
including introducing their own health workforce incentives and through workload reduction 
policies, such as reducing frequency of visits for established ART patients (95). Task-shifting 
and expanded use of community health workers, including “expert patients” and peer educators, 
has been another common innovation (88, 95). Longer-term responses have included efforts to 
align salary scales and to share incentives between HIV and non-HIV workers (88) or to rotate 
clinical staff through positions with access to incentives (95). These coping mechanisms may 
have blunted the negative impact of GHIs, but they introduce new risks during transition, by 
relying on lay health workers funded by donors or increasing the number of workers that depend 
on incentives to supplement their salaries. 
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HRH policies and practices adopted during the scale-up of ART may not be suitable 
without donor support. In particular, the disorganized and uncoordinated expansion of lay HIV 
health worker cadres, such as “expert patients”, HIV testing counselors, peer mentors, and 
community health workers (CHWs) (hereafter referred to collectively as lay health workers) 
noted during HIV scale-up may make these cadres unsustainable following transition (96). 
National programs for lay health workers are often too weak and underfinanced to absorb and 
supervise the specialized HIV-trained lay health worker cadres employed by donor programs, 
and facilities may lack the budget to retain, train, and deploy these workers without donor 
funding. 
In one of the few studies to examine the effects of transition on HRH, Cairney LI, 
Kapilashrami A. (2014) note that recruitment and retention strategies used during HIV scale-up 
in Namibia were not feasible following PEPFAR and GFATM’s scale-down. GHI programs in 
Namibia led to an increased hiring of health workers using a private recruitment firm at salaries 
that were higher than those offered by the MOH. The GFATM opted to cut its staff salaries by 
half, driving many to seek alternative employment. When both PEPFAR and the GFATM 
abruptly decided to cut back support in 2011, there was no transition plan in place. Government 
personnel management processes for creating new posts within the MoH, which require Cabinet 
approval, were slow to respond to transition (97). 
Given the continued debate about the legacy of HSS by GHIs and the limited research 
conducted to date on transition, there is uncertainty about how transition might influence HRH. 
Only one study explicitly explores the effect of donor scale-back on HRH and only at a high 
level (97). Empirical studies are needed in order to shed light on the impact of transition. Also, 
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by examining what happens when donors exit, these studies may reveal ways in which GHIs 
have distorted the HRH systems when they were present.  
In order to target PEPFAR resources to regions with high unmet HIV needs, PEPFAR 
launched the Geographic Prioritization (GP) in the 2016 fiscal year across all 15 “long-term 
strategy” countries. “Long-term strategy” is a category of country that, under PEPFAR FY2014 
Guidance, is characterized by high need for external support, high HIV prevalence, and limited 
domestic financial resources (14).  In Uganda, the GP included both regional and low-volume 
facility components. Ten districts in Northeastern Uganda, including 94 facilities as well as 
another 640 more facilities identified as “low-volume” by PEPFAR were targeted to shift to 
“central support” through the GP (17). Transition of these facilities from site-level support was 
intended to take place by October 2016, according to PEPFAR documents (4). 
Geographic Prioritization resulted in 734 health facilities being identified by PEPFAR for 
transition, thereby losing site-level support from PEPFAR IPs in Uganda. In parallel, contract 
terminations, re-distribution of regional programming to single IPs, and a shift from HIV-
specific to integrated health system programming have been ongoing over the period (98), and 
may have resulted in additional facilities losing IP support. 
PEPFAR IP site-level support comes in many forms, including supervision, training, 
salaries and bonuses/top-ups for health workers, outreach allowances, laboratory supplies and 
technical assistance, data quality support, and transport of commodities and lab samples. Many 
of the forms of IP support lost in transition went to strengthening HRH. The loss of support may 
impact health worker’s skills and morale, which can influence their productivity and quality of 
care. Loss of salaries can result in terminations, while lost incentives may lead workers in 
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transition facilities to seek employment elsewhere. The evidence base for transition’s impact on 
HRH is incomplete at best. 
2.2.1 Objectives 
 
The objective of this paper is to understand how transition from PEPFAR support in 
Uganda affected site-level support for HRH and how facilities and health workers respond to 
transition in terms of HRH. There are two sub-objectives. First, I seek to summarize how 
transition changes the support that facilities receive from all sources for supervision, salaries, 
incentives, training, and laboratory. Secondly, I explore changes in human resources in 
transitioned and maintained facilities in terms of termination of posts, worker time-allocation, 
job satisfaction, and motivation. 
This study relies on two key hypotheses. First, that PEPFAR IPs will withdraw support for 
HRH, and other actors — MoH, DHOs, health facilities themselves — will not fill all the 
resulting gaps. Secondly, that health workers will be aware of, and responsive to, the loss of 
support, and that some will respond by voluntarily transferring to other facilities, resulting in 
lower staffing, or by becoming demotivated and unsatisfied. Health facilities may also 




To understand the impacts of transition on HRH, I am using both a primary facility survey 
and a secondary dataset. 




The study team fielded a cross-sectional survey of 262 facilities in 28 selected districts in 
Northern, Eastern, and Central Uganda in July–August 2017. The survey used a sample frame of 
PEPFAR-supported facilities in 42 districts across Northern, Eastern, and Central Uganda. We 
limited the sample to facilities that had been identified as supported by an implementing partner 
contracted to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), per 
requirements from the funder. We selected district-level clusters of facilities using three 
approaches:  (1) 100% selection of all districts containing transitioning health center IVs and/or 
Hospitals as well as Kampala and Wakiso districts, 2) random sampling of 11 out of 18 
remaining districts that were designated as central support or maintenance districts, and 3) 
random sampling of 6 out of 14 priority districts. In sampled districts, we sampled all USAID IP-
supported transition and maintenance facilities, except for in Kampala and Wakiso districts, 
where we sample 40% of USAID IP-supported transition facilities only. Two facilities that were 
case study sites for the parent study, but were not included in other sampling approaches, were 
purposively added to the survey sample. The survey sample is not nationally representative for 
all PEPFAR facilities in Uganda.  
Survey enumerators asked facility in-charges about current and pre-transition access to 
trainings, supervision for HIV and MNCH services, salary support, and staffing patterns in their 
facilities. Additionally, in each facility, we sought 1–3 health workers involved in HIV to 
respond to a short questionnaire asking about the worker’s non-salary support, time-allocation, 
motivation, and job satisfaction. As 36 facilities reported having no PEPFAR support in the past 
three years, we excluded them from the analysis. The final sample included 226 facilities that 
had reported receiving PEPFAR support during the past three years, 206 of which reported 
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transition and 20 of which reported maintenance of PEPFAR support. We also collected at total 
of 479 individual interviews. 
Analysis of the facility survey accounts for survey design using sampling weights, 
clustering at the district level, stratification, and finite population correction. For outcomes 
reported by workers, I also include adjustment for clustering of workers at the facility level. All 
analysis was performed using Stata 15 (99). 
 
2.3.2 Facility Survey – Outcomes & Analysis 
 
The facility survey findings from the in-charge and worker modules contribute to both sub-
objectives (Table 7). To assess the impact of transition on inputs to HRH, I use the following 
outcomes:  1) Loss of PEPFAR IP support for Outreach, Training, Laboratory, & Supervision; 2) 
Change in Frequency of HIV and MNCH Supervision; 3) Changes in Salaries from PEPFAR IP, 
by cadre; 4) Changes in Non-Salary support for Bonus/Top-Ups, Outreach Allowances, and 
“Other” (which mostly consists of mobile airtime, transition allowances, and food items). For 
these outcomes, I conduct bivariate analysis only. Given the retrospective comparison included 
in these outcomes — changes in support since prior to transition – the analysis controls for fixed 
facility characteristics. I include supervision and training for maternal, neonatal, and child health 
(MNCH) as well as for HIV because supportive supervision visits can address both, and 
supervision and training can support quality of care and health worker morale even when not 
targeted to HIV. 
For categorical outcomes, I performed a weighted Chi-square test comparing maintenance 
and transition facilities. As many unweighted contingency tables have cells with 5 or fewer 
observations, the Chi-square test is not reliable in all cases. I used the unweighted Fisher’s exact 
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test to check the results. For the proportion of workers with salary from the IP, I used a mixed 
effects logistic binomial model to provide inference on the difference-in-difference in salary 
support for transition relative to maintenance facilities. I included the stratification variables in 
fixed effects portion of the model and account for clustering at both the district and facility 
levels, in accordance with the principle of model-based analysis of survey data. 
 In order to assess how health facilities and workers respond to transition, I examined the 
outcomes of 1) Termination of HIV-related posts, 2) Changes in worker time-allocation since 
transition, 3) Changes in job satisfaction, and 4) Current motivation, measured through a 10-item 
index created by Mbindyo et al. (100). In the analysis, I compared the change in transition 
facilities to the changes in maintenance facilities. 
For the outcomes of training, motivation, and job satisfaction, I only had cross-sectional 
information with no pre-transition baseline. Access to training can vary considerably by level, 
size, and ownership of facilities. To address these issues, I performed a multivariate regression 
analysis of the number of HIV training days per HIV worker per year since transition, adjusting 
for facility level, ownership, number of HIV workers, and district characteristics (whether or not 
the district was transitioned in whole to central support and whether or not the district was 
created since 2007). The annualized number of HIV training days is highly non-Gaussian. 
Therefore, I used bootstrap resampling to construct an empirical distribution with 10,000 
permutations. As there were no significant differences in current job satisfaction or motivation 






Table 7:  Objectives, Outcomes, and Data Sources 
Objectives Outcomes Data Source Transition 
Indicator 
Source 
Summarize how transition 
changes site-level support 
for HRH  
 Forms of Support Transitioned 
(Outreach, Training, Supervision, and 
Laboratory) 
 Supervision (for HIV/MNCH) 
 Salaries from PEPFAR IP 
 In-charge Perception on training 
 Reported Training (Any/HIV-related) 





 Outreach Allowances 
 Other Non-Salary Support 





Explore changes in human 
resources in transitioned 
and maintained facilities  




 Changes in worker time-allocation  
 Change in Job Satisfaction 
 Motivation 












Footnotes:  GP, geographic prioritization; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; HRH, human resources for health; HRHIS, human resources for 
health information system; IP, implementing partners; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. 
 
 
2.3.3 Human Resources for Health Information System – Data Sources 
 
I hypothesize that facilities transitioned from PEPFAR will lose staff as a result of 
termination, reassignment, and voluntary turnover of health workers. The research team sought 
to measure the effects on staffing directly through the facility survey by collecting data on 
terminations and turnover. However, this survey captures only a portion of the national picture 
and relies on retrospective reporting by in-charges. Therefore, I also used secondary data on 
staffing levels from Uganda’s Human Resources for Health Information System (HRHIS). The 
system is based on the iHRIS platform developed by Intrahealth/Capacity Plus and managed by 
the Ministry of Health of Uganda (101). The HRHIS dataset includes facility audits, which are 
counts of workers of each cadre employed by specified health facilities. 
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The HRHIS Facility Audit data does not have full coverage in Uganda. There is less 
reporting by private not for-profits (PNFPs) and almost none by private for-profit (PFPs). 
Moreover, PNFPs do not staff according to the same template that public facilities follow in 
Uganda. Therefore, it would be difficult to compare ratios of filled-to-approved positions for the 
PNFP facilities to public facilities. By contrast, public facilities have guidelines for staffing by 
level (Table 8) (102). This allows estimation of a staffing ratio, i.e. the ratio of filled to allowed 
positions. Therefore, I have restricted the HRHIS sample to public facilities only, of which there 
are roughly 1,500 PEPFAR-supported facilities that consistently report to HRHIS (Table 9). 
 
 









Number of Staff by Cadre for Each Public Facility Level: 
Nursing & 
Midwife Cadres 
2 6 12 101 





1 5 19 28 
Medical, Dental, 
Pharmacist 





4 5 12 33 
Total (All Cadre) 9 19 50 185 
 Source:  Approved staffing Norms at Various Levels. Kampala, Uganda: Ministry of Health; 2014. 
 
 In this analysis, I used two aggregated counts of health workers:  “All cadre” — which 
includes all health worker cadres recognized by the MoH — and “Nurses/Midwives” — which 
includes several cadres of enrolled nurses & midwives, nursing or midwifery officers, but 
excludes nurse assistants. Both aggregates exclude lay health workers, such as VCT counselors, 
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expert patients, peer educators, and community health workers (CHWs). I included the 
nurse/midwife cadre for two reasons. First, they are supposed to be present at all levels of public 
health facilities, and, secondly, because they provide and/or supervise the bulk of MNCH and 
HIV care at health facilities. While a facility typically must have a clinical officer in order to 
offer ART, nurses & midwives are involved in HIV patient care through oversight of HTC and 
PMTCT and clinical examinations of ART patients. 
I first extracted data from the HRHIS Facility Audit database on April 19th, 2016. To 
extend the baseline, I used a dataset provided by Intrahealth that goes back to December 2015 
(Intrahealth, personal communication, November 06, 2017). This data was used to create the 
Human Resources for Health Audit Report 2015 (103), which was identified as representing the 
situation as of Dec 31, 2015. As many facilities likely transitioned before December 2015, this is 
not a genuine baseline. In our facility survey sample, 29% of facilities (unweighted) transitioned 
in 2015 or before. However, as I expected that staffing changes will be both immediate (e.g., 
resulting from loss of workers paid by PEPFAR IPs) and delayed (turnover of staff due to shifts 
in incentives and morale), I may still be able to capture the latter type using only post-transition 
data. The final data extraction took place in December 2017. This provides a 23-month follow-up 















Table 9:  HRHIS Data Extraction Timeline & Counts 
Data Source Calendar Date Months Since 
Baseline Data 
Number of Reporting PEPFAR-
Supported Government Facilities 
(% Coverage) 
Human Resources for 
Health Audit Report 
Dec 31, 2015 0 1,496 (78.9%) 
HRHIS Dataset 
April 19, 2016 3 1,520 (80.1%) 
Oct 2, 2016 9 1,496 (78.9%) 
Jan 19, 2017 12 1,507 (79.4%) 
May 5, 2017 16 1,503 (79.2%) 
August 19, 2017 19 1,494 (78.8%) 
Dec 14, 2017 23 1,491 (78.6%) 
Footnote:  HRHIS, Human Resources for Health Information System; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief. 
 
2.3.4 HRHIS Data - Analysis 
 
I merged HRHIS data to the 2015 list of 2,538 PEPFAR-supported facilities provided by 
USAID. As Uganda lacks unique facility identifiers, I developed a matching key for merging 
facility data using facility names. Only facilities listed as being publicly-owned according to 
PEPFAR datasets were retained. The resulting longitudinal dataset is described in Table 9, which 
outlines the reporting rate for government-owned facilities with PEPFAR support at baseline. 
Data coverage is consistent over time (Table 9); therefore, I only used the first and last 
observations in the statistical analysis as proxies for the pre- and post-transition situation, 
respectively. Lacking data on transition status for facilities not in the survey sample, I instead 
used USAID’s classification. Therefore, the primary analysis of HRHIS data should be 
considered as an intention to treat (ITT) analysis. 
Given the discrepancies between the USAID list and facility self-report noted in the 
introduction, I conducted a secondary analysis of HRHIS staffing data using the much smaller 
facility survey sample with self-reported transition status. As there is only one maintenance 
facility in the survey sample in Eastern Uganda and no facilities with data in Central Uganda, I 
omit regional interactions from the analysis, and include region only as Northern vs. Eastern. 
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Otherwise the analysis of HRHIS data using the facility survey sample is the same as described 
below. 
In the analysis, I included any facility reporting in either December 2015 or December 
2017. To address missing, I used a multi-level random intercepts model that is robust to missing 
under the missing at random (MAR) assumption. Essentially, I assume that missingness is not 
correlated with the outcome variable, i.e. the staffing ratio. This assumption requires that 
understaffing does not influence reporting to HRHIS, which is questionable. However, this 
assumption is less restrictive than the missing completely at random assumption that is required 
for other modeling approaches, such as complete case analysis, to yield unbiased results. 
The multi-level model controls for autocorrelation of staffing levels within facility. I have 
allowed for random intercepts in staffing levels by facility, which induces an exchangeable 
correlation structure. As an exchangeable structure may not be appropriate for the data, I 
included a Huber-White Sandwich estimator to update the autocorrelation model using the data. 
In the fixed effects portion of the model, I included facility level, region, and transition status to 
account for some of the systematic differences between facilities in order to improve the validity 
of the assumption of normally distributed random intercepts. I controlled for potential 
confounding by including interactions of facility level and region with the post-transition 
dummy. Using difference-in-difference (D-in-D) analysis, it is possible to control for secular 
changes in staffing unrelated to the PEPFAR GP. The 2017 Ugandan fiscal year (July 2016–June 
2017) was associated with a major increase in the national health budget and a rise in staffing 
levels. This national-level policy shift may have had regionally heterogeneous effects. Figure 29 
(Annex) shows that staffing ratio increased most in all of Uganda except Central. Figure 30 
shows weak evidence for differential changes in staffing by level of facility. Similar findings 
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suggested of confounding exist for staffing ratios of nurses & midwives (Annex:  Figure 33 & 
Figure 34). 
 I also controlled for facility upgrades during the study period. I identified facility upgrades 
from name changes over time. I confirmed the change in facility level by consulting DHIS2 
records. As of December 14, 2017, 60 facilities in the sample had been upgraded since 2015. 
Facility upgrades occur as a result of district-splitting and the conversion of a HC IV into a 
district hospital as well as through selective upgrading of lower level facilities. Often facilities 
can also be upgraded from HC II to HC III in order to post a clinical officer to the facility and 
allow it to provide ART. I used the upgraded level of the facility in the analysis. Changes in level 
of facility affects the staffing ratio because newly upgraded facilities often cannot achieve the 
staffing norm for their new level immediately and consequently appear particularly understaffed 
after being upgraded. This understaffing can persist for many years.  
The staffing ratios are fairly normally distributed, as shown in Figure 31 (and for nurses & 
midwives in Annex:  Figure 32). Therefore, I opted to use Gaussian standard errors. Inference 
about transition’s effect comes from the coefficient on the interaction term between time-
dummies and the PEPFAR transition dummy. The full model is presented in the Annex. 
Essentially, the model tells us how different the change in staffing ratios was from baseline for 
facilities transitioned from PEPFAR relative to facilities maintained on PEPFAR, with some 
models controlling for level x time & region x time interactions. I hypothesized that the change 
in staffing at transitioned facilities will be smaller than that taking place in maintained facilities, 
representing a reduced ability to recruit and/or retain staff at health facilities following transition.  
In order to interpret the effect estimates from D-in-D analysis as causal, I must be able to 
make three assumptions about the data:  1) parallel baseline trends, 2) that exposure to transition 
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is not determined on the baseline trend in the outcome (i.e. the staffing ratio), and 3) 
independence of units. The data suggest parallel trends, but transition facilities have lower 
staffing and facilities selected for “low-volume” transition may well be low-volume due to 
understaffing. Also, I assumed that staff will leave transition facilities in favor of facilities that 
continue to receive PEPFAR support (i.e. maintenance or scale-up), thereby violating the 
assumption of independence. Therefore, one should be cautious in interpreting the effect 
estimates as causal effects of transition on staffing ratios. 
2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Facility Survey Results 
 
 Of the 226 survey facilities with PEPFAR support, 206 reported transition and 20 
reported maintenance on PEPFAR (Table 10). The composition of facilities differed 
considerably between maintenance and transition. A higher proportion of HC III and a lower 
proportion of HC IVs and Hospitals reported transition from PEPFAR. A similar proportion of 
private facilities and public facilities report transition, but more PFP facilities report transition. 
The majority of facilities in transition and maintenance offer ART and deliveries. There were 
few notable differences in the types of support received from PEPFAR before transition, with the 
exception of training, which was reported by 91% of transition facilities vs. 70% of maintenance 
facilities. Nearly all transition facilities reported loss of all IP support while no maintenance 






Table 10:  Descriptive Statistics of Survey Facilities (Unweighted) 
 Transition 
(N = 206) 
Maintenance 
(N = 20) 
Level N (%) N (%) 
HC II/Clinic 50 (24%) 6 (30%) 
HC III 133 (65%) 10 (50%) 
HC IV 14 (7%) 1 (5%) 
Hospital 9 (4%) 3 (15%) 
Owner   
Public 145 (70%) 14 (70%) 
Private Not for-Profit 
(PNFP) 
29 (14%) 5 (25%) 
Private for-Profit (PFP) 32 (16%) 1 (5%) 
Services   
Offers ART  152 (74%) 16 (80%) 
Offers Deliveries 176 (85%) 17 (85%) 
District   
Central Support 66 (32%) 8 (40%) 
New District 31 (15%) 0 (0%) 
Types of Baseline 
Support from the IP 
  
Supervision 190 (92%) 17 (85%) 
Training 188 (91%) 14 (70%) 
Outreach 161 (78%) 16 (80%) 
Laboratory 177 (86%) 16 (80%) 
Loss of Support from IP 
(% losing support/supported at baseline) 
Supervision 176 (93%) 0 (0%) 
Training 176 (94%) 0 (0%) 
Outreach 158 (98%) 0 (0%) 
Laboratory 167 (94%) 0 (0%) 
Footnote:  ART, antiretroviral therapy; IP, implementing partner. 
 
 Among facilities reporting having supervision from any source, transition facilities are 
significantly more likely to report reduced frequency of supervision for HIV since transition 
(Table 11). However, the difference for MNCH supervision was not significant at a 5% level. 
Transition facilities were also significantly less likely to report having had any workers attend 
any training since transition. The unadjusted difference in the mean number of HIV training days 
per capita per year since transition is 2.64 days higher in maintenance facilities. This unadjusted 
difference is not significant using bootstrap standard errors (p=0.099). In a separate survey 
question asked only to transition facilities, 77.1% (95% C.I.:  72.6%, 81.0%) of transition facility 
in-charges reported “inability to attend trainings” as an effect of transition. 
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Excluding posts that were terminated or vacant at the time of the survey, the proportion of 
currently filled posts in the HIV workforce with salary paid by IP has declined from 6.0% to 
0.5% in transition facilities compared to 5.1% to 2.6% in maintenance. The unadjusted 
difference-in-difference using a Gaussian regression model is 3.4 percentage points, and it is 
statistically significant. In other words, the decline in salary support was 3.4 percentage points 
greater for transition than for maintenance. Using a more valid binomial logistic model, the 
interaction of transition and post is associated with 0.141 times the odds of having a worker 
supported by the PEPFAR IP, but the finding is not statistically significant at the 5% level. The 
full model results are included in the Annex (Table 43). 
 In regards to non-salary support, only 13.6% of transition workers and 2.3% of 
maintenance workers report having had any baseline bonus or top-up support from PEPFAR IP. 
Nearly all bonus support has been reported to have decreased or discontinued. By contrast, 
42.1% of transition and 32.1% of maintenance workers reported receiving outreach allowances at 
baseline, and among workers with outreach support at baseline, 95.3% of transition workers 
reported a decline or discontinuation vs. only 25.4% of maintenance workers (p<0.001). 
A total of 23.9% and 16.7% of transition and maintenance facility workers, respectively, 
reported receiving “other” non-salary support. Respondents commonly identified other support 
as mobile phone airtime, snacks, T-shirts, and transport allowances. For “other” support, 94.1% 







Table 11:  Changes in Support for HRH in Survey Facilities (Weighted) 










Change in Frequency of 
Supervision for HIV 
N = 162 N = 12   
Decrease 54.9% 9.2% <0.001 0.002 
Same 40.7% 70.1% 
Increase 4.4% 20.7% 
Change in Frequency of 
Supervision for MNCH 
N = 165 N = 15   
Decrease 39.4% 13.7% 0.050 0.117 
Same 51.9% 75.1% 
Increase 8.7% 11.2% 
Training Since Transition N = 206 N = 20   
Any Topic (HIV, MNCH, etc.) 39.6% 61.7% 0.022 0.104 
HIV-related 30.6% 44.4% 0.095 0.322 
Mean HIV Training Days per 







Proportion of Workers with 
Salaries from PEPFAR IPs 
(Among Current Positions) 
Transition  
N = 200 
Maintenance 





Before Transition 6.0% 
(4.3 – 7.6%) 
5.1% 




After Transition 0.5% 
(0.1 – 0.8%) 
2.6% 
(0 – 5.4%) 
 
Mixed Effect Logistic 
Binomial Model 
(N = 452) 





HIV Workers   
Proportion of workers 
Reporting Decline in/Loss off 
Non-Salary Support Among 










Top-Ups or Bonuses 100% 
(N = 1) 
98.8% 
(N = 53) 
0.805 1.000 
Outreach Allowances 95.3% 





(N = 103) 
13.5% 
(N = 7) 
<0.001 <0.001 
1Full model results presented in Table 43. 
Footnote:  D-in-D:  difference-in-difference; IP:  implementing partner; HIV:  human immunodeficiency virus; MNCH:  maternal, neonatal and 
child health. 
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Table 12 presents the results of a bivariate analysis of health workers’ responses to 
transition examining terminations, time-allocation, job satisfaction, and motivation. Transition 
facilities were more likely to report terminating any positions in their HIV workforce (25.7% vs. 
0%, p=0.005). Transition facilities terminated, on average, 9.5% of their pre-transition HIV. The 
most frequently terminated cadres were volunteers (29% of terminated workers), lab 
technicians/assistants (13%), peer educators/mentor mothers (11%), community health 
workers/outreach workers (11%), and voluntary testing and counselling (VTC) counselors 
(10%). The category of “Volunteers” may include “expert patients”, who are often paid small 
honoraria or transit allowances to assist in patient education, monitoring, and/or adherence 
counseling. 
 Among the workers surveyed, there were clear differences reported in changes to their 
time-allocation. Transition facility workers were less likely to report an increase in time-
allocation for HIV clinical care compared to maintenance. Transition facilities were also 
significantly less likely to report an increase (or more likely to report a decrease) for time spent 
in training (p<0.001), meetings (p<0.001), reporting (p=0.023), and administration (p=0.028). 
The change in time-allocation for non-HIV clinical care was not significantly different between 
facility types (p=0.148). Job satisfaction and motivation index scores were also not significantly 








Table 12:  HRH Responses to Transition 
Outcome: Transition  
(N = 206) 
Maintenance  
(N = 20) 






Termination of Health 
Workers 
Any Terminations 25.7% 0% 0.005 0.005 
Proportion HIV Workers 
Terminated 
9.5% 0% N/A N/A 
Changes in Time Allocation 
… for HIV Clinical Care Transition 
(N = 427) 
Maintenance 






Increase 33.6% 59.0% 0.002 0.003 
Same 34.3% 29.8% 
Decrease 32.1% 11.2% 
… for Non-HIV Clinical Transition 
(N = 426) 
Maintenance 






Increase 43.3% 55.3% 0.148 0.078 
Same 43.0% 41.1% 
Decrease 13.6% 3.6% 
… for Reports Transition 
(N = 426) 
Maintenance 






Increase 29.4% 49.2% 0.023 0.002 
Same 52.2% 41.3% 
Decrease 18.5% 9.5% 
… for Meetings Transition 
(N = 428) 
Maintenance 






Increase 15.0% 33.2% <0.001 <0.001 
Same 45.8% 60.9% 
Decrease 39.2% 6.0% 
… for Training Transition 
(N = 426) 
Maintenance 






Increase 6.1% 20.9% <0.001 0.005 
Same 13.1% 44.6% 
Decrease 80.8% 34.5% 
… for Administration Transition 
(N = 406) 
Maintenance 






Increase 18.0% 32.3% 0.028 0.005 
Same 65.9% 63.9% 
Decrease 16.1% 3.9% 
Motivation & Satisfaction 
Job Satisfaction Transition  
(N = 433) 
Maintenance  






Extremely Satisfied 4.4% 9.5% 0.223 0.168 
Somewhat Satisfied 62.7% 64.3% 
Neither Satisfied nor 
Dissatisfied 
13.6% 3.6% 
Somewhat Dissatisfied 17.7% 22.6% 




(N = 433) 
Maintenance 
(N = 46) 
T-Test  
Mean 3.92 3.97 0.399  





Bivariate analyses showed that transition workers reported less time on training but the 
difference in annualized HIV training-days per worker were not significant. In Table 13, I 
present the results of a multivariate analysis of training. Using bootstrap resampling and 
adjusting for facility characteristics, the difference in annualized HIV training days per worker 
declines to 2.47 days and is not statistically significant (p=0.070). Workers in larger facilities had 
more HIV training-days, on average, and workers in the central support districts tend to have 
fewer training days. Examining the distribution of the data in Figure 5, the distribution is highly 
non-normal and influenced by outliers. The high outliers are likely due to facilities that report 
having many workers trained since a recent transition date, resulting in a large amount of 
estimated training days per year. Removing the outliers would favor maintenance facilities even 























Table 13:  Multivariate Regression of Annualized HIV Training Days per Worker 
 Unadjusted Adjusted 


















Level   
HC III vs. HC II  1.325 
(-0.133, 2.784) 
0.075 
HC IV vs. HC II  3.338* 
(0.111, 6.565) 
0.043 
Hospital vs. HC II  5.623 
(-1.851, 13.10) 
0.140 
Ownership   
PNFP vs. Public  2.818 
(-1.137, 6.774) 
0.163 
PFP vs. Public  -0.788 
(-1.715, 0.138) 
0.095 
HIV Workforce Size  0.036 
(-0.268, 0.340) 
0.815 
New District  0.358 
(-0.682, 1.398) 
0.500 









N 219 219 
R2 0.017 0.124 








2.4.2 HRHIS Data:  All Available Data from Public Health Facilities  
 
Turning to the HRHIS outcomes, Figure 6 presents trends in “all cadre” staffing levels by 
transition status. The trends appear to be parallel, with transition facilities consistently having 














Figure 6:  All Cadre Staffing Trends by Transition Status (Full Sample) 
 
 
 Examining the D-in-D models (Table 14), the parallel trends are confirmed by statistical 
models. The unadjusted D-in-D in all cadre staffing is -1.3 percentage points (95% C.I.: -4.7, 2.2; 
p=0.480). The interpretation is not changed by controlling for confounding by level or region. 
For nurses and midwives, Figure 7 suggests that there some convergence in nurse and midwife 
staffing ratios for transition and maintenance facilities. The unadjusted D-in-D is 4.2p.p. (95% 
C.I.:  -4.6, 12.9; p=0.349). Adjusting for confounding by level and region, the D-in-D becomes 
negative:  -4.1p.p. (95% C.I.:  -15.2, 7.1; p=0.474).  
Controlling for level and ownership only, transition facilities have 11.3p.p. lower baseline 
“all cadre” staffing and 23.3p.p. lower “nurse & midwife” staffing ratios. For maintenance 
facilities, staffing increased by 10 percentage points for “all cadre” and roughly 22 percentage 
points for nurses and midwives between December 2015 and December 2017. Facility upgrades 
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resulted in 24.9 percentage points lower “all cadre” staffing and 29.4 percentage points lower 




Table 14:  Multivariate Models of Staffing Ratios 
 All Cadre Nurses & Midwives Only 
 Unadjusted Adjusted for 
Confounding 























 (-0.342, -0.124) 
<0.001 
-0.192*** 
 (-0.291, -0.094) 
<0.001 









 (0.159, 0.281) 
<0.001 
0.274** 
 (0.106, 0.442) 
0.001 









 (-0.046, 0.129) 
0.349 
-0.041 
 (-0.152, 0.071) 
0.474 







 (-0.417, -0.171) 
<0.001 
-0.294*** 
 (-0.417, -0.171) 
<0.001 
Level     







 (-0.296, -0.031) 
0.016 
-0.066 
 (-0.176, 0.045) 
0.245 







 (-0.245, 0.117) 
0.486 
0.045 
 (-0.109, 0.199) 
0.569 







 (-0.783, -0.439) 
<0.001 
-0.500*** 
 (-0.648, -0.353) 
<0.001 
Region     







 (-0.246, 0.011) 
0.073 
-0.196** 
 (-0.332, -0.059) 
0.005 







 (-0.293, -0.057) 
0.004 
-0.211** 
 (-0.342, -0.08) 
0.002 







 (-0.193, 0.179) 
0.941 
-0.108 
 (-0.275, 0.059) 
0.203 
Level x Post     




 (-0.322, -0.065) 
0.003 




 (-0.409, -0.024) 
0.027 




 (-0.376, -0.063) 
0.006 
Region x Post     




 (-0.003, 0.311) 
0.054 




 (-0.08, 0.221) 
0.358 













 (1.049, 1.337) 
<0.001 
1.166*** 
 (1.016, 1.316) 
<0.001 
N facilities 667 667 667 667 
 1,310 1,310 1,310 1,310 
Footnotes:  HC:  health centre. 




Figure 7:  Nurses and Midwife Staffing (Full Sample)  
  
 
2.4.3 HRHIS Data:  Survey Facility Sample 
 
Restricting the data to the facility survey sample, there are 166 public facilities with prior 
PEPFAR support. Of these, 144 facilities (86.7%) have data for either December 2015 or 
December 2017, including 12 facilities reporting maintenance and 134 facilities reporting 
transition. Out of the 166 eligible facilities, 136 (81.9%) have complete data (i.e. both Dec 2015 
& Dec 2017).  
Figure 8 shows that there is a small divergence in “all cadre” staffing in these facilities 
taking place at the end of 2017. The diverging trend is also noted for nurses and midwives ( 
Figure 9). The unadjusted D-in-D in staffing is -6.9p.p. (-21.4, 7.7; p=0.355) for all-cadre 
and -25.3 percentage points (-52.4, 1.8; p=0.067) for nurses and midwives. Adjusting for 




































 Within the facility survey sample, baseline differences in “all cadre” and “nurse & 
midwife” staffing ratios are smaller than for all HRHIS data as a whole, and the increase in 

















Table 15: Multivariate Regression of Staffing Ratios (Facility Survey Sample) 
 All Cadre Nurses & Midwives 
 Unadjusted Adjusted for 
Level 
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Level x Post     




































N facilities 144 144 144 144 
N obs. 282 282 282 282 
Footnote:  HC:  health centre. 






Transition facilities in our facility survey sample differed slightly in their ownership status 
and levels but were similar to maintenance facilities in their PEPFAR support at baseline. 
However, during transition the frequency of HIV supervision and the level of non-salary support 
declined more in transition. Declines in salary support from IPs and declines in MNCH 
supervision were greater in transition facilities, but not significantly so. There is not enough 
evidence from the cross-sectional measure of training to be sure that observed differences are 
significant, much less evidence that these differences are related to transition. Yet, 77% of 
transition facility in-charges report declining access to trainings and declining worker time-
allocation for training was reported by 80.8% of transition workers compared to 34.5% of 
maintenance. Therefore, at least some evidence suggests that training was affected. 
  Transition was also associated with a number of health worker outcomes, including 
termination of HIV workers, reduced time allocation for HIV clinical care, reporting, training, 
and administration. Transition facilities terminated 9.5% of their HIV workforces (mostly lay 
health workers). However, job satisfaction and motivation were not different among remaining 
workers. 
Despite terminations, there is no evidence of declines in staffing ratios for formal cadres at 
transitioned public health facilities. Nurse & midwife staffing actually increased more in 
transitioned facilities than maintenance, using USAID’s classification in the ITT analysis. Using 
the facility survey sample, transition facilities had a negative D-in-D, but the results were not 
statistically significant. These findings are not surprising, as the most commonly terminated 
positions were lay health worker cadres, not MOH-approved cadres. 
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There are several limitations in this analysis. First, our uncertainty in the transition status 
for many facilities is a major limitation. Even using the self-reported transition status, we cannot 
be sure if the respondent is mistaking a gap in support for transition. If there was a gap in 
support, the impacts of transition noted may not last when support returns. Connected to this 
issue, we have a small sample size of maintenance facilities (N=20) in our facility survey, which 
makes the results for staffing ratios and training uncertain and potentially sensitive to outliers. 
Secondly, most questions related to HRH in the facility survey were retrospective and, 
therefore, rely on recall and self-report. Our findings could be biased by differential recall, such 
as in-charges being more likely to recall terminating a post if transition occurred than if it did 
not. It is also possible that in-charges in transition facilities deliberately sought to paint transition 
in a negative light in order to influence policymakers to restore support. Furthermore, for cross-
sectional measures, such as training, job satisfaction, and motivation, the analysis is limited by 
the potential for residual confounding by unobserved factors. 
Lastly, the HRHIS is a relatively new and somewhat untested data source. HRHIS data is 
supposed to be updated when staffing changes; however, I do not have clear information on how 
rapidly or completely the data is updated when changes in staffing occur. The restriction to 
public facilities and the 80% reporting rate limit the generalizability of evidence from HRHIS 
data. The exclusion of lay health workers is also a limitation, given that these cadre were most 
affected by terminations in our facility survey. Readers should be cautious in drawing causal 
interpretations from the HRHIS due to the plausibility of confounding (or regionally varying 
effects of transition), uncertainty in the measurement of transition, and violations of the 
assumption of independence between facilities. 
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The findings present a mixed picture for how transition might affect human resources for 
health at the facility level. The loss of inputs, such as supervision and training, could place the 
quality of care for HIV services at risk. Job satisfaction, motivation, and staffing levels suggest 
that transition had limited impact on morale and staffing. However, transition facilities also have 
fewer lay health workers than before transition as a result of terminations. Given the importance 
of lay health worker cadres for HIV testing and patient adherence, there may be long-term 
impacts for the populations these facilities serve. In the second paper in this dissertation, I 
examine utilization of key HIV and non-HIV services in more depth. 
This study adds to the very limited literature on the impact of transitioning GHIs on HRH. 
The findings also shed light on the impacts that PEPFAR may have had when it was in place. 
PEPFAR provided additional inputs to health workers in the form of incentives, supervision, and 
access to training. At the time of our survey, such inputs that had not been replaced by 
government or other sources and, to the best of our knowledge there were no future plans to do 
so. However, the loss of these incentives have not had an immediate impact on staffing rates or 
motivation and satisfaction, which suggests that there distortional effect was limited. Yet, 
transition workers’ reports of reduced time-allocation for meetings, training, HIV care, and 
reporting (relative to maintenance) support the view that PEPFAR support resulted in increased 
time spent in these activities. But there is no shift to non-HIV care in transition that would 
suggest that PEPFAR’s time burdens came at the expense of non-HIV care. This null finding 
would agree with a recent study in Uganda that found ART scale-up to be unassociated with 
trends in outpatient department visits, suggesting that large increases in HIV care have not 
crowded out this general measure of non-HIV service delivery (68).  
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The decline in HIV supervision is not surprising, given that PEPFAR IPs are required to 
provide quarterly site visits to supported facilities. Since trainings continue to occur, declining 
access to trainings in transition facilities could be explained by workers no longer receiving 
transport and other allowances to enable them to attend. Donors and governments should explore 
less costly training models that are resilient to loss of donor financing. Cascading or training the 
trainers (TTT) models, where workers are prepared off-site in order to train their peers on-site, 
can reduce reliance on donors to support travel costs. This model has been evaluated for 
ophthalmology trainings across Sub-Saharan Africa (104). However, small facilities may be 
ignored in this model, as they lack a critical mass of potential trainees, and support for transition 
facility trainers to attend may even be lacking. 
The termination of lay health workers during transition in Uganda was predictable. Health 
facilities, particularly public facilities, lack the financial resources and budgetary flexibility to 
support salaries for these workers after transition. The national community health worker 
program in Uganda, the Village Health Teams, consists of unpaid volunteers, who have restricted 
mobility as a result of lacking transportation allowances and basic supplies, resulting in high 
dropout intentions (105). The Village Health Team programs studied in Mukono and Wakiso are 
themselves dependent on funding from donor programs (105).  
Village Health Teams may not be able to absorb lay health workers, but they also cannot 
replace them. Given that donor-supported HIV lay health workers have training, experience, and 
established linkages with facilities and patients, maintaining them is preferable to replacing them 
with other personnel. There is some evidence that HIV patients are willing to use Village Health 
Teams as a provider, but there is a preference for those who are also HIV+, indicating the 
importance of peer support and sensitization of community providers (106). Therefore, replacing 
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HIV-specialized lay health workers supported by IPs (including HIV+ “expert patients” and peer 
educators) with generic community health volunteers will be less effective than retaining them. 
However, merely retaining the workers is insufficient if DHOs and facilities are not 
equipped to supervise them. Transitioning responsibilities for supervision requires planning. 
Transition coordination between MoH, PEPFAR, and districts did not occur as planned. 
Interviews conducted through the parent study revealed that a transition team was assembled by 
the MoH, but ultimately did not meet (L. Paina, personal communication, September 27, 2016). 
Had transition planning taken place, ad hoc mechanisms could have been developed to provide 
bridge support and supervision for lay health workers until something more permanent could be 
created. 
These cadres are important to the HIV response, reaching patients outside of facilities for 
testing and linkage to care (107, 108). They can also reduce burdens on health facilities through 
community distribution of ART (109), which is particularly useful as the “Test and Treat” policy 
increases the number of patients on ART. There is considerable evidence that including CHWs 
or peer mentors in facility-based PMTCT and ART programs increases their effectiveness (110, 
111). Moreover, the cost of maintaining lay health workers is generally low, and lay and 
community health worker models have been shown to be cost effective in a number of settings 
(112). However, there are numerous barriers to absorbing these cadres into national systems in 
LMICs, including wage bill caps and the weak position of health ministries in the budgeting 
process, which have resulted in few countries studied finding a way to absorb lay cadres 




Not all of the possible impacts of GHIs on HRH can be revealed through the withdrawal of 
support. Genuine health system strengthening may have made facilities less responsive to loss of 
assistance. There may also be some gap-filling through DHOs or coping mechanisms at the 
facility level. Despite these limitations, the withdrawal of support remains informative about 
PEPFAR’s effects on HRH in Uganda. 
Transition of PEPFAR support was associated with negative impacts on HRH at 
transitioned health facilities. HRH needs to be considered during transitions of all donor health 
programs. Furthermore, transition planning is needed to mitigate the impact of transition on 
HRH at the facility level. Planning should attempt to institutionalize donor-supported functions 
into existing or new national programs, particularly support for lay health workers. However, 
donors should also be prepared to provide bridge support until national programs are prepared to 
take on the functions transitioned by GHIs. This study was limited in follow-up time. Future 
research should examine some of the longer-term impacts on health worker training and skills 
following transition.  
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Chapter 3. “The Impact PEPFAR Geographic Prioritization on HIV & non-
HIV service delivery in Uganda” 
3.1 Abstract 
 
Uganda has relied heavily on support from donors, including the President’s Emergency 
Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), to provide HIV services. In 2015, PEPFAR identified 734 
facilities for transition from site-level support in Uganda by end of 2016. I seek to measure the 
impact of PEPFAR’s transition on service availability, volume, and self-reported quality. 
 Using data from a facility survey conducted in mid-2017, I collect information reported 
by facility in-charges on the availability, access, and quality of key HIV and non-HIV services. I 
compare responses for facilities transitioned from PEPFAR to those maintained on constant 
PEPFAR support using weighted Chi-square and the unweighted Fisher’s exact tests. I also use 
counts of services provided from the district health information system (DHIS2) for the period 
Oct 2013–December 2017 to assess trends in utilization of HIV (testing & counseling, 
antiretroviral treatment, and retention on treatment) and non-HIV (outpatient visits, antenatal 
care, facility deliveries, and DPT3 immunization) services. I use mixed effect models to analyze 
the difference in trends and levels of indicators comparing transition to maintenance facilities. 
 Out of 226 PEPFAR-supported facilities surveyed, 206 reported transition and 20 
reported maintenance. Transition facility in-charges were more likely to report discontinuation of 
HIV outreach (51.6% vs. 4.1%, p<0.001) and worsening patient access to HIV (43.5% vs. 3.1%, 
p<0.001) and MNCH care (23.9% vs. 0%. p<0.001). Transition facilities also perceived 
worsening quality of HIV and MNCH care. However, the volume of HIV and MNCH services is 
either not lower in transition facilities compared to maintenance, is actually higher, or the 
differences do not appear to be related to transition.  
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 Despite negative effects on service delivery reported by facilities, there is a lack of 
evidence that PEPFAR transition has affected either HIV or MNCH care in the first year. 
Additional research is needed to assess the long-term impacts of site-level transition on service 
delivery. The discontinuation of outreach has the potential to impact HIV services and hinder 




In order to target resources to regions with high unmet HIV needs and the facilities capable 
of meeting these needs, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) launched the 
Geographic Prioritization (GP) in the 2016 fiscal year across all 15 PEPFAR “long-term 
strategy” countries (4). “Long-term strategy” is a category that, under PEPFAR FY2014 
Guidance, is characterized by high need for external support, high HIV prevalence, and limited 
domestic financial resources (14). The GP included both regional and low-volume facility 
components. In Uganda, GP resulted in 10 districts in Northeastern Uganda and their 94 facilities 
being identified for transition to “central support” as well as another 640 more facilities being 
identified as “low-volume” across Uganda by PEPFAR accounting (17). Transition was to take 
place between October 2015 and September 2016, which was extended to March 2017 (22). 
Transition facilities were to lose any site-level support that they received from PEPFAR 
implementing partners (IPs), which commonly includes supervision, training, incentives and 
salaries for health workers, and support for outreach. Above-site support systems, including 
laboratory networks and commodity supply chains, remain in place (17). However, facilities may 
have new difficulties in accessing these systems without IP support for ordering and transport. In 
Uganda, many of these forms of support are also provided — at least to public facilities — by 
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districts and national government; and transition implies that government would take over these 
roles. However, there is no specific mechanism to ensure government takes over the functions 
performed by PEPFAR IPs. The loss of support for health facilities in Uganda raises important 
questions about the sustainability of PEPFAR’s investments in service delivery. 
PEPFAR’s positive impact on HIV service delivery in Sub-Saharan Africa and Uganda, in 
particular, is well widely acknowledged (2, 56). Several studies have addressed the impact of 
HIV programs on non-HIV services as well (56-68). However, relatively few studies have 
evaluated the effect of transitioning HIV programs on HIV services (28, 30, 33, 69-75). 
Furthermore, I am aware of no previously published studies that have examined the effects of 
transition on non-HIV services empirically. In Rwanda, HIV services increased while PEPFAR 
support was scaled-back and funding transitioned to a budget-support model (70) and Farmer et 
al. (2013) report continued improvements in maternal, neonatal, and child health (MNCH) 
outcomes coincident with Rwanda’s HIV program transition, but does not explore the 
association (72). 
There are reasons to expect that non-HIV services will be affected by transition. Many 
PEPFAR IPs provide direct support to both MNCH as well as HIV/AIDS services and may use 
resources for HIV to support both types of care. Indirectly, increasing prevention of maternal-to-
child transmission (PMTCT) and early infant diagnosis (EID) requires high utilization of 
antenatal care (ANC) and post-natal care (PNC) by women and newborns. Facility upgrades and 
service quality improvements benefit HIV as well as non-HIV services. Training and supervision 
of health workers may also have spillover benefits for non-HIV care. Alternatively, PEPFAR 
supervision and incentives may crowd-out MNCH care by encouraging staff to engage in more 
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HIV care. Therefore, the net effect of PEPFAR support on non-HIV services is ambiguous, as is 




This study aims to measure the impacts of the withdrawal of site-level support on HIV and 
non-HIV service delivery at the facility level in Uganda. This paper has three specific objectives. 
First, I examine whether or not transition facilities are more likely to discontinue provision of 
any HIV or non-HIV service compared to facilities maintained on a constant level of PEPFAR 
support. Secondly, I want to understand how transition affects patient access to and quality of 
HIV and MNCH services, as reported by facility in-charges. Thirdly, using secondary 
longitudinal data from DHIS2, I compare trends in select services for transitioned and 
maintained facilities to identify if volume of HIV and non-HIV services was affected by 
transition. Two key hypotheses drive the study design of this paper. First, I assume that PEPFAR 
has been supporting HIV service delivery, including the provision of key HIV services, and I 
expect that transition from PEPFAR will result in reduced patient access and service quality, 
discontinuation of HIV services, and/or reduced volume of HIV services. Secondly, I also expect 




This paper uses quantitative data obtained from two separate sources:  a facility survey and 
secondary, routine data on delivery of health services from the District Health Information 
System 2.0 (DHIS2). The survey data contributes to objectives 1 & 2. DHIS2 data contributes to 




3.3.1 Facility Survey Data:  Objectives 1 & 2 
 
A facility survey was conducted by a joint Johns Hopkins/Makerere University study team 
in July & August of 2017. We expected transition to take place in mid-2016; however, the 
process was not completed until March of 2017, according to USAID. The survey was conducted 
roughly nine months after the transition midpoint (October 2016) and five months after the 
official end of the GP.  
The survey sample frame was drawn from a list of health facilities identified by the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) as PEPFAR-supported in FY2014. The 
list designated each facility as either maintenance, scale-up, or transition. For logistical reasons, 
the study team limited the sampling area for this survey to 40 districts in Northern and Eastern 
Uganda, as well as Kampala and Wakiso districts. This area contained 9 of the 10 districts that 
were identified for all facilities to be transitioned, known as “central support districts” as well as 
the majority of facilities designated for maintenance. Kampala and Wakiso are urban districts 
that contain a substantial fraction of the private for-profit (PFP) sites designated for transition 
from PEPFAR support. We sampled transition facilities within priority districts, but we did not 
sample any facilities identified for scale-up. We also restricted the sample frame to facilities that 
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 Cohort Retention on First-line 
ART at 12 months 
 ANC4+ Coverage 
 IPT2 Coverage in ANC 
Random intercept 
Gaussian regression 
ART – antiretroviral therapy; ANC – antenatal care; DHIS2 – district health information system 2.0; ANC4+ coverage – ratio of 4th or higher 
order ANC visits to first ANC visits; DPT3/Penta-3 – diphtheria pertussis tetanus/ pentavalent immunization 3rd dose; HIV – Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus; HTC – HIV testing and counseling; IPT2 – intermittent prophylaxis therapy 2nd dose; MNCH – maternal, neonatal, and 
child health; OPD – outpatient department; USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
 
We selected district primary sampling units from the sampling frame using a stratified 
random sampling design with three strata:  (1) 100% selection of all districts containing 
transitioning HC IVs and/or Hospitals as well as Kampala & Wakiso districts, (2) random 
sampling of 11 out of 18 districts that were designated as central support or maintenance but did 
not contain transitioning HC IV/Hospitals, (3) random sampling of 6 out of 14 scale-up districts. 
Within selected districts, all facilities identified as PEPFAR-supported at baseline and scheduled 
for either transition or maintenance were included, except for Kampala and Wakiso, where we 
took a 40% random sample of transition facilities only. Using this process, a total of 275 
facilities were included in the sample. We estimated 10% non-response and aimed for a final 
sample of 250. The sample size calculation is described in the Annex. Two case study facilities 




Of the 277 facilities in the sample, enumerators were able complete surveys at 262 
facilities. Of the 15 facilities that could not be surveyed, nine had closed permanently, two were 
closed for construction, two facilities were identified as duplicate records, one refused to 
participate in the survey, and one was not accessible on account of hazardous road conditions. Of 
the 262 facilities surveyed, 36 claimed to have had no PEPFAR support within the past 3 years, 
206 reported having been transitioned, and 20 reported continuing to receive PEPFAR support. 
This was contrary to what was expected, due both to the 36 sites with no recent PEPFAR support 
and the larger than expected proportion of sites reporting transition (and smaller than expected 
proportion reporting maintenance). From follow-up interviews with IPs and USAID, we 
determined that as many as 60 of the transitioned facilities were experiencing a break in support 
between IPs lasting for about 9–12 months. As these facilities reported similar processes and 
impacts as those that were genuinely transitioned, we have included them as transition facilities 
in this analysis. 
The survey asked each facility whether they provided any of four HIV services (ART, 
Outreach, PMTCT, and HTC) as well as five non-HIV services (ANC, deliveries, 
immunizations, nutrition, and child health clinic) related to MNCH. If the facility reported that 
they currently do not offer the service, the enumerator asked if they offered the service prior to 
the transition date. The transition date is reported by the facility in-charge if facility reports 
transition. If the facility does not report transition, a fixed reference date (October 1, 2016) is 
used. In-charge respondents were also asked general questions about trends in access and quality 
of HIV and MNCH services. Using this information, I compared responses on discontinuation 
and changes in quality or access across facilities reporting transition and maintenance using 
weighted Chi-square test. Analysis of the facility survey accounts of survey design using 
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sampling weights, clustering at the district level, stratification, and finite population correction. 
However, many tables are sparse, with fewer than 5 cases in each cell, making the Chi-square 
test unreliable. Therefore, I also used an unweighted Fisher’s exact test as a check. All analysis 
were performed using Stata 15 (99). 
 
3.3.2 DHIS2 Data & Analysis:  Objective 3 
 
The second data source is a nationwide longitudinal record of aggregated counts of 
services provided by health facilities obtained from DHIS2. I used data from two health 
management information system (HMIS) reporting forms:  HMIS 105, which is reported 
monthly and required for all health facilities, and HMIS 106a, which is reported quarterly and 
only submitted by facilities that provide HIV, TB, or other long-term services. The data covers 
the period October 2013 to December 2017. I selected HIV indicators that reflect each of the 90-
90-90 goals — testing, treatment, and suppression — (5) as well as a variety of common MNCH 
indicators. Table 17 presents information on the indicators used in this analysis with some 







Table 17:  DHIS2 Indicators used in Uganda 
Indicator &  
Shorthand 
Comment Derived Indicators Rationale 
Current on ART Quarterly  Vital measure of ability to maintain or 
expand HIV services. ART is the 
second “90” in the “90-90-90” 
ART Cohort 12 months Number enrolling on ART 
four quarters prior. 
 Retention on ART, preferably first-line, 
is necessary for sustained virologic 
response, the third “90”. 
Net Cohort  on First-line 
ART at 12 months 
Quarterly; in 2015, Uganda 
switched from reporting both 
numerator and denominator 
for cohort to reporting the 
quotient only 
Percent of Cohort Retained in 
care on First-line ART = 
Cohort_Num / 
Cohort_Denom 
New on ART Quarterly  Additional to current on ART, new on 
ART measures flow rather than stock. 
Since new ART patients take more time 
than established patients, New on ART 
indicates ability to expand ART 
services. 
HIV Testing & 
Counseling (HTC) 
  Since 19% of PLHIV are unaware of 
their status in Uganda, HTC is critical 
for the first “90” 
HIV Testing Positive 
(HTC_Pos) 
 HTC_Yield = HTC_Pos / 
HTC 
I include HIV yield to explain HTC 
trends:  Is testing declining because of 
better targeting? It is not used 
elsewhere. 
Outpatient Visits (OPD)   A generic measure of health facility 
service capacity. Driven by demand 
fluctuations (e.g. malaria incidence). 
Total ANC Visits   Measure of attractiveness to pregnant 
women as a site of ANC 
First ANC Visit 
(ANC1) 
  Used as a proxy for number of 
pregnancies. 
Fourth or more ANC 
Visits (ANC4+) 
4+ Visits Coverage of ANC4+ = 
ANC4+ / ANC1 
 
Completion of 4+ ANC visits is a proxy 




in pregnancy, 2nd dose 
(IPT2) 
 Coverage of IPTp2 in ANC = 
IPT2 / ANC1 
Metric of quality of ANC. Affected by 
stock-outs of Fansidar, neglect, and 
ANC timing and follow-up.  






guidelines switched from 
DPT/penta to Pentavalent 
only in 2015 
 Indicator or childhood care, 3 doses 
requires three visits before 12 months 
of age. 
Footnote:  ART:   antiretroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; DPT3/Penta-3 – diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus/ pentavalent immunization 3rd dose; 
HIV:  Human Immunodeficiency Virus; HTC:  HIV testing and counseling; IPT2:  intermittent prophylaxis therapy 2nd dose; MNCH:  maternal, 
neonatal, and child health; OPD:  outpatient department; PLHIV:  people living with HIV. 
 
This study relies heavily on HMIS data reported to the DHIS2. The HMIS is a set of 
administrative data collection systems intended for policymaking; however, since 2015 it has 
been used by PEPFAR for monitoring and evaluation of HIV service delivery. There has been 
limited use of HMIS/DHIS2 data in the peer-reviewed literature. In Uganda, Luboga et al. (2016) 
used district-level HMIS records (67). Other studies conducted in SSA have tended to use 
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facility registries or reporting forms (61, 62, 66, 68) rather than centralized HMIS data. In this 
study, the information on service volume comes exclusively from the centralized DHIS2 dataset. 
Following extraction from DHIS2, I merged each facility’s data to lists of PEPFAR-
supported facilities as of FY 2014 supplied by USAID mission in 2015 using integrated PEPFAR 
Site List identifiers (iPSL_ID) fields. The Uganda DHIS2 has no unique facility identifier, but I 
was able to match facility records to iPSL IDs using a linking key compiled by the Uganda M&E 
contractor project (B. Amuron, personal communication, September 27, 2016). I performed 
manual checking and manual matching to address any issues in matching. Using USAID’s 
classification of sites, a total of 1,153 maintenance and transition facilities were included, of 
which 734 were transition and 419 were maintenance. An additional 1,385 sites were identified 
as scale-up, and I omit them from the analysis. 
 The transition intention in the USAID list agrees poorly with self-report by facilities. 
Given the discrepancies between sources on transition status, I conduct two analyses of the 
DHIS2 data. The primary analysis used all available data with the USAID-reported designation. 
However, in a secondary analysis, I used only the DHIS2 data for facilities in the facility survey 
sample and used the self-reported transition status. 
I defined facilities that reported to DHIS2 at least two times during the predicted baseline 
period (October 2013 to June 2016) and at least two times during the predicted post-transition 
period (July 2016 to December 2017) as having enough data for analysis. At the outset of the 
project, July 2016 was our best guess for when transition would be completed. As most facilities 
are either non-reporters or fairly good reporters, more stringent criteria (e.g. requiring 3 reports 
from both periods) would not change the number of facilities included in the analysis 
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considerably. There are a total of 1,006 maintenance or transition facilities with enough data for 
analysis of HMIS 105 outcomes out of a total of 1,153 such facilities (87.3%) (Table 18). 
I performed a minimalist data cleaning with the goal of removing highly out-of-range data 
values that could bias the analysis. I could not remove all erroneous values caused by over or 
under-reporting. Therefore, I opted to remove the most extreme high values. I took the average 
of each data field by facility and identified large outlier values relative to the facility average. 
The DHIS2 data cleaning process is described in greater detail in the Annex. For most indicators, 
except cohort retention, less than 0.1% of data points were dropped. For cohort retention, 
changes to reporting in 2015 contributed to a large amount of bad data (<1% or >100% 
retention), and 11% of data points were flagged. 
 
 
Table 18:  Numbers of Facilities and Observations in Analysis 
 PEPFAR Facilities Facilities in DHIS2 Observations 
HMIS Form Total 
Enough data for 
analysis1 Total 




1,006 55,153 50,563 
106a (Quarterly) 482 18,632 8,194 
1 Facilities were considered as having enough data for analysis is they had two reports from the pre-transition period and two from the post-
transition period. 
 
 There is no distinction between missing and null in DHIS2. Therefore, a missing field on 
a submitted report is ambiguous. It may mean that no services or events occurred during the 
period or that the service was provided but was not entered. For consistency, I imputed zero in 
all cases when a valid report was submitted with a missing field. However, for OPD, any facility 
with zero reported OPD visits was excluded from the analysis of OPD, as zero OPD visits is 
inconsistent with a functioning health facility. Facilities that have no events (all zeroes) for the 
outcome are excluded from the analyses by default. For facility deliveries, I also excluded 
facilities that report an average of ≤1 delivery per month (≤4 per month in models with 
confounders) in order to achieve model convergence. 
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For objective 2, changes over time in the indicators among transition facilities were 
compared to the corresponding changes for maintenance facilities in a standard difference-in-
difference analysis (hereafter “D-in-D” for short). The D-in-D approach may be used to estimate 
the causal effect of transitioning on transitioned facilities (i.e. average treatment effect on the 
treated), if three assumptions are met:  1) parallel baseline trends across the comparison groups, 
2) the exposure status (i.e. a facility being selected for transition) is unrelated to the pre-exposure 
trends, and 3) no interaction between units (i.e. spillover effects) (113). When these assumptions 
are not met, the D-in-D results should not be interpreted as causal effects; however, the results 
still provide an informative comparison of the exposure groups, with some caveats. Each 
assumption is addressed below. 
First, the assumption of parallel trends was visually inspected for each indicator and 
found to apply mainly to indicators that are expected to change very slowly over time, which 
were proportion indicators, e.g. ANC4+ coverage. An alternative analysis strategy, Trend 
analysis (described below), was applied to the indicators that visually violated the parallel trend 
assumption.    
The second assumption, that selection of facilities is not made based on variables that 
predict trends, is valid for non-HIV indicators, which were not used to select transition sites. 
However, this assumption does not hold for HTC and current on ART, which were used to select 
“low-volume” facilities for transition; ruling out a causal interpretation of my findings. Selecting 
facilities for transition on the basis of having a low volume of HIV services may result in 
transitioned facilities increasing their HIV indicators due to regression to the mean alone. This 




There is a related concern that potential growth in an indicator is not linear, but rather 
depends on the baseline level of coverage of the service among the population in need. In 
practice it is often easier to go from 30% to 50% coverage than to go from 70% to 90% 
coverage. Comparing facilities at different levels of coverage on a linear metric would penalize 
better-performing facilities. However, I assumed that a facility’s volume of services are primarily 
constrained on the supply side (i.e. there is always sufficient demand for any increase in supply). 
Therefore, the ability of facilities to increase an indicator is not constrained by baseline level of 
coverage in their catchment populations, so long as the assumption holds. 
The third criterion, independence of units, may also be violated, as it is possible that 
patients will switch from transition to maintenance facilities. My assumption that facilities are 
supply-constrained means that the volume of services is not sensitive to demand for services, and 
also that changing demand from patients moving from one facility to another will have no net 
effect on the volume of services delivered. Again, this assumption cannot be supported or refuted 
with available data. There is evidence to suggest that, at least for some services, demand factors 
(e.g. seasonal variations in OPD visits related to malaria) do influence volume of services 
provided, though these may only be seasonal fluctuations to core facility capacity levels and not 
signal responsiveness to demand over the long-term. Given the potential violations to 
assumptions required for making a causal interpretation using D-in-D, readers should not take 
observed estimates as causal effects of transition on transitioned facilities. 
To analyze count data, for which baseline trends do vary considerably, I used a difference-
in-difference in trend analysis (hereafter referred to as “trend analysis”). Trend analysis 
compares the change from pre-transition to post-transition slopes of trend lines for transition 
facilities to the change for maintenance facilities. Doing so controls not only for non-parallel 
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baseline trends but also for secular impacts on trends that are common to maintenance and 
transition facilities, such as national-level budget changes. I only modeled the linear slope in the 
pre- and post-periods rather than engaging in more complex modeling of trends because I am 
primarily interested in the change in slope as a single measure of transition impact. 
For count data, I modelled the indicator using a negative binomial model. The negative 
binomial model is flexible for overdispersion relative to the Poisson distribution. When the 
outcome is a proportion (i.e. coverage of ANC4+, coverage of IPT2, and 12-month cohort 
retention), I assess normality of the indicator, controlling for treatment assignment. In no cases 
did I judge the departure from normality to be large enough for the use linear models with 
Gaussian standard errors to bias conclusions. Thus, linear models were used to implement the 
analysis for such indicators using D-in-D analysis. However, I also used bootstrap replication to 
generate an empirical confidence interval, thereby relaxing the normality assumption used in 
computation of Gaussian standard errors. 
To address autocorrelation in longitudinal data, I applied random intercept (mixed effect) 
models. Using random intercepts induces an exchangeable correlation structure between 
observations from the same facility. Since an exchangeable correlation structure may not be 
suitable for all indicators, I also used a Huber-White sandwich estimator (“vce(robust)” in Stata) 
to update the autocorrelation model using the empirical autocorrelation function. In addition, I 
bootstrapped the random intercept models using 500 replications to obtain confidence intervals 
that are robust to misspecification of the correlation model. The bootstrap is also the 
recommended way to deal with autocorrelation in D-in-D analysis to reduce the risk of inflating 
type I errors by Bertrand M, Duflo E, and Mullainathan S (2004) (114). 
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Transition in Uganda took place over a period of several years. I identified transition time-
points in a somewhat arbitrary way, using official start and endpoints reported by USAID as well 
as observed midpoint in our facility survey sample. By varying the time-point, we can check to 
see if the observed D-in-D and D-in-D in trend are spurious. In sensitivity analysis for count 
models, I have displaced the transition midpoint from October 2016 to April 2016, July 2016, 
and January 2017. For proportion outcomes, I used three different transition windows (October 
2014–March 2017, October 2014–December 2016, & January 2015–December 2016) in addition 
to the preferred window (January 2015–March 2017). 
The base model includes seasonal adjustment (except for ART and cohort outcomes, which 
show little seasonal variation) as well as level & ownership fixed effects. Seasonality has an 
important influence in health utilization, with low utilization of many outpatient services (ANC, 
HTC) in December and high utilization of OPD during rainy seasons, associated with malaria 
incidence. Removing this seasonal influence is important to properly modeling pre- and post-
transition trends. The purpose of including level and ownership fixed effects is to improve model 
fit and the assumption of normally distributed random intercepts by capturing a major source of 
variation in the fixed effects rather than the random intercepts. These models do not include 
interactions between facility fixed effects (level, ownership) and post-transition dummies that 
would be needed to account for confounding by these factors. 
For proportion indicators, I modelled a difference-in-difference using transition (vs. 
maintenance) facility and post-transition (vs. pre-transition) time dummy variables. The D-in-D 
coefficient on the interaction term for transition x post is the basis for inference. Using trend 
analysis, I modelled the slope in the pre and post-transition periods for maintenance facilities and 
include an interaction term for transition facilities. The basis for inference is the difference 
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between the change in slope for transition and the change in slope for maintenance. The models 
are described in full in the Annex. 
Searching for effect measure modification can be an important check for causal attribution. 
It is possible that D-in-D or trend analysis will be modified by facility characteristics (region, 
level, ownership). Effect measure modification would imply either that transition from PEPFAR 
has heterogeneous effects or that there is confounding by factors other than transition. 
Heterogeneous effects are interesting, but hard to explain, and the more likely explanation will 
often be residual confounding. I examine effect measure modification by region, facility level, 
and ownership by repeating the base analysis after disaggregating by region (Central, Eastern, 
Northern, Western), level (HC II/Clinic, HC III, HC IV/Hospital), and ownership (public, private 
not for-profit, and private for-profit). I omitted PFPs and HC IIs for ART indicators as few of 
either provide ART. 
3.4 Results 
 
3.4.1 Facility Survey Sample Characteristics 
 
The facility survey obtained results from 226 PEPFAR-supported sites in Uganda. The 
unweighted characteristics of facilities are presented in (Table 19). Three-quarters of facilities in 
both maintenance and transition categories were health centre (HC) III level or higher. A total of 
73% of facilities offered ART prior to transition and 85% of facilities offered routine deliveries. 
 The majority of sampled facilities were public (unweighted 70%). Roughly equal 
proportions of facilities were private for-profit (PFP) and private not for-profit (PNFP). 
However, many PFPs were caught-up in the “low-volume” component of the GP and relatively 
fewer PNFPs were transitioned. The majority of both transition and maintenance facilities 
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reported receiving support from PEPFAR IPs for multiple services at baseline:  65% reported 
receiving assistance for supervision, outreach, training, and laboratory, and 22% reported 
receiving three of the four services (not shown). 
Almost one-third of the transition facilities in our sample were located in the “central 
support districts” identified by PEPFAR. However, more than 40% of maintenance facilities 
were located in the central support districts as well, where all facilities were expected to have 
been transitioned. Many facilities that we expected to report maintenance actually reported their 
status as transition, and it also appears that PEPFAR IPs in central support districts also decided 




Table 19:  Unweighted Facility Characteristics in Survey Sample  
Transition Maintenance  
No. % No.   % 
Facility Level 
HC II or N/A 50 24.3% 6 30.0% 
HC III 133 64.6% 10 50.0% 
HC IV 14 6.8% 1 5.0% 
Hospital 9 4.4% 3 15.0% 
Facility Ownership 
Private for-profit 32 15.5% 1 5.0% 
Public 145 70.4% 14 70.0% 
Private not for-profit 29 14.1% 5 25.0% 
Services Available 
Offers ART (Yes) 152 74% 16 80% 
Offers Deliveries (Yes) 176  85% 17 85% 
PEPFAR District Classification 
Maintenance 98 47.6% 9 45.0% 
Priority 42 20.4% 3 15.0% 
Central Support 66 32.0% 8 40.0% 
Year of Transition 
2013 – 2014 18 8.7% n/a n/a 
2015 – 2016 118 57.3% n/a n/a 





Footnote:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; HC:  health centre; n/a:  not applicable. 
 
The transition of facilities in our survey sample appeared to occur in three waves. The first 
wave in 2013–2014 consists of facilities that were dropped prior to the formal start of the GP in 
October 2015. However, these facilities were identified by USAID as part of the GP. Major 
transition activity did not take place until 2015–2016, and by October 2016, half of transitions 
had taken place. Late transitions taking place in early 2017 were often supported by Management 
Sciences for Health/Strengthening TB & HIV/AIDS Responses – Eastern Uganda (MSH/STAR-
E), which closed operations in March/April 2017 following a six-month contract extension. 
Some of the facilities dropped by MSH/STAR-E represent genuine transitions, while others are 
expected to begin receiving support from the Regional Health Integration to Enhance Services in 
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Eastern Uganda (RHITES-E) project, which will provide integrated support. It is not clear 











3.4.2 Objective 1:  Discontinuation of Services 
 
In-charge respondents reported substantial discontinuation of only one HIV service:  HIV 
outreach (Table 20). Among facilities that provided outreach prior to transition, 51.6% of 
transition facilities discontinued outreach, compared to only 4.1% of maintenance facilities. No 
MNCH services were discontinued by more than a handful of facilities, and there were no 
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significant differences in the proportions of transition and maintenance facilities discontinuing 
any MNCH service. Among facilities having all services at baseline, 16.6% of transition 
facilities and 0% maintenance facilities have discontinued any MNCH service (p=0.070). 
 
Table 20:  Discontinuation of HIV and non-HIV Services 









Transition Maintenance Transition, 
Maintenance 
HIV Services 
ART 1.3% 0% 0.333 0.413 149, 15 
Outreach 51.6% 4.1% <0.001 <0.001 175, 19 
PMTCT 4.2% 0% 0.372 0.297 175, 19 
HTC 2.7% 0% 0.265 0.289 201, 19 
MNCH Services 
ANC 2.3% 0% 0.451 0.346 189, 18 
Delivery 3.1% 0% 0.449 0.352 176, 16 
Immunization 5.1% 0% 0.361 0.302 190, 20 
Nutrition 4.4% 0% 0.237 0.270 151, 16 
Child 0% 0% N/A N/A 177, 18 
Any MNCH 
Service 
16.6% 0% 0.070 0.364 137, 14 
Footnote:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; MNCH:  maternal, neonatal & child health; 





3.4.3 Objective 2:  Perceptions of Patient Access and Service Quality  
 
In-charge respondents in transition facilities were more likely to report worsening patient 
access for both HIV and MNCH care than in maintenance facilities (Table 21). They are also 
more likely to report that quality was deteriorating. The differences in proportions were greater 
for HIV care than for MNCH. Although transition in-charges were more likely to report negative 




Table 21:  In-Charge Reported Change in Access and Quality of Care 
Outcome Weighted Proportion of 



















43.5% 3.1% <0.001 
 
<0.001 204, 19 
MNCH access 
(average patient) 
23.9% 0.0% <0.001 <0.001 198, 19 
HIV quality 35.6% 0.0% <0.001 0.008 204, 19 
MNCH quality 19.8% 5.1% <0.001 <0.001 198, 19 
Footnote:  HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; MNCH:  maternal, neonatal & child health. 
 
For specific services, transition facility in-charges were more likely to report that the 
quality of specific HIV services that they were providing were declining (Table 22). 
Maintenance facilities generally report that their services were improving. Many transition 
facilities report improvement as well, but the differences in proportions are large, worse for 




Table 22:  Change in Quality of Specific HIV and non-HIV Services 
HIV Services 
Weighted Proportion 









Maintenance) Transition Maintenance 
ART 44.5% 14.9% <0.001 <0.001 147, 15 
Outreach 46.5% 13.9% <0.001 <0.001 84, 15 
PMTCT 36.4% 8.7% <0.001 <0.001 170, 19 















ANC 33.5% 70.1% 0.001 <0.001 185, 18 
Delivery 38.0% 85.8% <0.001 <0.001 172, 16 
Immunization 46.4% 83.3% <0.001 0.005 185, 20 
Nutrition 28.7% 69.9% <0.001 0.001 145, 16 
Child Health 
Clinic 
32.7% 76.8% <0.001 <0.001 177, 18 
Footnote:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; MNCH:  maternal, neonatal & child health; 
PMTCT:  prevention of mother-to-child transmission. 
 
3.4.4 Objective 3:  Effects on Service Volume 
 
Table 23 presents the results of the ITT analysis of DHIS2 data trends using a transition 
date of October 2016 for trend analysis and a transition window of Jan 2015–March 2017 for D-
in-D. The full models are presented in Table 45 & Table 46 in the Annex. Two findings favored 
transition facilities:  HTC and New on ART. One significant finding favored maintenance:  





Table 23:  Trends in Service Delivery (ITT Analysis) 
Service 
Indicator 
Freq. Maintenance  Transition D-in-D 








Trend Analysis  Pre Post Pre Post 
HTC2 Monthly 
0.3% -0.3% -0.8% 1.7% 
3.1% 
(1.6%, 4.7%) 
<0.001 989 49,187 
New on ART Quarterly 
-2.0% 7.1% -5.5% 9.9% 
6.4% 
(1.3%, 1.6%) 




8.3% 5.5% 8.2% 6.6% 
1.2% 
(-2.4%, 5.0%) 
0.518 482 7,858 
OPD2 Monthly 
0.0% -0.7% 0.0% -0.6% 
0.1% 
(-0.5%, 0.6%) 
0.843 989 48,984 
ANC Total2 Monthly 
0.3% 0.1% 0.3% 0.9% 
0.8% 
(0.009, 1.016) 




0.8% 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 
0.8% 
(-0.3%, 1.8%) 




-0.1% -0.7% -0.1% -0.5% 
0.2% 
(-0.4%, 0.9%) 





81.2% 72.4% 82.3% 69.3% 
-4.2 p.p.3 
(-9.6, 1.2) 




32.4% 39.0% 36.8% 39.1% 
-4.3 p.p.3 
(-8.2, -0.4) 




25.6% 28.0% 25.7% 27.2% 
-0.8 p.p.3 
(-2.6, 0.8) 
0.302 939 19,651 
1 All models adjusted for level and ownership 
2 Also adjusted for seasonal variation 
3 Percentage points 
Footnote:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; ANC4+, ratio of 4th or higher order antenatal care visits to 1st visits; DPT3/penta3:  
DPT3/Penta-3 – diphtheria pertussis tetanus/ pentavalent immunization 3rd dose; HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; IPT2 – intermittent 
prophylaxis therapy 2nd dose; OPD – outpatient department visits. 
 
 
Relative to maintenance facilities, transition facilities had a 3.1% per month faster change 
in growth in HTC following transition. Transition facilities also had a higher change in the rate 
of growth in the number of patients new on ART of 6.4% per quarter. Comparing ANC4+ 
coverage (ANC4+/ANC1), transition facilities improved less than maintenance facilities. The 
difference-in-difference for ANC4+ coverage was -4.3 percentage points. It is important to 








Figure 11 presents the trends in HTC for the study period along with the transition 
midpoint (solid black line) and the widow of peak transition activity (Oct 2015–Mar 2017). The 
window of peak transition activity is not the same as the transition window used in the D-in-D 
analysis (Jan 2015–Mar 2017). An increase in HTC in maintenance facilities in 2014–2015 was 
not sustained in 2016–2017. Transition facilities experienced a relatively smaller increase and 














While not an outcome of priority, it is important to note that HTC Yield (the proportion of 
HIV tests that were positive) did not improve in either category of facility (Figure 12). 
Therefore, there is little reason to expect that the decline in HTC observed in maintenance is due 




















Both transition and maintenance facilities maintained their baseline trajectories in the 
number of patients currently on ART (Figure 13). The average ART patient load at PEPFAR 























Trends in enrollment of new patients on ART are largely flat with peaks in 2014 and 2017 
(Figure 14). The trend analysis model was not intended for such a variable indicator. Transition 
facilities were able to increase new on ART during the second peak in 2017 at a proportion 
comparable to maintenance facilities. In fact, transition facilities have a significantly higher 
difference-in-difference in trend than maintenance facilities by 6.4% per quarter (1.3%, 11.6%). 
This is largely due to the more stable trend in new on ART in transition compared to the higher 














Transition facilities and maintenance facilities have similar levels of retention of patients 
on first-line ART at 12 months following enrollment on ART (Figure 15). The decline in cohort 
retention at 12 months is substantial, nearly 15 percentage points between Q4 2013 and Q4 2017, 





















Turning to non-HIV services, trends in OPD visits did not differ significantly between 
transition and maintenance (Figure 16). Seasonal variation is very important for this indicator. 






















Coverage of 4+ ANC visits during pregnancy increased more for maintenance than for 
transition over the time-period (Figure 17). The D-in-D is -4.3 percentage points and marginally 
significant (p=0.031). The closing of the curves seems to be due to less improvement in the 













Figure 18:  Trends in IPT2 Coverage 
 
 
There was no significant D-in-D for IPT2 coverage in ANC (Figure 18). IPT2 coverage in 










Facility deliveries have been increasing steadily in both types of facilities (Figure 19). 























There was no significant difference-in-difference in trends for maintenance and transition 
facilities for DPT3/Penta-3 (Figure 20). However, there is a downward trend in both 
maintenance and transition facilities.  
 




Restricting the data to the facility survey sample results in a considerable reduction in 
sample size. In particular, the number of maintenance facilities contributing to the analysis is 11 
for Current on ART and 10 for Cohort Retention. Using the base model, transition facilities have 
a significantly higher trend in current on ART (1.7% per quarter; 95% C.I.:  0.1%–3.3%; 
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p=0.034). For cohort retention, the decline in transition is almost significantly larger than in 
maintenance (p=0.063). 
 
Table 24:  Trends in Service Delivery (Survey Sample) 
Service 
Indicator 











 Pre Post Pre Post 
HTC2 
Monthly -0.3% -1.2% -0.3% -2.6% 
-1.5% 
(-7.0%, 4.3%) 
0.611 207 10,336 
New on 







ART Quarterly 9.4% 6.6% 8.5% 7.5% 
1.7% 
(0.1%, 3.3%) 
0.034 139 2,220 
OPD visits2 
Monthly -0.3% -1.1% -0.3% -0.7% 
0.4%  
(-1.5%, 2.3%) 
0.694 207 10,289 
ANC Total2 
Monthly 1.5% -1.0% 0.4% -0.3% 
1.7%  
(-0.7%, 4.1%) 
0.152 207 10,336 
Facility 
Deliveries2 Monthly 0.6% 0.5% 1.3% 0.1% 
-1.1%  
(-3.3%, 1.3%) 
0.372 207 10,338 
DPT3/ 
Penta-32 Monthly 0.0% 0.2% -0.2% -0.9% 
-1.0%  
(-3.0%, 1.3%) 
0.436 207 10,337 
D-in-D Analysis 
Cohort 
Retention  68.0% 64.3% 75.1% 60.9% 
-10.4p.p.3 
(-21.4, 0.6) 
0.063 133 626 
ANC4+ 
Coverage2  42.2% 47.2% 36.8% 41.7% 
-0.1p.p.3  
(-10.4, 10.1) 




 24.6% 23.4% 24.2% 25.4% 
2.4p.p.3  
(-4.2%, 9.0%) 
0.472 200 4,378 
1 Adjusted for level and ownership 
2 Also adjusted for seasonal variation 
3 Percentage points 
Footnotes:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; D-in-D:  difference-in-difference; DPT3/Penta-3:  diphtheria pertussis tetanus/ 
pentavalent immunization 3rd dose; HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; IPT:  intermittent prophylactic therapy 2nd dose. 
 
 
I explore the cohort retention finding in greater depth. Given the small sample size of 
maintenance facilities, it is possible that a few outliers could influence the result. I include a 
bootstrap model to test the consistency of the finding for cohort retention under repeat sampling. 
The resulting D-in-D is -10.4p.p. (-22.2, 1.3; p=0.082). The full model is presented in the Annex 
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(Table 53). Examining the trends in Cohort Retention graphically (Figure 21), the D-in-D for 
cohort retention appears to be related to a decline in retention in transition facilities in 2015 & 
2016, which precedes transition. 
 





3.4.6 Sensitivity Analysis: Sensitivity to Transition Timing  
 
First, I examine sensitivity of findings to timing of the transition timeline that may reflect 
noise at a specific point in time. Using the basic model described previously, varying the 
transition midpoints and transition windows does not demonstrate that the conclusions are 
sensitive to the timing used to model transition (Table 25 & Table 26). Only for the number of 
total ANC visits using a midpoint of April 2016 did the results change qualitatively from 






Table 25:  Sensitivity to Transition Midpoint, Full Sample (Trend Analysis) 





July 2016 April 2016 Jan 2017 
HTC IRR 1.031*** 1.024*** 1.020** 1.033*** 
Robust  
95% C.I. (1.016, 1.047) (1.010, 1.037) (1.008, 1.033) (1.014, 1.052) 
p-value <0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
New on 
ART 
IRR 1.064* 1.053** 1.057** 1.065* 
Robust  
95% C.I. (1.013, 1.116) (1.013, 1.095) (1.013, 1.102) (1.005, 1.129) 
p-value 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.035 
Current 
on ART 
IRR 1.012 1.003 1.003 1.011 
Robust  
95% C.I. (0.976, 1.050) (0.974, 1.033) (0.971, 1.036) (0.971, 1.052) 
p-value 0.518 0.844 0.850 0.609 
OPD IRR 1.001 1.000 1.000 1.002 
Robust  
95% C.I. (0.995, 1.006) (0.995, 1.005) (0.996, 1.005) (0.994, 1.009) 
p-value 0.843 0.961 0.940 0.661 
Total ANC 
Visits 
IRR 1.008 1.008 1.008* 1.009 
Robust  
95% C.I. (0.999, 1.016) (1.000, 1.015) (1.001, 1.015) (0.999, 1.019) 
p-value 0.072 0.051 0.034 0.082 
Facility 
Delivery 
IRR 1.008 1.006 1.005 1.009 
Robust  
95% C.I. (0.997, 1.018) (0.997, 1.015) (0.997, 1.014) (0.997, 1.021) 
p-value 0.121 0.214 0.244 0.140 
DPT3/ 
penta-3 
IRR 1.002 1.001 1.001 1.003 
Robust  
95% C.I. (0.995, 1.009) (0.995, 1.007) (0.995, 1.007) (0.995, 1.011) 
p-value 0.496 0.758 0.741 0.438 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Footnotes:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; D-in-D:  difference-in-difference; DPT3/Penta-3:  diphtheria pertussis tetanus/ 







Table 26:  Sensitivity to Transition Window, Full Sample (D-in-D Analysis) 
Indicator D-in-D 
in Level: 
Jan 2015 –  
Mar 2017 
(Preferred) 
Oct 2014 – 
 Mar 2017 
Oct 2014 – 
 Dec 2016 
Jan 2015 – 
 Dec 2016 
ANC4+ 
Coverage 
Estimate -0.043* -0.052* -0.054** -0.045* 
Robust  
95% C.I. (-0.082, -0.004) (-0.093, -0.012) (-0.092, -0.016) (-0.082, -0.009) 
p-value 0.031 0.012 0.005 0.015 
IPT2 
Coverage 
Estimate -0.008 -0.009 -0.004 -0.004 
Robust  
95% C.I. (-0.025, 0.008) (-0.025, 0.008) (-0.020, 0.012) (-0.020, 0.011) 
p-value 0.302 0.314 0.610 0.588 
Cohort 
Retention 
Estimate -0.042 -0.052 -0.043 -0.033 
Robust  
95% C.I. (-0.096, 0.013) (-0.110, 0.007) (-0.097, 0.010) (-0.084, 0.018) 
p-value 0.132 0.082 0.110 0.202 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Footnotes:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; D-in-D:  difference-in-difference; DPT3/Penta-3:  diphtheria pertussis tetanus/ 
pentavalent immunization 3rd dose; HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; IPT:  intermittent prophylactic therapy 2nd dose. 
 
3.4.7 Sensitivity to Effect Measure Modifiers:  Region, Level, and Ownership 
 
Next, I examine effect measure modification by region. Region modifies the difference-in-
difference in trend for several indicators (Annex:  Table 47 & Table 48). The significant positive 
association between transition and relative trends in HTC can be attributed to Northern and 
Western Uganda only. New on ART is significantly primarily due to the associations found in 
Northern and Western Uganda; the association is not significant for Central and Eastern Uganda. 
A positive D-in-D in trend for Total ANC and DPT3 is noted for Western Uganda only. Cohort 
retention declined significantly more in transition facilities in Central and Western Uganda, but 
no significant effect was seen in Eastern and Northern Uganda. 
Health facility level modifies the association for only one count indicator. The difference-
in-difference in trend is significant for New on ART only for HC III and not among HC IV & 
Hospitals (Annex:  Table 49). The significant and negative D-in-D for ANC4+ is only observed 
in HC IIs (Annex:  Table 50). For IPT2, there is no significant D-in-D at any level of facility. 
Cohort retention has a larger negative D-in-D in HC IVs & Hospitals than in HC IIIs, but the 
difference is not statistically significant (Annex: Table 50). 
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Ownership modified the association for HTC, where the positive D-in-D in trend seen in 
public and PNFP facilities is not noted in PFPs. I examine effect modification more directly for 
PFPs in the third paper of this thesis. For New on ART, there was no significant D-in-D in trend 
for PNFPs but a positive effect in public facilities (Annex: Table 51). The association between 
transition and reduced ANC4+ is modified by ownership. The D-in-D for ANC4+ is large and 
negative for PFPs:  -0.201 (95% C.I.:  -0.424, 0.022; p=0.077), but not significant. For public 
and PNFPs, the D-in-D is much smaller. The D-in-D in IPT2 coverage is significant for public 
facilities only (Annex:  Table 52). 
 
3.4.8 Sensitivity to Model Misspecification:  Bootstrap 
 
Bootstrap confidence intervals are not sensitive to misspecification of either the 
distribution of the dependent variable or the autocorrelation model. The bootstrap confidence 
intervals in Table 27 & Table 28 are similar to the robust confidence intervals for the preferred 




Table 27:  Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for Count Models (Trend Analysis) 




HTC IRR 1.031*** 1.031*** 
95% C.I. (1.016, 1.047) (1.016, 1.047) 
p-value <0.001 <0.001 
New on ART IRR 1.064* 1.055* 
95% C.I. (1.013, 1.116) (1.011, 1.100) 
p-value 0.012 0.013 
Current on ART IRR 1.012 1.009 
95% C.I. (0.976,1.050) (0.980, 1.040) 
p-value 0.518 0.539 
OPD IRR 1.001 1.001 
95% C.I. (0.995, 1.006) (0.994, 1.007) 
p-value 0.843 0.854 
Total ANC Visits IRR 1.008 1.008 
95% C.I. (0.999, 1.016) (0.999, 1.016) 
p-value 0.072 0.076 
Facility Delivery IRR 1.008 1.008 
 95% C.I. (0.997, 1.018) (0.998, 1.018) 
p-value 0.121 0.123 
DPT3/penta-3 IRR 1.002 1.002 
 95% C.I. (0.995, 1.009) (0.996, 1.009) 
p-value 0.496 0.505 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
Footnotes:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; D-in-D:  difference-in-difference; DPT3/Penta-3:  diphtheria pertussis tetanus/ 
pentavalent immunization 3rd dose; HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; OPD:  outpatient department visits. 
 
 
Table 28:  Bootstrap Confidence Intervals for D-in-D models 




ANC4+ Coverage Estimate -0.043* -0.043* 
 95% C.I. (-0.082, -0.004) (-0.083, -0.004) 
p-value 0.031 0.032 
IPT2 Coverage Estimate -0.008 -0.008 
95% C.I. (-0.025, 0.008) (-0.025, 0.008) 
p-value 0.302 0.323 
Cohort Retention Estimate -0.042 -0.042 
95% C.I. (-0.096, 0.013) (-0.096, 0.013) 
p-value 0.132 0.133 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 






In transitioned health facilities in Uganda, health workers report discontinuation of HIV 
outreach and worsening patient access and quality of care. However, there is a contradiction 
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between reports by facility respondents and secondary data on services. DHIS2 service delivery 
indicators do not reveal a decline in service volume in transition. Transition facilities have 
sustained HTC better than maintenance facilities. Trends in current on ART are similar for both 
facilities. While one would expect the reported discontinuation of outreach to worsen cohort 
retention, the decline in cohort retention is similar for maintenance and transition facilities in the 
ITT analysis. In the survey sample analysis, the change in cohort retention is a nearly significant 
10.4 percentage points lower for transition than for maintenance. However, the divergence 
appears to begin prior to the official beginning of PEPFAR GP and is based on data from only 10 
maintenance facilities. 
For non-HIV services, there is also a contrast between the lower proportion of in-charges 
reporting improvement in access and quality of MNCH care in transition, on the one hand, and 
the lack of differences-in-difference in trend in DHIS2, on the other hand. Only for ANC4+ were 
transition facilities worse off. 
In trying to reconcile the discrepancy between data sources, I consider two possible 
explanations. First, facility in-charges may be exaggerating the impact of transition reported in 
our survey. In-charges may be deliberately trying to influence the findings to show transition in a 
negative light, or they may be unintentionally underestimating their own facilities’ and patients’ 
ability to adjust to changes. While the survey is retrospective, it also takes place at only one point 
in time, in July and August 2017, and the mood of transition facility respondents may have been 
particularly pessimistic at that time. 
The second possible explanation is that I may be missing important changes in service 
delivery due to limitations in the data or methodology used. Most indicators are volume-based, 
and do not capture quality of services. Even coverage indicators (i.e. coverage of ANC4+, 
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coverage of IPT2, cohort retention) are rough measures that do not truly capture the quality of 
care, much less patient satisfaction. Secondly, with only 15 months of data following the 
assumed midpoint of transition activity, many of the impacts of transition may not yet be 
apparent in DHIS2. Transition from PEPFAR has affected supervision, incentives for health 
workers, training, and outreach. It may take time for these impacts to translate into lower 
capacity or quality of care. Facilities also may be benefiting from past investments in systems 
and infrastructure that temporarily blunt the short-term loss of ongoing support. 
Lastly, there may be clinically meaningful (albeit statistically insignificant) changes in 
services that I do not have the power to detect with available data. Treating the coefficients for 
difference-in-difference in trend as an approximation of the percentage change in services per 
unit time, the cumulative 1-year difference implied by the robust confidence intervals are fairly 
large. For example, the 95% confidence intervals for Current on ART (-3.7%, 2.7% per quarter) 
imply that transition facilities could have -14.0% to +11.3% difference-in-difference in the 
number of patients current on ART after one year — a very wide confidence interval. I would 
consider a relative decline of 10% in current on ART as programmatically significant, which 
falls well within the bounds created from robust confidence intervals. That said, were there many 
negative impacts of transition, it is unlikely that I would observe only one negative point 





Table 29:  Projected Differences in Service Volume at 12 months following Transition (ITT 
Analysis) 
Service Name Method Robust 
Confidence 
Interval 
95% Lower Bound 
Relative Difference 
  
95% Upper Bound 
Relative Difference 
HTC Trend (1.1%, 4.7%)  
per month 
14.0% 73.5% 





Trend (-3.7%, 2.7%) 
per quarter 
-14.0% 11.3% 










Trend (-0.5%, 1.0%) 
per month 
-5.8% 12.7% 
Footnotes:  ART:  anti-retroviral therapy; ANC:  antenatal care; D-in-D:  difference-in-difference; DPT3/Penta-3:  diphtheria pertussis tetanus/ 
pentavalent immunization 3rd dose; HTC:  HIV testing & counseling; OPD:  outpatient department visits. 
 
For the proportion indicators, I consider a decline of 5p.p. as programmatically significant. 
This was not achieved for any point estimate, but robust 95% confidence intervals include a 
change of -5p.p. in cohort retention and ANC4+ coverage. Therefore, it is possible that 
meaningful impacts of transition could have occurred, but I lack statistical power to detect them. 
The existence of variations in the measure of association for OPD, ANC, and HTC by 
region, level, and/or ownership adds to the need for caution when making causal interpretations. 
Were transition to explain observed associations for all outcomes, we would either expect that 1) 
transition would have a consistent effect across regions, levels, and ownership categories; or 2) 
that there were mediating factors across groups that could affect how transition’s impact is 
experienced differently. The variations observed across regions, levels, and ownership suggest 
that the significant associations are far more likely to be caused by geographically or 
institutionally differing trends in utilization across facilities rather than by transition. I will 
examine effect mediation for by ownership for HIV indicators in the third paper in this thesis. 
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Unrelated to transition, there has been a major increase in the number of patients on ART 
but a concurrent decline in cohort retention. The secular decline in cohort retention was also 
noted in UNAIDS estimates, which show retention dropping from 85% in 2014 to 78% in 2017 
(115). UNAIDS produces a national-level estimate, whereas I report facility-level averages 
without weighting. The decline in retention seems to be genuine and requires attention. 
3.5.1 Limitations 
 
There were several limitations to this study. As noted previously, the facility survey relied 
on self-report and respondent recall. Therefore, our findings are subject to response and recall 
bias. These biases could influence our findings if transition facility in-charges were more likely 
to recall or report true negative outcomes than maintenance facilities. Furthermore, we conducted 
the facility survey only in 28 districts of Uganda that were selected out of 42 possible districts in 
our sample area, which is a subset of 112 districts nationally. Therefore, our facility survey is not 
nationally representative. 
The DHIS2 data has known issues with completeness. Among maintenance and transition 
PEPFAR facilities, 1,006 out of 1,153 facilities (87.3%) had enough data in DHIS2 for HMIS 
105 indicators (e.g. HTC, ANC, facility deliveries). It is not known how many facilities should 
be reporting HMIS 106a; however, from the facility survey, I found that only 73% of facilities 
that reported providing PMTCT or ART made the minimum number of HMIS 106a reports to be 
included in the analysis. It is likely that reporting facilities are systematically different from non-
reporting facilities. However, in order for incomplete reporting to bias the findings, the 
difference-in-differences would need to vary systematically between reporting and non-reporting 
facilities. This is less likely, though still possible. 
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Inaccuracies in DHIS2 data are also probable. My efforts to remove a small number of 
extreme outliers likely did little to address poor quality data. Imputation of missing as zero, 
while necessary to address ambiguous reporting forms, may have further biased the findings. 
However, due to the difference-in-difference/trend analysis design, only differential changes in 
data quality could bias our findings. Yet, differential data quality change is quite likely. PEPFAR 
IPs are supposed to continue annual data quality visits, but this may not be enough to maintain 
data quality in transition facilities. If data quality changed systematically in transition facilities 
compared to maintenance facilities, then the DHIS2 findings would be biased. 
The relatively short follow-up time of the DHIS2 analysis (15 months following the 
median transition date in our survey) is a limitation. Some effects of transition may take years to 
become apparent. The lack of an observed impact on service volume may be due to past 
investments that continue to pay dividends for service delivery that wane over time. 
Alternatively, these trends could persist. However, with longer follow-up time, there is greater 
risk that unobserved, confounding events will bias the analysis. 
While the exposure of interest is a permanent transition from PEPFAR support, I cannot 
directly measure this exposure. Rather, I used two different proxies:  transition status as reported 
by facility in-charges and official PEPFAR transition assignment. Both sources of data are 
problematic. Many facilities in our survey reporting transition from PEPFAR are officially 
classified as maintenance, with many being in a 9–12 month gap between IP contracts. 
Therefore, some facilities reporting transition may receive support again, and transition facilities 
that knew other sources of support were coming may have responded to support differently than 
those that were sure they were losing support permanently. Moreover, this resulted in far fewer 
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sites reporting maintenance in our survey than we anticipated, with consequences for statistical 
power.  
There was limited agreement between official transition assignment and self-reported 
transition assignment by facilities in our survey. Non-differential measurement error in the 
exposure variable would drive our association to the null. The ITT analysis fails to find negative 
impacts of transition for most indicators. Yet, repeating the analysis with facility-reported 
transition status does not change the results dramatically, though this may not have been possible 
with the sample size. 
Lastly, I am using utilization of health services as a metric for health facility functional 
capacity. This assumes either that supply is the only constraint on service volume or that trends 
in demand for health services are consistent over time and across transition and maintenance. 
The former assumption cannot be tested with available data. The latter assumption is violated in 
for MNCH indicators when considering changes in birthrates in differing areas of Uganda with 
more or fewer transition sites. In the Karamoja region, in which most PEPFAR facilities have 
been transitioned, the total fertility rate was 7.9 children per women in 2013–2016 compared to a 
national average of 5.4. While national fertility rates declined from 6.2 births per woman in the 
2008–2011 period, they remained high in Karamoja (116). Therefore, there are differential trends 
in births across regions, affecting need for MNCH services. Regional differences in demand for 
MNCH services likely confound some of the associations observed. The same is potentially true 
for HIV indicators:  if transition facilities’ catchment areas have more untested and untreated 
PLHIV, they can potentially increase the number of HTC, new on ART, and current on ART 
faster, assuming they have the capacity to do so. Regression to the mean might also explain the 
better performance of transition facilities on HTC and ART indicators. Many transition facilities 
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were selected on the basis of being “low volume” for HIV indicators. However, even if the 
trends were biased by these factors, the ability to increase testing and enrolling patients on ART 
would speak against major negative impacts of transition on facility service delivery capacity. 
 
3.5.2 Conclusions  
 
Despite these limitations, this study adds to the literature on the impacts of transitioning 
GHIs at the facility level. Few studies have examined the impact of withdrawing site-level 
support on HIV services, and none have done so for as wide a range of HIV and non-HIV 
services. This study suggests that transition can disrupt services, particularly HIV outreach. 
However, the findings do not provide evidence that service volume will be negatively affected as 
a result. There is no evidence to suggest that HIV service delivery will collapse as a result of 
transition. 
Following transition from PEPFAR, affected facilities report discontinuing outreach and 
perceive negative impacts on access to and quality of services. However, there is little evidence 
to support negative impacts on patient volume. Further monitoring of the GP will be needed in 
order to identify possible effects of loss of PEPFAR support on service delivery. Unrelated to 
transition, the decline in cohort retention on first-line ART is concerning for Uganda’s 
achievement of the 90-90-90 goal. PEPFAR and the Government of Uganda should undertake 






Chapter 4. “PEPFAR Transition in Uganda Impacted Private for-Profit, 
Private not for-Profit, and Public Facilities Differently”  
4.1 Abstract 
 
Since 2003, the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) has encouraged 
private sector provision of HIV care. Private facilities provided a substantial minority of HIV 
care in Uganda in recent years. However, PEPFAR’s Geographic Prioritization (GP) identified 
734 facilities for transition, including 137 private not-for-profits (PNFP) and 140 private for-
profits (PFPs). It is unclear whether private facilities will receive support from the government to 
fill gaps left by PEPFAR or maintain HIV services following transition. To assess the effects of 
GP on private facilities, I use a survey conducted among 145 public, 29 PNFPs, 32 PFPs that 
report transition from PEPFAR. The survey collected information on prior PEPFAR support, 
service delivery, commodities, laboratory, staff time-allocation, and human resources. I used 
multivariate regression models to explore the association between ownership and survey 
responses, controlling for other characteristics. I also extracted facility-level data from DHIS2 on 
HIV services for the period October 2013–December 2017. Compared to transitioned public 
facilities with similar characteristics, PFPs were more likely to discontinue HIV-related outreach 
(OR=3.03, 1.16–7.82; p=0.025) and to report reduced time on HIV care (OR=6.241, 2.709–
14.38, p<0.001) as well as non-HIV care (OR=3.01; 1.32–12.19; p=0.011) since transition. 
Transitioned PFPs have declines in volume of HIV tests relative to transitioned public facilities 
(IRR=0.641, 0.471–0.874, p= 0.005) in DHIS2. Private not for-profits were more likely to report 
declining frequency of supervision (OR = 2.51, 1.456–4.319, p=0.002), loss of permanent staff 
(OR=5.886, 2.914–11.887, p<0.001), and reduced time spent on HIV care (OR=2.117, 
1.054─4.255, p=0.036). However, PNFPs were less likely than public facilities to report 
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declining quality of HIV care. Although PNFPs continued to provide HIV services, they did so 
with less staff and support, raising concerns about long-term sustainability. The gap left by PFP 
facilities in HIV testing may be filled by public facilities, but clients who prefer the anonymity 




The private sector has played a large and diverse role in the response to HIV/AIDS in 
Uganda and many other low-and-middle-income countries (LMICs). That role has been shaped 
by donor HIV programs, including the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). 
While the inclusion of private providers has been encouraged by some (117), others have warned 
about the risks of drug resistance from unregulated private providers (118) or raised questions 
about the sustainability of provision in private facilities following transition (95, 119).  
4.2.1 The Private Sector in Uganda 
 
According to the Uganda Private Sector Assessment, the private sector in Uganda is large, 
and accounts for 47% of the health workforce, including 60% of clinical officers and 80% of 
doctors (120), though medical doctors in Uganda commonly work in both the private and public 
sectors (121). According to the 2011/2012 National Health Assessment (NHA), out-of-pocket 
spending, the majority of which is directed to private providers, accounts for 38% of total health 
expenditure (120). However, much of this spending is for drugs obtained at pharmacies and drug 
shops, whereas nearly all HIV commodities (other than condoms) are channeled through health 
facilities (120). 
The facility-based private sector in Uganda encompasses both for-profit facilities as well as 
faith- and community-based not-for-profit providers, which range in size from single owner-
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operated clinics to large networks of hospitals and health centers. I restrict this discussion of HIV 
service provision by private providers to licensed facilities staffed by trained medical personnel 
who perform clinical HIV services (e.g. HIV testing and counseling – HTC, prevention of 
mother-to-child transmission – PMTCT, antiretroviral therapy – ART). I thereby exclude 
traditional healers, quacks, drug shops, and stand-alone pharmacies. This also omits community-
based organizations or NGOs that only engage in non-clinical care, such as HIV prevention or 
psychosocial support. 
Private providers in Uganda are divided between a well-organized and somewhat 
integrated PNFP sector and a weakly-regulated PFP sector. The PNFP sector is predominantly 
structured along faith-lines. The Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau (UPMB), Uganda Catholic 
Medical Bureau (UCMB), Uganda Muslim Medical Bureau (UMMB), and the Orthodox Church 
of Uganda Medical Bureau (OUMB) are the primary umbrella organizations for PNFP providers. 
These four bureaus supervised 645 PNFP facilities in 2014 (120). PNFPs are distributed across 
the country, including remote rural areas (120). In addition, PNFPs include NGOs that are not 
formally connected to a faith-based bureau but provide some stand-alone service delivery. The 
AIDS Support Organization (TASO) was formed in 1987 as an HIV/AIDS advocacy and 
palliative care organization and has since become a major provider of community and facility-
based care and treatment (122). Mildmay Uganda was founded in 1998 as a privately-funded 
center of excellence in HIV care and has developed to include a hospital and outpatient clinic 
(123). PNFPs are integrated into the Government of Uganda’s health planning process and 
receive some financial support from government (124).  
By contrast, the private for-profit (PFP) sector in Uganda varies from unlicensed drug 
shops to large, accredited hospitals, though the latter are few in number (120). Most licensed and 
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clinically-staffed PFP facilities are located in urban areas of Uganda, with Kampala having 
nearly half the national total in 2005 (125). Many PFPs are directly owned by health 
professionals, especially medical doctors, the majority of which also work in the public sector 
(125). PFP providers have their own umbrella organization, the Uganda Private Medical 
Practitioners’ Association (UMPMA), which advocates for its members. However, while the 
linkage between PNFP’s and government is often characterized as “weak”, the formal 
relationship between PFPs and government is nearly non-existent (126). 
 
4.2.2 Private HIV Provision in Uganda 
 
The role of the private sector in provision of health care in LMICs is highly variable, both 
by country and by type of service (127). In 2008–2010, women in Uganda were more likely to 
seek care from the private sector for family planning and childhood fever/cough or diarrhea than 
in any of 12 other LMICs. However, for HIV testing, Ugandan women were more on par with 
their peers in other LMICs (128). According to Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
conducted from 2004–2008, the proportion of women receiving their most recent HIV test from 
a private provider (PFP or PNFP) ranged from 10% in Rwanda to 58% in Haiti, with 28.5% of 
women and 36.4% of men in Uganda being tested by a private facility (129). A more recent 
study using the 2011 Uganda DHS puts the share of women tested in the private sector in 
Uganda at a more modest 18% (128). According to DHIS2 data, 28% of people receiving 
antiretroviral therapy (ART) in 2015 obtained it from a private provider, almost entirely in 
PNFPs (120). When accounting for non-clinical HIV services, such as psychosocial support and 
prevention, the role of the private sector in Uganda was much broader. In 2008–2010, 68.5% of 
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HIV-related services were delivered by private sector providers (including community-based 
organizations, NGOs, PFPs, and PNFPs) (130).  
While the private sector is diverse and serves many roles, there is an income gradient in the 
use of private health services in Uganda. While only 18% of all women received an HIV test 
from a private (PNFP or PFP) provider in 2008–2010, 31% of urban women, and 29% of the 
richest quintile of women did so (120). As a result, more than half of women receiving a test 
from a private provider were among the highest wealth quintile in 2008–2010 (128). The 
relatively affluent demographic using private providers has led some to argue that PNFPs should 
consider co-payment for ART in the event of funding cutbacks (119), and a pilot model for a fee-
based after-hours ART clinic in Kampala has been studied (131). Even in rural areas of Uganda, 
there is evidence that patients value factors like proximity and quality more than cost in deciding 
between public and private providers for outpatient care (132), perhaps due to informal payments 
and travel costs that make public facilities less attractive. 
 
4.2.3 The Role of Donors in Private Sector HIV Service Provision 
 
Donor HIV programs have encouraged the growth of private HIV service provision in 
many settings, particularly for PNFPs. The private sector’s share of total HIV/AIDS expenditure 
increased following the expansion of donor funding for HIV early in the 2000s. Out of five 
countries examined by Sulzbach, De, & Wang (2011), PNFP facilities’ share of HIV 
expenditures increased in four (Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, and Zambia) between 2002/03 and 
2005/06 (133). PNFPs’ share decreased only in Tanzania, where public provision of HIV/AIDS 
services prior to 2002 was very limited. The share of expenditures going to PFPs increased in 
two countries but declined marginally in three countries (133). Coutinho, Roxo, Epino, et al. 
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(2012) identified Uganda as a leader in private sector involvement in HIV and indigenous NGOs 
as a major destination for PEPFAR funding in 2007–2010 (122). Coutinho, Roxo, Epino, et al. 
(2012) also argue that global health programs in Uganda could not have achieved their ambitious 
targets without the help of indigenous NGOs (122). By 2014, 25% of facilities supported by 
PEPFAR in Uganda were privately-owned, including 481 PNFPs and 160 PFPs. 
 
4.2.4 Private Facilities in Transition 
 
Private providers, particularly those offering HIV services, often fill niche roles and 
complement the public sector. However, having multiple, uncoordinated private providers can 
also fragment the HIV response. As donor funding for HIV declines (1), transitions of HIV 
programs to national control and funding are likely to increase. Without incentives and political 
support from donor organizations, it is unclear to what extent private providers will continue to 
be a part of the HIV response in LMICs.   
There is limited research on the private sector in HIV transitions. In South Africa, 
PEPFAR transition resulted in patients being transferred from private HIV clinics to public 
primary health centers (30) or, in one pilot, to private general practitioners (134). Interruption in 
care during private-to-public transfers has been reported in many cases (30, 73), as has reduced 
satisfaction with the care received in the public clinics (30). None of these studies have examined 
the effects of loss of support on private providers themselves. 
The PEPFAR GP in Uganda presents an opportunity to study the effect that loss of donor 
support has on private facilities relative to public facilities transitioned from PEPFAR. The GP 
process identified 734 facilities for transition to “central support” (17), including 137 PNFP and 
140 PFPs. Under the GP, these facilities are expected to lose site-level support for supervision, 
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training, and on-site laboratories, outreach, and health worker incentive, but retain above-site 
support through commodity supply chains and laboratory hubs. It is unclear to what extent 
private facilities will receive support for HIV services from government to replace lost PEPFAR 




 This paper is one of a series examining the impact of the PEPFAR GP on 1) health 
systems and human resources for health, 2) health services, and 3) effects on private and public 
providers. Other papers have noted the negative impacts of transition reported by health facilities 
on access to care and the health workforce but did not identify negative impacts of transition on 
staffing or the volume of HIV and non-HIV services delivered. 
The objective of this paper is to understand how the experiences and responses of private 
facilities transitioned from PEPFAR, both PNFPs and PFPs, support differ from those of 
transitioned public facilities. Compared to public facilities, I anticipate that transitioned PNFPs 
will be more likely to lose supervision, access to training, and access to lab networks. However, 
PNFPs, which have a strong mandate to provide care and greater flexibility than public facilities 
in how they do so, will continue to offer HIV services at a level comparable to public facilities. I 
also expect PFPs to lose more support than transitioned public facilities. However, PFPs do not 
have the same obligations or motivations as PNFPs, and I expect PFPs to disengage from HIV 
services, which mostly consists of HIV testing, following transition. To isolate the effect of 
facility ownership on the selected outcomes, I will control for factors likely to differ across 
ownership types, including level, size of HIV workforce, time since transition, and amount of 






A team from Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health and Makerere University 
School of Public Health conducted a mixed methods evaluation of the GP in Uganda using 
document review, key informant interviews, a facility survey, secondary data analysis, and 
longitudinal case studies. To address the objectives of this article, I relied on the facility survey 
and analysis of secondary data from DHIS2 components (Table 30). I divide the outcomes into 
two categories:  support provided to health facilities and responses of facilities to transition. The 
former includes HIV supervision from any source, continued supervision by the IP, lab testing 
disruptions, and training. The latter includes service delivery volume (from DHIS2) and 
information on provision of HIV outreach, worker time allocation for HIV & non-HIV clinical 
care, and termination of staff since transition (from the facility survey). 
 
Table 30:  Objectives and Methods 
Objectives Outcomes Data 
Source 
Support provided to health 
facilities 
HIV Supervision Frequency 
IP Supervision 
Viral Load Testing Disruption 
Sputum Testing Disruption 




Facility and worker responses 
to transition 
Discontinuation of Outreach 
Time-allocation (in-charge reported) 
Time-allocation (worker reported) 
Self-Reported Quality of HIV Services 
Loss of Staff Since Transition 
Facility 
Survey 
HIV Testing & Counseling 
Current on ART 
12-month Cohort Retention on First-line ART 
DHIS2 






4.3.1 Data Source:  Facility Survey 
 
In Uganda, the study team conducted a cross-sectional facility survey in July & August of 
2017, about nine months after the median transition date and four months after the official end of 
transition reported by USAID. For logistical reasons, we limited the sampling area for this 
survey to 42 districts:  40 districts in Northern and Eastern Uganda, as well as Kampala and 
Wakiso districts in Central Uganda. Kampala and Wakiso are urban districts and have more than 
half of Uganda’s PEPFAR’s transitioning PFPs. 
I constructed the sample frame from a list supplied by USAID with designation of facilities 
as intended for either maintenance, scale-up, or transition to central support. Only facilities 
supported by USAID-contracted IPs were included. I also excluded all facilities identified for 
scale-up. From the sample frame, I selected districts using a stratified random sampling design 
with three strata:  1) 100% selection of all districts containing transitioning health center IVs 
and/or Hospitals as well as Kampala and Wakiso, 2) Random sampling of 11 out of 18 remaining 
districts that were designated as central support or maintenance districts, and 3) Random 
sampling of 6 out of 14 priority districts. I sampled all facilities within selected districts that 
were identified as maintenance or transition, except for Kampala/Wakiso, where I selected a 
40% sample of transition facilities only.  
Using this process, I selected 275 facilities. I assumed a 10% non-response rate to achieve 
a final sample of approximately 250. Two facilities that were selected for longitudinal case 
studies by the parent study but not randomly selected for the facility survey — Amuru HC III 
(PNFP) and JB Clinic (PFP) — were purposively added to the survey sample for a total of 277. 
Enumerators were able complete surveys at 262 facilities. Of the 15 facilities that could not be 
surveyed, nine had closed permanently, two were closed for construction, two facilities were 
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identified as duplicate records, one (a PFP facility) refused to participate in the survey, and one 
was not accessible due to road conditions. An additional 36 claimed to have had no PEPFAR 
support within the past 3 years, 206 reported having been transitioned, and 20 reported 
continuing to receive PEPFAR support. This was contrary to what was expected, due both to the 
36 sites with no recent PEPFAR support and the larger than expected proportion of sites 
reporting transition. From follow-up interviews with IPs and USAID, we determined that as 
many as 60 of the transitioned facilities were experiencing a break in support between IPs lasting 
for 9–12 months. However, as these facilities reported similar processes and impacts as those 
that were intended for transition, I have included them as transition facilities in this analysis. I 
excluded the 36 facilities that reported no support from PEPFAR IPs. To examine differences 
between transitioned PFPs, PNFPs, and public facilities, I restrict the analysis in this paper to 
facilities reporting transition only. 
In smaller facilities, survey interviews were conducted with facility in-charges, or their 
acting replacements. In larger facilities, multiple respondents (e.g., facility in-charge, head of the 
HIV clinic, head of the maternity ward, pharmacist, laboratory director, and a financial officer) 
contributed to different components of the survey. In addition, enumerators sought 2–3 staff that 
provide HIV care (including potentially the primary respondent) present on the day of the survey 
to answer a short individual questionnaire. The questionnaire was related to trends in the 
worker’s own time-allocation, receipt of incentives, job satisfaction, and motivation on a ten-
item index developed by Mbindyo et al. (2009) (100). These individual interviews were 
conducted in private to improve confidentiality. A total of 429 individual interviews were 





Transition Impact Index 
 
The purpose of this paper is to isolate differences in outcomes that are due to ownership by 
controlling for other potential confounders. Public, PFP, and PNFP facilities had varying levels 
of PEPFAR support at baseline. To control for the quantity of support that facilities lost during 
transition, I constructed a transition impact index for data reduction purposes. Site level PEPFAR 
support comes in many forms. PEPFAR IPs provide supportive supervision; conduct on-site 
trainings and facilitated access to off-site trainings; support laboratory and outreach capacity 
related to HIV; and provide workers with salaries and incentives (top-ups, bonuses, outreach 
allowances, and mobile phone airtime). 
Rather than including many different types of support lost in transition, which would 
overwhelm the small sample size, I used exploratory factor analysis to construct a single index. 
In constructing the transition impact index, I included four ordinal variables. For non-salary 
support, I sum the types of incentives provided by the IP to at least one worker in the facility 
prior to transition (0=none provided, 1=bonuses or outreach allowances provided, 2=both 
provided). As nearly all this support was lost during transition, it is a proxy for transition impact. 
The other three components of the index are the number of types of IP support for HIV reported 
lost (for training, supervision, outreach, ART, Laboratory), number of HIV services (HTC, 
PMTCT, ART, Outreach) for which the in-charge identified the PEPFAR IP as primary source of 
support prior to transition but not after transition, and the change in frequency of HIV 
supervision since transition (-1 decreased, 0 same, 1 increased). I attempted to include loss of 
salaries paid by the IP, both as a proportion of workers and as a binary variable for any salaries 
lost; however, salaries had a high degree of uniqueness and added little to the index. Principle 
component analysis with a polychoric correlation matrix resulted in a single factor model that 
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explained 50.7% of variance. I used exploratory factor analysis to determine factor loadings and 
created an index score for each facility (Table 31). 
 
Table 31:  Transition Impact Index 
Category Definition Type Comment Factor 
Loading 
Non-Salary 




Ups & Outreach 
Coded as “0” if staff report neither was 
provided, “1” if workers report one of 
bonuses/top-ups or outreach allowances, and 
“2” if staff report receiving both before 





Types of Support 
Lost in the 
Transition 
Number of types of HIV support (Training, 
supervision, Outreach, ART, Laboratory) 





Support to HIV 
Services 
Number of HIV services (HTC, PMTCT, ART, 
Outreach) for which PEPFAR IP was identified 





Change in HIV 
Supervision 
Frequency 
-1 if frequency declines, 0 if frequency 
remained the same (or if no supervision 




Salaries paid by 
PEPFAR IP 
Change in proportion of workers providing 
HIV services whose salaries are paid by 
PEPFAR 
Continuous Salary support was 
rare. Replaced with 
a binary measure. 
N/A 
“1” if facility lost any salary support for HIV 
workers 
Binary Ultimately dropped 
from the index 
N/A 
ART, antiretroviral therapy; DHIS2, district health information system 2.0; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; HTC, HIV testing and 
counseling; IP, implementing partner; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; PMTCT, prevention of mother-to-child 
transmission.  
 
The index predicts transition status with a high degree of accuracy (Area under the ROC 
Curve 0.981), but the diversity of scores for transition facilities is considerable (Figure 22). The 
range of index scores suggests that the amount of support lost in transition differed considerably 
across transition facilities. The impact index was independently associated with several 
outcomes:  discontinuation of outreach, loss of staff, and in-charge’s perception of worsening 
HIV access and quality of HIV care. However, the index is only a rough measure of the loss of 
support during transition. Since the index contains information on supervision frequency, I omit 





Figure 22:  Transition Impact Index Scores by Transition Status 
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Transition Preparedness Index and Other Covariates 
 
In addition to the transition impact index, I included other covariates. The covariates 
included are facility level (health center - HC II or clinic, HC III, HC IV, or hospital), number of 
HIV workers prior to transition, number of months since transition, an index of preparedness, 
and district-level dummies (central support district and whether the district was created since 
2007). I created the preparedness index by taking an unweighted average of 14 questions about 
the facility’s preparedness for transition in domains of communication (to facility, to patients, 
between facilities), consistency (of HIV and MNCH services, reporting systems, and outreach to 
key populations) before and after transition, and capacity (of facility, management, staff) for 
transition, each rated on a 5-item Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, …, 5=strongly agree), 
excluding don’t know/not applicable. Through these controls, I estimated the effect of ownership 
on outcomes — independent of the facility’s level, HIV workforce size, preparedness for 
transition, district status, time since transition, and amount of PEPFAR support lost. 
 
4.3.2 Facility Survey Analysis 
 
The outcomes were selected for this analysis after the survey had already been conducted 
but prior to the analysis (i.e. “pre-specified”). The outcomes were chosen based on hypotheses 
about what types of health system components were likely to be differentially affected in private 
and public facilities. I expected that transition would result in more of a decline in supervision in 
PFPs and PNFPs than in public facilities, under the assumption that district governments would 
prioritize their own facilities. However, PEPFAR IPs, which provide direct service delivery at 
PNFPs, may preferentially continue to supervise PNFPs after transition. 
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Access to trainings following transition may be affected differently in private facilities, 
which have fungible resources from patient fees that can be used for transport, but private 
facilities may also be marginalized in accessing trainings hosted by the MoH. Sputum and viral 
load testing were disrupted more in transition than in maintenance, and I hypothesized that 
private facilities would be more marginal to the lab systems, and therefore more likely to report 
disruptions. Given that few PFPs perform VL testing, I restricted the comparison to PNFPs vs. 
public facilities. 
Due to the large number of potential comparisons, I pre-specified 17 hypotheses to reduce 
the risk of multiple comparison problems (Table 32). Rather than applying Bonferroni correction 
(i.e. dividing the alpha level by the number of comparisons), which would be overly conservative 
given correlation between outcomes, I have chosen to report the expected number of false 
positives for each level of significance under the conservative assumption that all outcomes are 
independent. The expected number of false positive findings at the 0.01─0.05 level is 0.68 and 
0.17 at the 0.01 level, making it possible that I will have roughly one spurious finding at the 0.1–
0.05 level and unlikely (equal or less than a 1-in-6 chance) at the 0.01 level. I included post-hoc 
findings not pre-specified only if they are significant at the 0.01 level. 
I used logistic regression models to analyze the facility survey data for all but one variable, 
the number of HIV Training-days per HIV worker since transition (Table 32). I estimated the 
number of HIV training-days by adding up the product of training length and number of 
attendees (total worker-days) and then dividing by the number of HIV workers and the length of 
time since transition (units:  days/worker/year). The estimate of annualized number of training-
days per HIV worker per year is noisy and highly non-normal. Therefore, I used the non-
parametric permutation test with 10,000 replicates to determine statistical significance of the 
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difference between training in PNFP and public. By permuting the ownership status of PNFPs 
vs. public randomly, the permutation test generates a null distribution to which the observed 
difference can be compared. As the sample is small and there are extreme outliers, I also used 
non-parametric bootstrap resampling with 10,000 replications to test for robustness to exclusion 
of some outlier values. 
All analyses from the facility survey used weights, stratification, and clustering to account 
for survey design. For outcomes collected from a sample of HIV workers within facilities (e.g. 
time-allocation), I accounted for clustering at the facility level as well as clustering due to survey 


























Table 32:  Hypotheses and Comparisons 




IP providing supervision after transition PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 Binary (Y/N) 
Change in HIV Supervision Frequency (less 
frequent vs. same/more frequent) 
PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 
In-charge Reports Less Time on HIV and 
More Time on MNCH 
PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 
Facility stopped providing outreach after 
transition 
PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 
Change in Worker Time Spent on HIV 
Clinical Care 
PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 
Change in Time Spent on Non-HIV Clinical 
Care 
PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 
Change in Frequency of Disruption of Viral 
Load Testing 
PNFP vs. Public 1 
Change in Frequency of Disruption of 
Sputum Testing 
PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 
Training Days HIV per Worker per Year 
Since Transition 
PNFP vs. Public; 
PFP vs. Public 
2 Continuous 
Post-hoc Findings: Comparisons  Outcome 
Type 
In-Charge Reports Loss of Staff1 As A Result 
Of Transition 
PNFP vs. Public 1 Binary (Y/N) 
HIV Quality Change (Worse vs. 
Same/Better) 
PNFP vs. Public 1 Binary (Y/N) 
1 Question:  “Loss of staff through their resignation, or reassignment to other health facilities”. Response:  “The effect has already 
occurred” vs (“The effect has not yet occurred but you expect it to do so” OR “You don’t expect this effect to occur” OR “You don’t know 
whether the effect is likely to occur or not”) 





4.3.3 DHIS2 Data 
 
I extracted data from the Ugandan District Health Information System 2.0 (DHIS2) for all 
facilities in Uganda that PEPFAR claimed to support in FY2014. Extracted variables include the 
number of HIV tests and counseling (HTC), number of patients current on ART, and the 
proportion of ART cohort retained on first-line treatment at 12 months (cohort retention). I used 
DHIS2 data to identify the ownership of facilities. I did not limit the DHIS2 data to the facility 
survey sample in the interest retaining sample size. Therefore, I am unable to include survey data 
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as covariates in the analysis of DHIS2 data. Our data on transition status comes from PEPFAR 
records. As mentioned previously in this thesis, this information is in poor agreement with 
reporting by the facilities themselves. I considered a facility as having enough data if there are 
≥2 reports from Oct 2013–June 2016 and ≥2 reports from July 2016–Dec 2017. Reporting to 
DHIS2 is incomplete, especially for private facilities. Given that few PFPs report providing 
ART, I have not included them in the analysis of ART indicators. 
 
4.3.4 DHIS2 Analysis 
 
DHIS2 does not distinguish between missing and zero. Therefore, missing values may be 
due to no services having been provided or due to counts not being entered. For facilities that 
submitted a report to DHIS2 but have empty fields for HTC and current on ART, I imputed zero 
for the reporting period. However, I did not impute any values for cohort retention, which should 
not be 0. To clean the data for HTC and current on ART, I flagged outliers that are substantially 
above the mean value for the facility. I excluded any months when the number of HTC reported 
exceeds the facility average by a factor of 20 when the average is greater than 10. I also excluded 
values for HTC of more than 10,000 per month, which exceeds the level of even the largest 
facilities. I excluded any quarters for which current on ART is >5x the facility mean value, 
provided that the mean number of patients current on ART is greater than 5. Only 0.06% of 
public and PNFP facility and 0.25% of PFP facility records were flagged for HTC and no records 
were flagged for ART. Due to changes in reporting for cohort retention in 2015, there were many 
illogical values (<1%, >100%) for cohort retention that I flagged and excluded (11% of total). 
The annex describes the cleaning process in more depth. 
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 I create time trend curves of the mean number of HTC, current on ART, and cohort 
retention. I used random intercept Gaussian and negative binomial regression models, which are 
robust to missing under the missing at random assumption (MAR). MAR requires that item-level 
missing is not associated with the true value. The random intercept models also account for the 
autocorrelation present in the longitudinal data by inducing an exchangeable (constant 
covariance) correlation structure. As an exchangeable model may be incorrect, I used a Huber-
White sandwich estimator to create robust confidence intervals and check these results using 
bootstrap estimation using 500 replications for each analysis. 
I used difference-in-difference (hereafter D-in-D) as the measure of association for HTC 
and cohort retention. D-in-D analysis relies on the parallel baseline trends assumption. This 
assumption cannot be confirmed, but visual inspection of trend curves helps. For current on 
ART, which shows substantial differences in baseline trends, I compared the change in slope for 
transition facilities to that for maintenance facilities (hereafter “trend analysis”) around October 
2016, the median transition date for public and PNFPs in our facility survey. This accounts for 
differing baseline trends and makes the change in slope (not level) the measure of transition’s 
impact. 
Both D-in-D and Trend analysis account for secular changes by using transitioned public 
facilities as a control. For D-in-D models, I used Oct 2013–Dec 2014 for a pre-transition period 
and Jan–Dec 2017 for post-transition. Public and PNFP facilities in our facility survey sample 
have similar transition timelines (Table 33). However, for PFPs, the median transition date was 
April 2015, more than a year before the median for public facilities. The preferred transition 
window (Jan 2015–March 2017) contains most PFP and nearly all public facility transitions in 
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our facility survey sample. In sensitivity analyses I varied the transition period for PFPs. I also 
excluded the period Oct 2013–January 2014, which had very high volume of HTC in PFPs. 
In order to interpret estimates from D-in-D and trend analysis models as estimates of the 
causal effect of transition, I must make two further assumptions:  1) that exposure is unrelated to 
trends in the indicator and 2) no spill-over between units. Unlike in previous papers where the 
exposure was transition, the exposure here is facility ownership. However, ownership is 
correlated with selection of facilities for transition, as nearly all PFPs were transitioned on the 
basis of being “low volume” while this was the case for only some public facilities and PNFPs. 
Therefore, transition PFPs may have different trends in HTC related not to transition but to 
regression to the mean. The second assumption requires that patients do not switch 
systematically between transitioned PFPs, PNFPs, and public facilities. It could be argued that 
patients would prefer to transfer to facilities that continue to receive PEPFAR support, where the 
option is available, but movement between transitioned facilities of differing ownership status is 
also possible. Given the potential violation of these assumptions, the estimates from the models 





4.4 Results  
 
4.4.1 Description of data 
 
In the survey, 206 facilities reported have been transitioned from PEPFAR (Table 33:  
Facility Survey Descriptive Statistics). The majority were public (N=145, 70%). Private facilities 
were roughly equally split among PNFPs (N=29, 14%) and PFPs (N=32, 16%). Most facilities 
(65%) were health center IIIs (HC IIIs). Only 11% of facilities were HC IV or hospitals, but 74% 
of all facilities surveyed offered ART. Notably, among PFPs, only 9% offered ART and the 
majority of PFPs were low-level facilities (HC II or Clinics). The mean transition impact index 
score was highest for public facilities (2.58), followed by PNFPs (2.25), and lowest for PFPs 
(1.88). Preparedness scores were significantly higher for PNFPs (3.73) than for PFPs (3.25) and 




Table 33:  Facility Survey Descriptive Statistics (Unweighted Proportions) 
PEPFAR Transition 
Facilities 
Public PNFP PFP 
 N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Total 145 (70%) 29 (14%) 32 (16%) 
Level    
HC II or Clinic 22 (44%) 6 (12%) 22 (44%) 
HC III 104 (78%) 20 (15%) 9 (7%) 
HC IV 12 (86%) 1 (7%) 1 (7%) 
Hospital 7 (78%) 2 (22%) 0 (0%) 
Region    
Eastern 101 (81%) 15 (12%) 8 (6%) 
Northern 42 (75%) 12 (21%) 2 (4%) 
Central (Kampala/Wakiso) 2 (8%) 2 (8%) 22 (85%) 
Services Offered 
(as % of facilities in 
ownership type) N (%) N (%) N (%) 
HTC 137 (95%) 27 (93%) 32 (100%) 
HIV Outreach 58 (40%) 16 (55%) 11 (34%) 
PMTCT 134 (92%) 26 (90%) 13 (41%) 
ART 127 (88%) 22 (76%) 3 (9%) 
Reports HMIS 105 145 (100%) 27 (93%) 23 (72%) 
Reports HMIS 106a 113 (84%) 14 (54%) 1 (8%) 
Mean Transition Impact 















Transition Date Distribution 
10th Percentile May 2015 March 2015 February 2014 
Median September 2016  September 2016 April 2015 
90th Percentile March 2017 March 2017 September 2016 
Footnote:  ART, antiretroviral therapy; C.I.:  confidence interval; HTC: HIV testing & counseling; PEPFAR, President’s Emergency Plan for 
AIDS Relief; PMTCT, prevention of mother-to-child transmission; PNFP, private not for-profit; PFP, private for-profit. 
 
In Table 34, I present descriptive statistics for the DHIS2 data. Out of 734 facilities 
designated by PEPFAR for transition, 457 are listed as public, 137 as PNFPs, and 140 as PFPs. 
The proportion of facilities with enough data for analysis for HMIS 105 was 86.7% of public, 
85.4% for PNFPs, but only 43.6% for PFPs. There were 106 public and 21 PNFP facilities that 






Table 34:  DHIS2 Descriptive Statistics (Unweighted Proportions) 
 Public PNFP PFP 
 N (%) N (%) N (%) 
Number of PEPFAR facilities 
Intended for Transition 
457 137 140 








Reporting for ART Indicators 106 21 3 
Mean Number Current on ART 146.8 85.9 Omitted 
Mean number of HTC Per Month 217.5 210.5 99.6 




















Footnote:  ART, antiretroviral therapy; C.I.:  confidence interval; CS, central support; HTC: HIV testing & counseling; PEPFAR, President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief; PMTCT, prevention of mother-to-child transmission; PNFP, private not for-profit; PFP, private for-profit. 
 
4.4.2 Facility Survey:  Effects on Health Service Inputs 
 
A previously noted in the first (Human Resources for Health) paper in this thesis, transition 
facilities as a whole report a reduction in supervision frequency for HIV, a reported decline in 
quality of HIV care, loss of staff, discontinuation of outreach, and less worker time spent on HIV 
clinical care, but no significant differences for non-HIV clinical care or in training days per 
worker per year since transition.  
In the Annex, I present the weighted, unadjusted proportions of public, PNFP, and PFP 
transition facilities reporting pre-specified and post hoc survey outcomes (Table 54). Using 
unadjusted proportions, PNFPs were significantly more likely than public facilities to report a 
decline in HIV supervision frequency (61.5% vs. 43.9%, p=0.026). PNFPs were less likely than 
public to report increased disruption of VL testing (8.8% vs. 24.3%, p=0.016). PFPs were less 
likely to report declining supervision frequency (18.0% vs. 43.9%, p=0.002).  
Table 35 presents the results for the multivariate analysis of changes in support during 
transition. Compared to public transition facilities, PNFPs are more likely to report declining 
frequency of HIV supervision from any source (OR=2.507, 1.456─4.319, p=0.002). Larger 
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facilities also reported declines in HIV supervision frequency more often than smaller facilities. 
Both PFPs and PNFPs were less likely than public facilities to report increased (vs. 









Model Logistic Logistic 
Outcome Decline in HIV 
Supervision 
Frequency 
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N 204 160 
Notes:  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 1The transition impact index uses information about supervision frequency, making it 
tautologically associated with the outcome “Change in Frequency of HIV Supervision”. I omitted the index from the analysis. 








4.4.3 Facility Survey:  Effects on Health Service Delivery 
 
In the unadjusted analysis, PFP workers were more likely to report spending less time on 
HIV care than public facility workers (59.6% vs. 23.5%, p<0.001) but the difference was not 
significant for PNFPs (Table 54). One post-hoc finding, in-charge reports declining quality of 
HIV services, is significantly less commonly reported in PNFPs vs. public transition facilities 
(41.6% vs. 21.4%, p<0.001). 
Adjusting for facility characteristics, transitioned PNFPs are more likely to report loss of 
staff (OR = 5.886, 2.914–11.887, p<0.001) (post-hoc) and reduced time spent on HIV care 
among remaining staff (OR=2.117, 1.054–4.255, p=0.036) compared to public. However, PNFP 
facilities are less likely to report a perceived decline in quality of HIV services (OR=0.491, 
0.301–1.395, p=0.006) than public (post-hoc). 
PFPs are more likely to discontinue outreach (OR=3.029, 1.325–6.925, p=0.011) and their 
workers are more likely to report declining time (vs. increased or same time) spent on HIV care 
since transition (OR=6.241, 2.709–14.38, p<0.001) as well as decreased time on non-HIV care 
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N 179 427 426 204 175 
Notes:  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 




Other outcomes were not statistically significant, and I report these in the Annex (Table 
55). Notable among the null findings are that neither PFP nor PNFP in-charges report spending 
“less time on HIV and more time on MNCH”, relative to public facilities. 
Though PNFPs report 2.76 more days of HIV training per worker since transition than 
public facilities, the significance of the difference cannot be assessed using Gaussian standard 
errors given the highly skewed distributions of annualized HIV training days per worker since 
transition (Figure 23). Most PNFPs and public facilities have had no trainings since transition, 
making median zero for both. The difference in means is primarily due to the few outliers 
reporting 30 or more days of HIV-related training.  
 In order to assess the significance of the difference in training for PNFPs and public 
facilities, I permute membership in PNFP and Public facilities 10,000 times to yield a null 
distribution under which the ownership is randomly assigned. Only in 211 out of 10,000 
repetitions (p=0.021) did the adjusted difference between PNFPs and public facilities from the 
null distribution exceed the observed value. This would suggest that PNFPs workers have had 
significantly more training since transition than their public peers. However, the outlier values 
were likely influential. Therefore, I also used bootstrap resampling as means of testing the 
robustness to outliers, and the difference is not significant:  2.762 days (-1.361, 6.885; p=0.189). 
Furthermore, excluding the top three values with >30 days of reported training per year, the 










Figure 23:  Histogram of Annualized HIV Training Days per Worker since Transition 
 
 
4.4.4 DHIS2:  Impacts on HIV Service Volume 
 
I present trend curves for the mean number of HTC, current on ART, and 12-month cohort 
retention at PEPFAR facilities from Oct 2013–December 2017 in Figures 24–28. Figure 24 
















Figure 24:  Trends in HTC in Public, PNFP, and PFP Facilities 
  
 
Examining the HTC model output, there is a significant D-in-D for PFPs, but not for 
PNFPs for HTC (Table 37). The relative difference-in-difference for PFPs is about  
-38% (IRR=0.621, 0.426–0.903, p=0.005) fewer tests using robust confidence intervals. The 
bootstrap confidence intervals are similar and do not change the conclusions. Varying the 
transition windows for PFPs (Annex:  Table 56) and PNFPs (Annex:  Table 57) also does not 
affect the results qualitatively. The trends in HTC for PFPs and public in Oct 2013–Jan 2014 are 
clearly not parallel. Excluding these four months, the baseline trends appear to be parallel, and 
the decline in PFPs smaller but is still significant at  
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N obs.: 11,902 10,319 11,902 10,319 
N facilities:   513 454 513 454 
Public 396 396 396 396 
PNFP 117  117  
PFP  58  58 
Notes:  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
Footnote:  HC:  health centre; HTC:  HIV testing and counseling; IRR:  incidence rate ratio; PNFP, private not for-profit; PFP, private for-profit. 
 
Figure 25 suggests that PNFPs have not increased their level of current on ART as much as 
public transition facilities. However, disaggregating facilities by size (HC II & HC III vs. HC IV 
& Hospital) the picture becomes clearer. In Figure 26, HC II & III PNFPs have not had a clear 
drop-off in their trends in current on ART; however, trends in current on ART are clearly 
diverging by ownership for transition HC IV and Hospitals by ownership (Figure 27). There are 
only 3 PNFPs and 13 public facilities at the level of HC IV or Hospital that were transitioned 
from PEPFAR. In Figure 35 (Annex), I present the trends for these three facilities individually 
































Figure 27:  Trends in Current on ART (HC IV & Hospital) 
  
 
There is no significant difference-in-difference in trend for PNFPs vs. public facilities in 
current on ART. This remains the case after disaggregating by level of facility or applying 
bootstrap confidence intervals. The D-in-D in trend further from the null (more negative) for the 
HC IV & Hospitals (IRR=0.955, 0.855–1.067, 0.413), as Figure 27 suggests, but the result was 
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  11.12*** 
(5.77, 21.41) 
<0.001 












































































N obs.: 2,024 1,763 261 2,024 
N facilities:   127 111 16 127 
Public 106 93 13 106 
PNFP 21 18 3 21 
Notes:  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
Footnote:  HC:  health centre; ART:  antiretroviral therapy; IRR:  incidence rate ratio; PNFP, private not for-profit. 
 
In Figure 28, cohort retention has been declining over time at roughly equal rates for 








Figure 28:  Trends in Cohort Retention at Transitioned Public and PNFP Facilities 
 
 
For cohort retention, the D-in-D for PNFPs was not significant (3.6 percentage points; -8.2, 
15.4, p=0.553). This remains the case after disaggregating by level or using the bootstrap (Table 
39). Varying the transition dates also did not change the interpretation (Annex:  Table 58). 
Smaller facilities (HC II & III) have lower baseline cohort retention. The decline in cohort 
retention among reporting facilities during the study period is about 14 percentage points, and is 
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  -0.128** 
(-0.212, -0.045) 
0.002 
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N obs.: 628 370 95 628 
N facilities:   117 102 15 117 
Public 97 85 12 97 
PNFP 20 17 3 20 
Notes:  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  






PNFPs experienced larger reductions in HIV supervision and receive no more attention 
from IPs after transition than public facilities. PNFP employees are more likely than public to 
report declining time spent on HIV care and there is limited evidence that PNFPs, especially 
large ones, are not keeping up with their public peers in the number of patients on ART, but the 
divergence in trends seems to pre-date transition and is not statistically significant. 
Changes in support for PNFPs may be explained by their relative marginalization from 
government and lack of specialized attention from IPs. Continued IP visits, when they exist, did 
not favor public, PNFP, or PFP facilities. Lost supervision from IPs can be made up for through 
increased attention from district health offices (DHOs). However, PNFPs may be less of a 
priority than public facilities for DHOs providing supervision. 
In a post-hoc analysis, PNFP in-charges are more likely than public facility in-charges to 
report “Loss of staff through their resignation or reassignment to other health facilities” since 
transition. This is distinct from the issue of terminations of health workers noted in the first paper 
of this thesis. Reporting loss of staff is positively associated with the transition impact index and 
marginally negatively associated with transition preparedness, making it plausible that transition 
itself is a driver of loss of staff. Elsewhere in the survey (not reported in this paper), PNFPs 
report more than twice the odds of a position in their HIV workforces having turnover since 
transition compared to public. It is possible that PNFP workers have more flexibility to respond 
to changing incentives than government health workers, and this is reflected in voluntary 
turnover of these health workers. However, higher turnover in PNFPs may be unrelated to 
transition. It is unclear whether the reported turnover results in less staffing. There are very few 
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PNFPs that report consistently to HRHIS, making the type of analysis of staffing ratios done in 
the first paper of this thesis impossible. 
A second post-hoc finding relates to quality in PNFPs vs. public. PNFP in-charges are less 
likely than public facility in-charges to report declining quality of HIV care. That fewer PNFP 
facilities report declines in quality of HIV services may be due to initiatives by PNFP umbrella 
organizations, which have sought to improve quality in their member facilities in recent years 
(124). However, reported declines in quality of HIV services in public facilities may reflect in-
charges’ dissatisfaction with government support post-transition and their desire to depict their 
post-transition situation as dire to elicit a response from government. If PNFP know that they 
must cope without additional government support, they may be less inclined to misrepresent the 
situation. 
While PNFPs seem able to maintain service delivery following transition, the sustainability 
of HIV service provision in PNFPs is uncertain. If PNFP coping mechanisms are exhausted, 
quality of HIV services in PNFPs may be affected. In the second paper of this dissertation, I 
question for how long transition facilities can maintain services following loss of support. This 
question is even more relevant for transition PNFPs, which have lost more supervision and staff 
than the typical transition facility. If HIV service provision by PNFPs proves unsustainable, 
patients will need to be transferred to public facilities with the recognition that these transfers 
have not always gone smoothly in the past (30, 73). 
Although transition PNFPs report more annualized HIV-related training days per worker 
per year, the evidence is weak. Few facilities report any training and the method of annualizing 
the data (dividing training days by workers and time since transition) can result in large outliers, 
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particularly among facilities that report transition recently. Bootstrap resampling, in which some 
resamples of the data will contain outliers and others will not, rejected statistical significance.  
PFPs are not more likely than public facilities to have declining supervision and are less 
likely to experience disruptions of sputum testing. However, these may not be the most relevant 
metric for PFPs, which may have been more influenced by financial incentives not included in 
the analysis. 
There is evidence that PFPs are disengaging from HIV care since transition, with 
discontinuation of HIV outreach, less staff time spent on HIV, and fewer testing and counseling 
visits performed relative to public facilities. Private providers play a major role in provision of 
HTC in urban populations and among higher-income groups, who prefer the service and 
anonymity of private facilities (120). From the Uganda Private Sector Assessment: 
Private facilities, particularly [PFPs] offering comprehensive services including 
HIV/AIDS, are a “one stop shop” that provide convenience, privacy, and flexibility. 
Some [PFP] practitioners described their ART clients as “walk-ins,” and others reported 
that [PFP] facilities provided timesaving measures such as call-in ARV prescriptions for 
clients. (p. 129) 
 
 
Furthermore, interviews conducted as part of the parent study with key informants and 
staff at one PFP facility revealed that fees for HTC had been introduced after transition and 
outreach visits ceased, which substantially decreased demand (H. Zakumumpa, personal 
communication, October 17, 2018). While patients may simply switch to nearby public facilities, 
many of which continue to receive PEPFAR support, some clients who prefer the privacy of 
PFPs may forgo testing altogether. 
 Considering the large role that the private sector has historically played in HIV care in 
Uganda (120, 122), there may be harms to a diminished role for PFPs in HIV care and a 
stagnating role for PNFPs. Advocates of private sector inclusion and public-private partnerships 
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will be discouraged by these findings. However, there may be counteracting benefits for 
Uganda’s HIV response. Increased consolidation of HIV services in the public sector could 
improve planning, coordination, and monitoring of outcomes. PFPs provided a sizable share of 
testing, but only a few offered ART, which meant that patients testing positive in PFPs required a 
referral to an ART facility. This was an impediment to “test-and-treat” policies. Furthermore, 
monitoring of services delivered by PFPs through routine reporting is particularly difficult, given 




This analysis is limited by the small sample size of private facilities in our survey, which 
results in low power. Multiple comparisons risks inflating Type I error rates, thereby limiting our 
ability to test large numbers of hypotheses without identifying many false positives. In the 
facility survey, under conservative assumptions, I expect 0.68 false positive at a 1-<5% level and 
0.17 false positives at the 1% level among our pre-specified hypotheses. This makes it likely that 
one out of four findings at the 1-<5% level (reduced outreach in PFPs, reduced time spent on 
HIV care in PNFPs, decreased disruptions of sputum testing in PNFPs, and reduced time spent 
on non-HIV care among PFPs) is spurious. It is possible, though unlikely, that any of the three 
pre-specified findings significant at the 1% level is spurious. The post-hoc findings should be 
considered with some skepticism as well. 
The facility survey relies on self-report and recall by facility in-charges and workers, 
which may be subject to response and recall bias. Our analysis will only be biased if there is 
differential recall or response bias between private and public facilities. This may happen if 
private and public facility in-charges have differing rationales for misreporting outcomes. For 
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example, our finding that PFPs are more likely to discontinue outreach would be biased if public 
in-charges were reluctant to report that they could no longer provide a valued service but PFPs 
in-charges were not.  
It is also true that PFPs are concentrated in urban areas in Uganda, and our PFP sample 
comes almost exclusively two districts (Kampala and Wakiso) and were mostly previously 
supported by just one implementing partner. Differences between PFPs and public facilities 
could be specific to these districts and/or the IP involved. 
Under-reporting of PFPs in DHIS2 is also a limitation. The facilities that report to DHIS2 
are likely different from those that do not. However, it is a matter of debate whether reporting 
and non-reporting facilities will respond to transition differently. If the PFPs reporting to DHIS2 
were those that had more capacity, they may also be better equipped to respond to transition. 
However, if reporting PFPs are those that relied on PEPFAR support more, they may well be 
more affected by transition. 
The quality of DHIS2 data is also a limitation in our analysis. Systematic bias in DHIS2 
reporting is likely to exist and could differ for facilities of differing ownership status. Constant 
over- or under-reporting would not affect our analysis, but differential changes in the quality of 
reporting would. For example, if training programs improve the quality of DHIS2 reporting in 
public facilities over time but not in private ones, our findings would be biased. The direction of 
the bias would depend on the extent of over or under-reporting at baseline. 
Lastly, difference-in-difference analysis relies on assumption of parallel baseline trends 
and has been shown to have inflated Type I error rates. Excluding the months October 2013–Jan 
2014 that have high testing activity by PFPs, the baseline trends for HTC in PFPs and public 
facilities appear parallel, albeit with noise, and the D-in-D remains significant for PFPs. I 
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addressed concerns about inflating type I errors with D-in-D through 1) sensitivity analysis by 
varying the pre- and post-transition periods, and 2) bootstrap replication to account for auto-
correlation, as recommended by Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan (114). Despite these steps, 
estimates of effect modification by ownership should not be treated as estimates of the causal 
effect modification of ownership.  
 
4.5.2 Conclusions & Implications 
 
The declining role of PFPs in HIV provision and the decline in support to PNFPs in 
Uganda provide causes for concern. Although declining HIV testing in the (mostly) urban PFP 
facilities can be offset by increased testing in nearby public facilities, patients who prefer the 
accessibility and confidentiality of private providers may forgo testing altogether. Future 
population-based sero-prevalence studies, including the AIDS indicator Survey and the 
population-based AIDS impact assessments (PHIA) surveys, could determine if transition has led 
to less testing and more PLHIV unaware of their status among demographic groups that use 
PFPs. 
The loss of supervision and staff reported by PNFPs following transition leads to concerns 
about the sustainability of HIV care provided at PNFPs. PNFPs often serve remote areas that 
lack equivalently-equipped public facilities, making it difficult for patients to go elsewhere. If 
transitioned PNFPs stop enrolling patients on ART, “ART-deserts” may result in some rural 
areas, affecting access to treatment.  
 With declining global donor funding for HIV/AIDS (1), more transitions are likely in the 
future. Private facilities serve different segments of the population and are likely to experience 
transition differently than public facilities, and their needs should be considered in transition 
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planning. Maintaining supervision following transition of private providers requires mechanisms 
to extend public supervision to private facilities or to enable private umbrella organizations (e.g. 
UPMB) to supervise their members. Future research should address the experiences of patients 







Chapter 5. Conclusions & Policy Implications  
 
5.1 Summary of results 
 
In the preceding three papers, I present some negative impacts of transition. The 
termination of lay health workers and the probable reduction in training are the most 
problematic, among the impacts on human resources. Perceptions among staff in transition 
facilities of worsening access and quality of care are also a cause for concern, especially if they 
are ultimately confirmed by service volume data. Other important negative effects include the 
diminished role of the private sector, particularly PFPs, with the potential decline in testing by 
their clients. Transition has put PNFPs under increased strain, with reduced supervision and 
potentially fewer staff than public facilities. 
Among the positive findings, there is a lack of evidence that transition has negatively 
impacted service volume. In addition, staffing levels and worker motivation do not appear to 
have been affected by transition. Even if transition facilities eventually fall behind maintenance 
facilities to some degree, it is important to note that HIV services have not collapsed 
immediately following loss of PEPFAR support — a positive result in and of itself.  
 
5.1.1 Comparing Hypotheses and Results 
 
The findings from the preceding three papers both agree with and contrast with the 




Table 40 compares the findings to the hypotheses. When workers in transition facilities 
lost incentives, they did not leave their posts or become less motivated, contrary to my 
expectations. Coping mechanisms may have lessened the impact of transition, or workers may 
not have had sufficient time to respond to transition to become demotivated or leave. 
There is also no evidence that workers shifted time from HIV to non-HIV care. Although 
transition workers do report spending less time on HIV relative to other services, they do not 
differ significantly in their reported changes in time spent on non-HIV care, relative to 
maintenance workers. Transition workers also reported a decline in time spent in training (as 
well as meetings and reporting); however, I did not capture clear changes in quality of HIV care, 
other than in the perceptions of facility in-charges.  
 Transition in-charges were more likely to report worsening access to HIV care and loss of 
outreach. The expected outcome of discontinuation of outreach, reduced access to HIV services, 
and declining time-allocation for HIV in transition facilities is reduced volume of HIV services. 
However, these effects were not observed using the DHIS2 data, possibly because they might 
only appear in the longer-term. 
 In the third paper, I found that HIV testing decreased in PFPs relative to public facilities, 
suggesting a change in the private-public mixture. Transition PNFPs, especially large PNFPs, 
were not keeping up with transition public facilities in current on ART, but this trend preceded 
the PEPFAR GP. Ultimately, PNFPs may play a smaller role in provision of ART in the future 
for reasons unrelated to transition. Decentralization of HIV care in the public sector increased the 
number of access points, which might have led more new and continuing ART patients to seek 















Distribution Loss of incentives causes 
staff to leave transition 
facilities 
 Official cadre have not left public transitioned facilities 
 Lay health worker cadres have been affected by 
terminations of staff, which is occurring only in 
transition facilities 
Motivation Loss of Incentives results 
in less productivity 
(through absenteeism) or 
decline in responsiveness 
 Transition did result in loss of incentives 
 However, transition workers are not less motivated 
than their peers in maintenance 
 Absenteeism (not reported) did not differ significantly 
between maintenance and transition 
 The expected impacts on HIV and non-HIV service 




Decline in frequency of 
HIV training and indirect 
effects on non-HIV skills 
 There was some evidence that training declined in 
transition 
 In-charges in transition reported worsening or less 
improvement in quality 
 Expected impacts on quality of services examined 








Discontinuation of HIV 
services in transitioned 
facilities 
 More than half of transitioned facilities report 
discontinuation of outreach compared to only one 
maintenance facility 
 Other HIV services were unaffected 
 Despite this, trends in HTC, ART, and cohort retention 
were not different 
Access barriers or 
reduced attention to HIV 
services result in reduced 
utilization of HIV 
Services 
 Transition facility staff spend less time on HIV but not 
more time on non-HIV care 
 In-charges report reduced access to HIV care 








discontinue or seek cost 
recovery for HIV 
 PFPs do appear to be reducing HIV service volume, 
availability of outreach, and HIV time-allocation 
 PNFP workers report spending less time on HIV at a 
higher rate than public, but PNFPs have not deviated 
from their pre-transition service delivery trends 
Footnotes:  ART, antiretroviral therapy; DHIS2, district health information system 2.0; HIV, human immunodeficiency virus; PNFP, private not 
for-profit; PFP, private for-profit. 
 
 
5.1.2 Discussion of GP Findings in Uganda 
 
The evidence presented across these papers suggests that the GP in Uganda has had the 
expected negative impacts on the support for facilities and the services that rely heavily on that 
support (i.e. HIV outreach). However, downstream activities — such as enrollment and retention 
of patients on ART — have not been affected. This presents a conundrum.  
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While more evidence is needed; two possible interpretations exist at this time. First, the 
negative perceptions reported by in-charges may only be perceptions. Negative health worker 
perceptions may be driven by temporary panic or deliberate mis-representation of the situation to 
survey enumerators. However, it is also possible that negative impacts have occurred or will 
occur but are not observable with presently available data. I lean towards the former argument:  
transition has put strain on the health system, which is reflected in changing inputs and 
perceptions of access and quality, but the health system is exhibiting some resilience. 
 Resiliency in the face of transition could result from multiple sources. First, past donor 
investments in training, infrastructure, and systems may be paying dividends that make up for 
lost support. Norms established over the past 15 plus years of PEPFAR programming have likely 
remained in place. However, it remains to be seen whether past investments are self-sustaining or 
depreciate over time. Increased resource mobilization, most likely to come from the national 
government of Uganda, will be critical to maintaining health system performance in the long-
run.  
 
5.2 A Note on the Context and Transition Process 
 
The results presented in this thesis occurred in spite of a hasty, complicated, and one-sided 
transition process. The GP sought to transition facilities from PEPFAR to “central support”; 
however, PEPFAR never defined what “central support” would mean, and the instructions 
provided to missions in COP guidance did not include how to engage national stakeholders in 
transition planning (4). In fact, there was no joint planning process at all in Uganda. A 
“Transition Task Force” was formed, but it never met (L. Paina, personal communication, March 
16, 2018). In part, this was due to the mistaken notion that the facilities to be transitioned were 
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“low volume” and, hence, unimportant. This is only partly true. Many high-volume facilities 
were transitioned in the 10 central support districts. Furthermore, the data used for identifying 
“low-volume” facilities for transition was incomplete and often erroneous. 
 The negative impacts of transition were generally predictable. PEPFAR IPs led 
supervision visits and paid for health workers’ training and salaries. Withdrawing PEPFAR 
support resulted in less supervision, training, and fewer (lay) health workers. Yet, PEPFAR made 
little effort to ensure that the support it provided would be made up from other sources. 
 However, the lack of planning on PEPFAR’s part is not shocking to me. First, that 
service delivery did not collapse following PEPFAR transition is evidence that PEPFAR’s 
support may not have been as vital to the health facilities as some critics have assumed. The 
Foundation for AIDS Research (amfAR) predicted that a 5.6% decrease in global U.S. 
HIV/AIDS funding would result in 253,000 patients experiencing disruption of treatment 
globally (135), yet, in Uganda, transition facilities have lost nearly all of their site-level support 
and have still been able to keep pace with their maintenance counterparts. 
Secondly, donor health programs exist to temporarily provide the support to the health 
system that domestic government and private resources cannot. The ultimate responsibility for 
the health system rests with the national government. While PEPFAR should have initiated 
planning for transition early on, the Government of Uganda (GoU) had 11 years between 
PEPFAR’s entry in 2004 and the start of GP in 2015 to prepare for PEPFAR’s inevitable 
withdrawal. The burden of ensuring a smooth transition, and the blame for a lack of a transition 
plan, rests with both PEPFAR and GoU. 
The Government of Uganda could have had better systems for absorbing lay health 
workers and providing training, and these remain vital as PEPFAR and donors consider further 
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scale-backs. However, it likely made sense for the GoU not to fill all gaps in support created by 
transition. Where PEPFAR and other donors were willing to spend heavily, the GoU allowed 
them to do so. It would not be feasible for Uganda to provide the same level of support to HIV 
that PEPFAR itself, through the GP process, has determined to be excessive. GoU has focused its 
limited resources on health system strengthening more broadly, and the country has made steady 
progress on health indicators unrelated to diseases targeted by PEPFAR. Therefore, some loss of 
support for HIV is to be expected in transition, though it did not need to result in termination of 
lay health workers. 
However, even for a low-income country, GoU could be doing more to support its health 
system. In 2014, the GoU spent only 10.8% of its budget on health, far below the Abuja 
declaration goal of 15% (13). The limited fiscal space in Uganda’s health budget makes it more 
difficult to cope with the loss of donor support. This was in evidence in 2017, when the 
government sought to cut the health budget at the same time as donor support was declining and 
treatment needs have been growing, leading to a shortfall in funding for ARVs (136). Rwanda, 
despite also being a low-income country, spent 23.8% of its government budget on health care in 
2014 (13). Rwanda has coped with declining PEPFAR support while successfully scaling-up 
ART (70) and has exceeded the second 90-90-90 target with 83% of PLHIV on ART (137) 
compared to Uganda’s 72% (11). Rwanda is an exceptional case, but it demonstrates what is 
possible in a low-income country with adequate resources and coordination. 
 
5.3 Lessons for Transitions in other Settings 
 
Going beyond the GP experience in Uganda, there are relevant lessons for transitions in 
other settings. The PEPFAR GP is likely only the beginning for transitions of GHIs. Declining 
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donor funding for HIV (1) coupled with expanding treatment targets under the 90-90-90 goals 
make increasing the domestic share of HIV expenditure necessary. While transition and/or 
increased co-financing of health programs may seem inevitable, the PEPFAR GP experience 
suggests that preparedness is lacking from both donors and government. 
 
5.3.1 Lessons from the GP Model:  Suddenness 
 
 In the PEPFAR GP process, COP directives announcing the PEPFAR GP came from 
Washington, D.C. in 2015. Country missions made COP plans in 2015 and were expected to 
implement them by October 2016 (i.e. the end of FY2016). This compressed transition timeline 
did not permit appropriate stakeholder engagement or transition planning. As noted previously, 
the “Transition Task Force” in Uganda never met. This is not an exceptional experience; in 2011 
PEPFAR announced to Namibia that they would be scaling-down support immediately without 
prior consultation (97). The Government of Namibia had no transition plan until support was 
already being scaled-back. While the GFATM has a multi-year transition planning process with 
clear staging and criteria (138), the transition timeline depends on having adequate resources to 
gradually phase out support. The GFATM has a three-year budget horizon, and all eyes should 
be on the 2019 replenishment for 2020–2022. 
Recent U.S. budget proposals with large cuts to foreign assistance have been rejected by 
Congress (139), but if donor cuts do come, many U.S. and multi-lateral programs will need to be 
scaled-back on a rapid timescale. Therefore, the suddenness and the lack of attention to transition 




5.3.2 Lessons from the GP Model:  Prioritization 
 
PEPFAR prioritized facilities and sub-national units for transition based on cost-
effectiveness and contribution to the national HIV response. Prioritizing support at the 
subnational level makes sense from a programmatic perspective; it is more cost-effective to 
provide resources where the largest number of recipients are to be found. However, the process 
in Uganda identified districts for transition in Northern and Eastern regions that were among the 
poorest in Uganda and that were often newly-established districts lacking capacity. Prioritization 
has the potential to exacerbate existing inequalities in access to care. Areas with low HIV 
prevalence are often remote and hard to reach. Donors may well not see the programmatic 
benefits as being worth the costs and decide to transition these areas first. National governments 
could and should step in to make up for this support, but this does not appear to have happened 
in Uganda, and it cannot be assumed that governments struggling to provide basic services in 
already marginalized areas will be able to also replace lost donor support following transition. 
Another issue with prioritization emerges when multiple donors (or donors and 
government) decide to prioritize their support simultaneously. USAID has also prioritized its 
MNCH programs in Kenya at the same time as both PEPFAR and the Government of Kenya 
were doing so for HIV (D. Rodríguez, personal communication, March 16, 2018). Having 
multiple and overlapping actors simultaneously prioritizing their support increases the 
complexity and risks of transition and has the potential to further marginalize remote regions. 
 
5.3.3 Lessons from the GP Model:  Transition to Central Support 
 
Another element of the GP model likely to be relevant in the future is a transition of site-
level support while leaving “above site” support in place. This element has appeared in prior 
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PEPFAR transitions Southern Africa (32) and Rwanda (70), where site-level support was 
channeled through central government budget support. 
This model has good features for ownership and coordination of the HIV response. By 
centralizing the allocation of funding and decision-making, the central support model invests in 
the capacity of the national health systems and has the potential to be more sustainable than 
direct service delivery. However, the above-site support model also has three key limitations. 
 First, the central support model relies on national systems that may not be able or willing 
to perform all of the functions that donors provided prior to transition. Established vertical 
systems may not easily be integrated into or replaced by national programs. An example of this 
in Uganda was that there was no national, paid community health worker program to absorb the 
lay health workers supported by departing PEPFAR IPs. IPs have the resources and flexibility to 
fill gaps in government support at the site level, going so far as to print data collection tools 
when government of Uganda ran out of stock or replace tires on government vehicles. 
Government budgeting and procurement processes are often far less flexible and responsive to 
health system needs than those of PEPFAR IPs. 
Another problem with the central support model is that support to national systems is not 
helpful if facilities cannot access those systems. In the PEPFAR GP, support for lab hubs 
remained in place, but funding for transport riders to collect samples and airtime for health 
workers to download test results were affected by transition. This resulted in increased disruption 
in viral load testing in transition facilities until patchwork solutions were implemented to 
alleviate the problem (L. Paina & D. Rodríguez, personal communication, March 16, 2018). In a 
similar vein, PEPFAR’s support for workers to attend trainings was instrumental in them getting 
trained. Supporting training at the national level will not be helpful if workers cannot travel. 
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During transition, donors and governments will need to institutionalize the support donors 
provided. While it would be difficult for low-income nations to adopt donor-supported functions 
wholesale, they can also adapt them to increase cost-effectiveness. An example of this is 
cascading training of the trainers (TTT), which reduces travel costs. 
5.3.4 Lessons from the GP Model:  Summary 
 
In Summary, the GP model has positive aspects, especially when compared with an abrupt 
termination of programs or an untargeted scale-back in support. However, the limitations of the 
model noted in the Ugandan GP experience offer lessons for its use elsewhere. Not all donor 
systems can be integrated into national systems, and bridge support may be required to maintain 
vertical systems until a more sustainable solution can be found. Critical gaps between national 
systems and health providers, such as the reliance on donors to maintain lab transit riders, should 
be identified and addressed as a part of transition planning. Transition planning should also 
include all major stakeholders, including other donors, to avoid simultaneous prioritization and 
ensure agreement on post-transition roles. Government has a specific role in supporting equity 
following transition, which can be worsened by prioritization of support. 
For researchers, the GP model presents an excellent opportunity to study the effects of 
transition at the sub-national and facility levels by using units that continue to receive support as 
controls. However, researchers should remember that geographic factors and facility volume are 
often selection criteria and address confounding and selection bias in their analyses. However, as 
donors are unlikely to employ randomization of transition, the GP model remains one of the best 




5.3.5 Lessons from PEPFAR GP’s Results, with Caveats 
 
Despite the loss of support and the disruption of outreach in Uganda, there were no notable 
impacts of transition on service volume. This is despite PEPFAR’s large role in the Ugandan 
health sector, including transitioned facilities. In settings with stronger health systems and less 
donor dependence than Uganda, a total collapse of HIV services should not, in general, be 
expected immediately following transition. If transitioned facilities in Uganda continue to keep 
pace with those still supported by PEPFAR over the coming years, it will be evidence that 
transition has potential for increasing national control while maintaining progress. Yet, any 
evidence derived from the GP in Uganda need to come with several limitations. 
The transition process in Uganda hardly represents a repeatable controlled experiment — 
much less a randomized controlled experiment. The rushed implementation of the PEPFAR GP 
and the reliance on incomplete and inaccurate data for making investment decisions are not the 
hallmarks of a good transition process, regardless of the outcomes. I recommend more careful 
design and implementation of future transitions with prospective evaluation to further build the 
evidence base. This requires some openness to experimenting with transition, and I counsel 
cautious optimism about the potential for sustainable transition of HIV programs. 
However, my cautious optimism about transition comes with two important caveats. First, 
above site support, particularly for commodities, has been critical to maintaining progress in 
Uganda, and will be so for other countries that lack the financial resources and technical capacity 
to maintain commodity supply and lab systems. Had PEPFAR and the Global Funds not 




Secondly, sustained service delivery following transition relies on political will. Treatment 
for HIV has political support in Uganda, but some HIV prevention approaches do not. Uganda’s 
criminalization of homosexuality and sex work make it unlikely that the government would 
sustain programs targeted to key populations (KPs). The GP retained PEPFAR support for KP 
programming in Uganda; however, in other transition experiences, such as GFATM’s transition 
in Eastern Europe and the PEPFAR transition in the Eastern Caribbean (28, 71), KP programs 
were transitioned to socially conservative governments that were uninterested in supporting 
them, with disastrous results. This will not always be the case; in the Avahan transition 
experience, the Government of India was willing to continue supporting KP programs after 
support from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation ended support (25). However, KP 
programming should always be handled with caution in transition (75). 
 Finally, in opting for cautious optimism, I am making assumptions about the potential 
benefits of transition and setting them against the possible harms. These potential benefits 
include increased national ownership and coordination of the HIV response, and, possibly, 
efficiencies from horizontal integration of health services. These effects, in turn, can lead to a 
virtuous sociopolitical cycle:  when tax-financed systems, not donors, are recognized as the 
source of health services, citizens advocate for greater domestic resource mobilization and better 
management of health funds. The parent study for this project was not designed to capture these 
benefits, which will only accrue over the long-term. However, the dividends from transition can 
and should be assessed empirically. If they do not emerge, the pain of transition, temporary or 
not, will not have offsetting merits for LMICs. Therefore, a considerable amount of additional 




Chapter 6. Annex 
6.1 Annex for Introduction 
 
6.1.1 Search Terms for Review of Conceptual Frameworks 
 
I performed a non-systematic review of the literature to identify studies containing 
conceptual frameworks of indirect health system effects from all vertical health programs, of 
which HIV programs are a large component. The search combined three sets of controlled 
terminology and keywords:  1.) terms related to “conceptual frameworks”, 2.) “health systems” 
terms, and 3.) terms identifying low and middle income countries. Due to the large number of 
potential terms related to vertical programs, including HIV programs, identification of relevant 
articles was performed during the title/abstract screening phase. 
The search was initially designed for PubMed and repeated in Embase using adapted 
controlled terminology, as well as in Scopus and Africa-wide Information, using keyword 
searches. Across the four databases, the search resulted in 2,933 citations. Five articles were 
identified through review of the PHRplus database (http://www.phrplus.org/pubs_new.html), a 
search of the gray literature, and through consultation with subject matter experts (S. Bennett & 
D. Rodríguez). After de-duplication, a total 2,579 citations remained. Titles and abstracts of 
citations were reviewed for evidence that the studies contain a conceptual model on the indirect 
impacts of HIV programs on health systems. Full text was reviewed for 38 articles, and seven 
studies (52, 76-81) were deemed relevant. 
6.1.2 Sample Size Calculation 
 
The number of primary sampling units and facilities was chosen as a result of 1,000 Monte 
Carlo simulations. In each simulation, I applied hypothetical scenarios to the facility list in 
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Uganda. I created the clusters from districts, lumping and splitting districts to obtain 8-19 
facilities per cluster. I sampled these clusters and applied random binary data using various 
assumptions about the proportion of facilities to change their responses during transition. I used a 
randomization process to produce responses for facilities that induced an average intra-class 
correlation coefficient (ICC) of approximately 0.30 at the district level across simulations. This 
would correspond to localized variation in response to transition that would occur if district 
health offices undertook to support transitioned facilities, but not in all districts. 
Initially, the sample size calculation was designed for a two-wave survey of transition 
facilities only. I sought to have 80% power to detect a shift in responses among the transition 
facilities of 30% of sampled facilities with a 4:1 ratio of Yes-to-No compared to No-to-Yes (or 
vice-versa) changes at a 5% Type-I error level using McNemar’s test. This required a minimum 
sample size of 135 facilities.  
Later, the survey design was changed from two-wave to retrospective recall, and we 
included a maintenance facility comparison group. I sought to achieve a 2:1 ratio of CS to 
maintenance facilities to allow for comparisons within transition facilities as well as between 
maintenance facilities and transition facilities. This required adding another 68 facilities to the 





Table 41:  Power Simulation Results 
Overall Power  Rate Using Cluster-based Sampling 
Mean N 
Facilities 
20% Shift 30% Shift 40% Shift 
Ratio = 4 Ratio = 9 Ratio = 4 Ratio = 9 Ratio = 3 Ratio = 9 
α=0.01 α=0.05 α=0.01 α=0.05 α=0.01 α=0.05 α=0.01 α=0.05 α=0.01 α=0.05 α=0.01 α=0.05 
67.7 0.218 0.295 0.311 0.437 0.196 0.350 0.255 0.466 0.196 0.319 0.297 0.52 
89.6 0.143 0.472 0.25 0.669 0.155 0.459 0.300 0.703 0.103 0.336 0.414 0.811 
111.8 0.328 0.673 0.603 0.882 0.293 0.638 0.625 0.919 0.192 0.496 0.746 0.982 
134.4 0.528 0.825 0.819 0.977 0.475 0.81 0.851 0.982 0.294 0.664 0.909 1 
156.4 0.686 0.93 0.946 0.999 0.676 0.925 0.974 1 0.495 0.82 0.997 1 
178.8 0.872 0.981 0.997 1 0.866 0.986 0.999 1 0.714 0.957 1 1 
 
Ultimately, the survey team limited the sample to Northern and Eastern Uganda as well as 
Kampala & Wakiso. Limiting the sampling area reduced travel costs, and resources were 
adequate for a larger target sample size of 250. However, the reduced sample frame resulted in a 
very different survey design. Furthermore, many assumptions made in the power simulation were 
not borne out in the data. First, we identified far fewer maintenance facilities than we expected in 
our sample (20 vs. 70-80). Secondly, 14% of facilities reported no recent PEPFAR support and 
were excluded. Therefore, the power simulation is presented to explain the initial considerations 
for sample size, not to indicate the power in our resulting sample. 
6.2 Annex:  Paper 1 
 
6.2.1 Equation 1: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑍𝑗 , 𝑢𝑗) = 𝑢𝑗 + 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 × 𝐿𝑗 + 𝛽2 × 𝑅𝑗 + 𝛽3 × 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽4 × 𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽5 × 𝑃𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽6 × 𝑃𝑡 ×






In Equation 1, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, represents the staffing ratio for facility of type, indexed by i, at time t. 
The random intercept for each facility, 𝑢𝑗 , is indexed by j, the facility identifier. The random 
intercepts are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. There is an overall intercept, 
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𝛽0, that represents baseline staffing levels in the maintenance group reference categories for 
region and level. I include a fixed effect for level, L, and region, R, to improve the fit of the 
model. The coefficient 𝛽3 represents the baseline difference in staffing levels for transition 
facilities and 𝛽4 represents the change in staffing levels for maintenance facilities. The 
difference-in-difference is represented by the interaction term coefficient, 𝛽5. Additional 
interaction terms for level x post, 𝑃𝑡 × 𝐿𝑗, and region x post, 𝑃𝑡 × 𝑅𝑗 , address confounding by 




6.2.2 Paper 1 – Additional Tables & Figures 
 
Table 42:  Facility Survey Descriptive Statistics (Weighted Proportions) 
 Transition 
(N = 206) 
Maintenance 
(N = 20) 
Level % % 
HC II, Clinic 32.4% 37.7% 
HC III 57.7% 27.7% 
HC IV 6.2% 5.2% 
Hospital 3.7% 19.4% 
Owner   




Private for-Profit 23.9% 3.1% 
Services   
Offers ART  62.8% 72.6% 
Offers Deliveries 80.2% 75.7% 
District   
Central Support 21.7% 29.4% 
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Random Sample of 







N facilities 226 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 




















































































































6.3 Annex:  Paper 2 
 
6.3.1 Rationale for Indicators 
 
HIV testing remains a key component of Uganda’s HIV Cascade as 19% of PLHIV do not 
know their status in 2017 (115) compared to the 90-90-90 goals of having 90% of PLHIV know 
their status (5). Under “test-and-treat”, which has been implemented across Uganda, expansion 
of current on ART is expected and necessary to reach the second goal of having 81% of PLHIV 
on treatment. Retention on treatment — preferably low-cost, first-line treatment — is a necessary 
condition for the third 90 goal, 72% of PLHIV virally suppressed. A 12-month cohort period was 
chosen as it is more responsive than a longer period while being more sensitive to quality of care 
than a 6-month cohort retention indicator. 
Outpatient department visits (OPD) is a catchall indicator that is sensitive both to demand 
(illness, health seeking behavior) and supply-side factors (staff shortages, delays in care). It 
includes both HIV care visits, MNCH care, and unrelated non-HIV care (e.g. injuries). 
Therefore, OPD is a non-specific metric for health facility performance. In Uganda, OPD has the 
disadvantage of being highly seasonal, as it responds to seasonal shifts in malaria incidence. 
However, it is a commonly used metric of other studies of the effect of HIV programs on health 
systems in Uganda (67, 68). 
Coverage of 4+ ANC visits was selected as a measure of ANC quality. ANC visits serve as 
a platform for important interventions — including HIV testing and intermittent prophylaxis 
treatment (IPT) — that have direct impacts on maternal, fetal, and child health. In Uganda, 
nearly all women obtain ANC during pregnancy, but fewer complete the recommended four or 
more visits. Most seek ANC from a nearby public or private provider (116). Therefore, ANC1 is 
a good proxy for pregnant women in the catchment area of the facility. The ratio ANC4+/ANC1 
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is a proxy for the proportion of pregnant women who complete ANC at the same facility. 
However, pregnant women may be referred to another facility, especially if they are HIV+ and 
the facility does not provide PMTCT. Also, women do not generally receive their fourth and first 
ANC visits in the same month. Therefore, dividing the count of ANC4+ by the number of ANC1 
visits in the same month is only a rough estimate even when averaging over many facilities. 
Malaria is endemic or epidemic in all areas of Uganda (140), and two-doses of intermittent 
prophylactic treatment during pregnancy (IPTp) for malaria are recommended for reduction of 
maternal mortality and morbidity associated with infection during pregnancy. The standard drug 
for IPTp is Sulfadoxine-Pyrimethamine (Fansidar), which can only be administered after the first 
trimester. Delivery of IPTp can be interrupted by not attending ANC, by having a stock-out of 
SP, by health workers not dispensing IPTp during the ANC visit, or by patients not consuming 
IPTp. Therefore, IPT2/ANC1 is a metric of the quality of ANC care that differs somewhat from 
ANC4+/ANC1. 
Skilled birth attendance (SBA) is a major health goal in Uganda and throughout LMICs. 
The 5th Millennium Development Goal, which sought to reduce maternal mortality by 75%, was 
directly tied to increasing SBA (141). In Uganda, facility deliveries are the primary platform for 
SBA. Therefore, I have included facility deliveries as a non-HIV indicator. However, as women 
may deliver at a facility other than the one in which they receive ANC, the ratio of facility 
deliveries to ANC1 would not proxy coverage of facility delivery among pregnant women, and 
we did not include it as an indicator. 
Lastly, as a postnatal and child health metric, I have included the number of Diphtheria-
Pertussis-Tetanus (DPT) or pentavalent (Diphtheria-Pertussis-Tetanus, HiB, Hepatitis B) 3rd 
doses received. Moreover, several previous studies of the effects of HIV programs on non-HIV 
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health care have included immunization as an outcome (57, 58, 67). Uganda adopted pentavalent 
immunization in 2002 (142), but adapted its reporting forms to include only pentavalent in July 
2015. Therefore, I include immunization with either DPT or pentavalent 3rd dose. Since three 
doses must be administered within the first year, usually in a health facility, DPT3/penta3 
indicates a sustained relationship between mothers and facilities in the postnatal period and a 
regular supply of vaccine. Oral polio vaccine and measles, mumps, & rubella (MMR) vaccines 
are provided outside of health facilities through specialized immunization events. Therefore, 
their provision might not reflect health facility capacity. Furthermore, as women do not 
necessarily seek ANC and immunizations for their infants from the same facilities, we cannot 
estimate immunization rates at the level of the facility using ANC as a denominator. 
In addition to the outcomes presented in Table 17, I sought to calculate data related to 
Early Infant Diagnosis (EID), which is a measure of PMTCT success or early identification. 
However, the rarity of reporting on EID and the substantial lag between reporting of births of 
exposed infants and follow-up testing, hinder easy interpretation. Two outcomes related to 
quality of antenatal care (ANC), syphilis & HIV testing in ANC, could not be obtained from 
Uganda’s reporting forms. 
 
6.3.2 DHIS2 Model Specification: 
 
Basic Count Trend Model: 
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑍𝑗, 𝑢𝑗 , 𝑡)) = 𝑢𝑗 + 𝛽0+𝛽𝐿 × 𝐿𝑗 + 𝛽𝑂 × 𝑂𝑗 + 𝛽1 × 𝑡 + 𝛽2 × 𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖 +  𝛽3 × 𝑃𝑡 ×
(𝑡 − 𝑡0) + 𝛽4 × 𝑃𝑡 × (𝑡 − 𝑡0) × 𝑇𝑖 (Eq. 1) 
 Where,  
 𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝜁𝑗~𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑜𝑛(𝜁𝑖𝑗) 






Equation 1 presents the negative binomial random intercept trend model used for count 
data.  The outcome, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, is a count of services or events, where 𝑖 denotes group membership 
(0=maintenance, 1=transition), and 𝑡 is a time unit index (months or quarters). Each facility, 
denoted by j has a random intercept 𝑢𝑗 , and fixed covariates for level, 𝐿𝑗, and ownership, 𝑂𝑗. The 
purpose of the fixed characteristics is to improve the validity of the assumption of normally 
distributed random intercepts by accounting for major systematic differences in utilization by 
facilities due to level and ownership. The dummies 𝑃𝑡 and 𝑇𝑖, represent post-transition and 
transition facility, respectively. There are terms for the maintenance pre-transition trend, 𝛽1, the 
difference in slope for transition facilities prior to transition, 𝛽2, a change in slope for 
maintenance facilities, 𝛽3,  following the transition midpoint, 𝑡0, and a difference-in-difference 
in trend, 𝛽4. I infer the transition impact from the statistical evaluation of the difference-in-
difference in trend. The random intercepts are modeled as normally distributed. Since 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is 
modeled as negative binomial, it is distributed as a Poisson with a random rate, 𝜁𝑗 , that is a draw 
from a gamma-distribution for each facility. In the sensitivity analysis, I vary the transition 
midpoint, 𝑡0, and also replace the assumption of negative binomial distribution in calculation of 
standard errors and derive a confidence interval using a bootstrap method.  
 
Basic Proportions Model: 
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖𝑡|𝑍𝑗 , 𝑢𝑗) = 𝑢𝑗 + β0+βL × Lj + βO × Oj + 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 × 𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽3 × 𝑃𝑡 + 𝛽4 × 𝑃𝑡 × 𝑇𝑖 






 Equation 2 presents a difference-in-difference model for proportion outcomes, 𝑦𝑖𝑡, that 
are presumed to be normally distributed. The primary difference in these models compared to the 
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count models are that the coefficients 𝛽1, … , 𝛽4 represent relative differences in proportions 
rather than relative slopes in the trend line. For example, 𝛽1, represents the level for maintenance 
in the pre period, 𝛽2 the difference for transition, 𝛽3 , the difference for maintenance post vs. pre-
transition, and 𝛽4 the difference-in-difference. In the sensitivity analysis, I vary the pre and post 
periods around a “transition window.” I also replace the assumption of normally-distributed 
outcomes using a bootstrap to generate an empirical confidence interval. 
 
6.3.3 DHIS2 Data Cleaning: 
 
I excluded observations that were multiple times higher than the facility-specific average 
value. For example, for HTC, I excluded values that were greater than 10 times the mean for any 
facility that had a minimum of 20 tests per month on average (Table 44) I deemed counts smaller 
than the minimum to be too variable to use this method, and unlikely to contribute substantially 
to errors. I also checked the largest 1-5% of cases to look for improbably high values given the 
facility size. For HTC, I removed any values from analysis with more than 10,000 reported HTC 
in a month, which exceeds the level of even the most active facilities. Less than 0.1% of cases 
were excluded for most indicators; however, for cohort retention in Uganda I excluded 11.4% of 
cases for quality issues. Changes to Uganda’s reporting forms in July 2015 meant that cohort 
retention went from being reported as a numerator and denominator to reporting a quotient as a 
percentage, which resulted in data quality issues. Any record with <1% or >100% cohort 





Table 44:  Key Parameters and Results of Data Cleaning - DHIS2 
Indicator Cutoff 
(x Mean) 
Minimum N Obs.  
Flagged 







10, 15 50, 30 40 48,984 0.08% 
IPT2 10 0 5 19,651 0.03% 
ANC Total 8 20 7 49,192 0.01% 
ANC4 5 100 9 19,717 0.05% 
Facility 
Delivery 
10 5 13 46,144 0.03% 
HTC 10 20 29 49,187 0.06% 




5,4 5 4 7,858 0.05% 
New on ART 5 5 19 7,591 0.25% 
Cohort 
Retention 






6.3.4 DHIS2 Full Model Results:  Full Sample (ITT) 
 
Table 45:  Full DHIS2 Base Models (Count Indicators, Trend Analysis) 
 HIV Indicators Non-HIV Indicators 
 HTC New on ART Current on 
ART 
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N facilities 989 482 482 989 989 926 989 
N obs. 49,187 7,591 7,858 48,984 49,192 46,144 49,195 




















Level    
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Seasonality    











































































N facilities 465 938 939 
N observations 2,277 19,717 19,651 
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6.3.5 Sensitivity Analysis Tables:  Effect Measure Modification 
 
Table 47:  Effect Measure Modification by Region (Trend Analysis) 
Indicator Diff-in-
Diff: 
All Central Eastern Northern Western 
HTC IRR 1.031*** 1.003 1.003 1.040** 1.038 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(1.016, 1.047) (0.972, 1.035) (0.978, 1.029) (1.016, 1.066) (0.995, 1.083) 
p-value <0.001 0.857 0.819 0.001 0.080 
New on 
ART 
IRR 1.064* 0.976 0.975 1.117** 1.149* 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(1.013,1.116] (0.893, 1.066) (0.927, 1.025) (1.028, 1.215) (1.016, 1.298) 
p-value 0.012 0.586 0.318 0.009 0.027 
Current on 
ART 
IRR 1.012 1.008 1.000 1.033 1.000 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
[0.976,1.050] (0.959, 1.060) (0.954, 1.049) (0.973, 1.098) (0.929, 1.076) 
p-value 0.518 0.754 0.984 0.286 0.995 
OPD IRR 1.001 0.990 0.998 1.004 0.994 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.995, 1.006) (0.974, 1.007) (0.988, 1.009) (0.995, 1.014) (0.984, 1.004) 
p-value 0.843 0.243 0.767 0.375 0.258 
Total ANC 
Visits 
IRR 1.008 1.005 1.002 1.004 1.022 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.999, 1.016) (0.987, 1.023) (0.989, 1.015) (0.990, 1.019) (0.997, 1.047) 
p-value 0.072 0.624 0.764 0.556 0.079 
Facility 
Delivery 
IRR 1.008 1.018 1.011 1.007 1.002 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.997, 1.018) (0.993, 1.043) (0.995, 1.028) (0.991, 1.022) (0.966, 1.040) 
p-value 0.121 0.152 0.175 0.392 0.901 
DPT3 # IRR 1.002 1.008 0.995 1.001 1.008 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.995, 1.009) (0.992, 1.024) (0.981, 1.009) (0.990, 1.012) (0.995, 1.021) 
p-value 0.496 0.339 0.482 0.885 0.237 
# Restricted to facilities with a mean of >5 immunizations per month to improve convergence 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
Table 48:  Effect Measure Modification by Region (D-in-D Analysis) 
Indicator D-in-D Preferred 
Model 
Central Eastern Northern Western 
ANC4+ 
Coverage 
IRR -0.043* -0.072 -0.016 0.015 -0.054 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.082, -0.004) (-0.170, 0.026) (-0.077, 0.045) (-0.045, 0.074) (-0.158, 0.050) 
p-value 0.031 0.151 0.612 0.622 0.310 
IPT2 
Coverage 
IRR -0.008 0.002 0.008 -0.019 0.001 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.025, 0.008) (-0.030, 0.035) (-0.024, 0.041) (-0.045, 0.006) (-0.039, 0.040) 
p-value 0.302 0.894 0.612 0.142 0.975 
Cohort 
Retention 
IRR -0.043 -0.112* -0.073 0.011 -0.175* 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.096, 0.012) (-0.218, -0.006) (-0.151, 0.006) (-0.065, 0.087) (-0.347, -0.004) 
p-value 0.132 0.039 0.069 0.776 0.045 










Table 49:  Effect Measure Modification by Facility Level (Trend Analysis) 
Indicator Diff-in-Diff: All HC II HC III HC IV & 
Hospital 
HTC IRR 1.031*** 1.016 1.016 0.982 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(1.016, 1.047) (0.981, 1.053) (0.999, 1.034) (0.942, 1.025) 
p-value <0.001 0.375 0.065 0.413 
N 989 470 428 91 
Current on 
ART 
IRR 1.009 Excluded 1.009 1.003 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.989, 1.029) (0.968, 1.052) 
(0.939, 1.070) 
p-value 0.379 0.671 0.939 
N 482 360 86 
New on 
ART 
IRR 1.062* Excluded 1.080** 0.993 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(1.031, 1.094) (1.019, 1.145) 
(0.914, 1.078) 
p-value <0.001 0.009 0.859 
N 482 360 86 
OPD IRR 1.001 1.002 1.008 1.017 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.995, 1.006) (0.990, 1.014) (0.998, 1.018) (0.995, 1.039) 
p-value 0.843 0.707 0.107 0.134 
N 989 470 428 91 
Total ANC 
Visits # 
IRR 1.008 1.004 1.007 1.018 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.999, 1.016) (0.984, 1.025) (0.997, 1.017) (0.999, 1.038) 
p-value 0.072 0.703 0.196 0.066 
N 962 470 428 91 
Facility 
Delivery 
IRR 1.008 1.008 1.007 0.999 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.997, 1.018) (0.976, 1.041) (0.995, 1.019) (0.982, 1.016) 
p-value 0.121 0.630 0.229 0.881 
N 926 415 420 91 
DPT3 IRR 1.002 1.010 1.006 1.005 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.995, 1.008) (0.997, 1.023) (0.995,1.017) (0.985, 1.025) 
p-value 0.627 0.116 0.262 0.618 
N 989 446 423 90 



















Table 50:  Effect Measure Modification by Level for (D-in-D Analysis) 




IRR -0.043* -0.095* 0.003 -0.005 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.082, -0.004) (-0.181, -0.009) (-0.054, 0.059) (-0.073, 0.064) 
p-value 0.031 0.030 0.926 0.889 
N 938 425 422 91 
IPT2 
Coverage 
IRR -0.008 -0.026 0.009 -0.005 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.025, 0.008) (-0.060, 0.009) (-0.012, 0.030) (-0.041, 0.031) 
p-value 0.302 0.142 0.406 0.775 
N1 939 425 422 91 
Cohort 
Retention 
IRR -0.043 Excluded -0.032 -0.086 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.096, 0.012) (-0.088, 0.025) (-0.235, 0.063) 
p-value 0.132 0.270 0.258 
N 465 354 84 
1N may not sum across categories due to missing information on facility level for a small number of facilities. 









































Table 51:  Effect Measure Modification by Ownership (Trend Analysis) 
Indicator D-in-D All Public PNFP PFP 
HTC IRR 1.031*** 1.027** 1.031* 1.007 
Robust  
95% C.I. (1.016, 1.047) (1.008, 1.046) (1.000, 1.063) (0.931, 1.088) 
p-value <0.001 0.005 0.048 0.869 
N 989 734 188 67 
Current on 
ART 




(0.989, 1.029) (0.980, 1.066) (0.905, 1.020) 
p-value 0.379 0.315 0.190 
N 482 400 79 




(1.031, 1.094) (1.024, 1.142) (0.885, 1.058) 
p-value <0.001 0.005 0.467 
N 482 400 79 
OPD IRR 1.001 0.998 1.006 0.998 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.995, 1.006) (0.992, 1.004) (0.989, 1.023) (0.918, 1.084) 
p-value 0.843 0.465 0.519 0.957 
N 989 734 188 67 
Total ANC 
Visits 
IRR 1.008 1.004 1.002 0.995 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.999, 1.016) (0.996, 1.012) (0.983, 1.021) (0.870, 1.139) 
p-value 0.072 0.349 0.875 0.945 
N 989 734 188 67 
Facility 
Delivery 
IRR 1.008 1.007 0.994 1.016 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(0.997, 1.018) (0.996, 1.018) (0.974, 1.015) (0.936, 1.104) 
p-value 0.121 0.201 0.576 0.701 
N 926 687 181 58 




(0.995, 1.008) (1.000, 1.014) (0.977, 1.009) 
p-value 0.627 0.063 0.397 
N 990 719 180 
N/A – Not Applicable 
^ Model could not be fit 




Table 52:  Effect Measure Modification by Ownership (D-in-D Analysis) 
Indicator D-in-D: All Public PNFP PFP 
ANC4+ 
Coverage 
Est. -0.043* -0.027 -0.047 -0.201 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.082, -0.004) (-0.066, 0.012) (-0.164, 0.069) (-0.424, 0.022) 
p-value 0.031 0.177 0.427 0.077 
N 938 708 175 55 
IPT2 
Coverage 
Est. -0.008 -0.019* 0.029 0.016 
Robust  
95% C.I. 
(-0.025, 0.008) (-0.036, -0.001) (-0.012, 0.071) (-0.071, 0.103) 
p-value 0.302 0.035 0.169 0.716 
N 939 709 178 52 
Cohort 
Retention 




(-0.096, 0.012) (-0.105, 0.016) (-0.147, 0.092) 
p-value 0.132 0.149 0.649 
N 465 389 76 




6.3.6 Full Table for Cohort Retention (Full ITT Sample & Survey-only Sample) 
 
Table 53:  Models for Cohort Retention (Full & Facility Survey Sample) 
Cohort 
Retention 
Full Sample Survey Sample 










Level    




 (0, 0.202) 
0.050 
0.101 
 (-0.028, 0.23) 
0.126 




 (-0.092, 0.13) 
0.739 
0.019 
 (-0.117, 0.155) 
0.784 




 (0.002, 0.234) 
0.047 
0.118 
 (-0.028, 0.264) 
0.114 
Owner    




 (0.024, 0.138) 
0.005 
0.081* 








 (-0.037, 0.178) 
0.198 
0.071 
 (-0.049, 0.19) 
0.245 




 (-0.139, 0.066) 
0.481 
-0.037 
 (-0.148, 0.075) 
0.518 




 (-0.214, 0.006) 
0.063 
-0.104 









 (0.534, 0.825) 
<0.001 
N Obs 5,529 636 636 
N Facilties 465 133 133 
N Transition 116 123 123 
N Maintenance 349 10 10 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001  
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6.4 Annex:  Paper 3 
 
6.4.1 Data Cleaning 
 
In July 2015, Uganda changed its system for HIV cohort data from reporting a numerator 
and denominator separately to reporting a quotient out of 100 (e.g. 88%). Some facilities 
switched before and some later than the official date, and the result was that some facilities had 
retention <1%. Other facilities report more than 100% retention, likely due to tabulation errors. I 
have flagged any reports that have <1% or >100% cohort retention. I report the proportion of 




6.4.2 Paper 3 – Additional Tables & Figures 
 
Table 54:  Weighted, Unadjusted Proportion of Public, PNFP, and PFP Facilities Reporting 
Selected Outcomes (Facility Survey) 
 
 Weighted Proportion Reporting Outcome 
% (95% C.I.) 



































Workers Report Less 
Time on HIV Services 
33.8% 






(42.7,  74.4) 
<0.001 
Workers Report Less 
Time on Non-HIV 
Services 
13.5% 






(11.7,  34.3) 
0.155 
Workers Report Less 






















In-charge Reports Less 
Time on HIV and More 










Increased Disruption of 






 omitted  












In-charge Reports Loss 







   
In-charge Reports HIV 















Table 55:  Non-significant Findings for Facility Survey Outcomes 
Hypothesis 
Type 
Pre-Specified Pre-Specified Pre-Specified Pre-Specified 








Time on HIV and 
More Time on 
MNCH 
Increased 
Disruption of Viral 
Load Testing 
Annualized HIV 















     
Ownership:     





















Level:       














IV/Hospital vs. HC 
II/HC III 












































Number of HIV 




















































N 206 191 151 206 
Notes:  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.  
1The level HC IV/Hospital is a perfect predictor of not having IP involvement following transition. Therefore, I removed level 
from the analysis rather than lose the cases.  










Table 56:  Sensitivity Analysis for HTC in PFPs 
 Preferred 
Model 




































































Level:   
HC IV & 
Hospital 

























N obs.: 10,319 10,343 13,421 8,657 
N facilities:   454 454 454 454 
Public 400 400 400 400 
PFP 54 54 54 54 


















(July 2015 – 
Mar 2017) 








































Level:   
HC IV & Hospital 



















N obs.: 11,902 11,919 15,424 
N facilities:   513 513 513 
Public 396 396 396 
PNFP 117 117 117 
















(April 2015 - Dec 
2016) 
 Robust S.E. Robust S.E. Robust S.E. 
 All All All 
 Prop. 
 (95% C.I.) 
p-value 
Prop. 
 (95% C.I.) 
p-value 
Prop. 
 (95% C.I.) 
p-value 
Level    
HC II & III vs. HC 































D-in-D    


















N obs.: 465 392 628 
N facilities:   117 114 123 
Public 97 96 102 
PNFP 20 18 21 
Notes:  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.   
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